‘I led then, and I will lead now’: US Defense Secretary hopeful sets out impassioned vision for the future

As a political firebrand and prominent Republican, Pete Hegseth was always going to be a contentious pick, particularly given his time as a television host with Fox News, author and former military officer. He is best known for his role as a co-host of Fox & Friends Weekend on Fox News, where he shares his views on political and social issues, often advocating for conservative values.

Prior to his selection by President Trump, Hegseth, born in Minneapolis, Minnesota, served with the US Army National Guard, deploying to the Middle East, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and completed a Princeton University degree in political science and a master’s in public policy from the Harvard University’s John F Kennedy School of Public Policy to round out his career.

During his time in uniform, he earned several military honours, including the Bronze Star, the Combat Infantryman Badge and the Meritorious Service Medal, recognising his leadership and contributions in combat.

His military career was a formative part of his identity, and he has often spoken about his experiences in service, including playing a formative role in his understanding of US foreign and national security policy and the interplay on the global stage, particularly when partnered with the use of US military power.

VIEW ALL

In addition to his work on television, Hegseth is the author of In the Arena: Good Citizens, a Great Republic, and How One Speech Can Change the World, which explores American politics and the importance of civic engagement. While Hegseth’s views are often focused on issues related to national security, veterans and American values, he remains an influential voice in conservative media.

To this point, during his opening statement, Hegseth said, “Two months ago, 77 million Americans gave President Trump a powerful mandate for change. To put America First – at home and abroad. I want to thank President Trump for his faith in me, and his selfless leadership of our great republic. The troops could have no better commander-in-chief than Donald Trump.”

It is these factors, coupled with his strident support of President-elect Trump that have set the scene for a truly monumental showdown during his confirmation hearing, but also provides valuable insights into how the man who would be the next Secretary of Defense not only views the world, but conceptualises the role of the US and its military in it and the implications for key allies, including Australia.

As part of his opening statement to the gathered senators, Hegseth outlined what he saw as his three key priorities should his confirmation be approved, summarised as:

1. Restore the warrior ethos – addressing the challenges of recruitment, retention and readiness, with an added focus on what he described as focusing on the “strength of our military lies in our unity and shared purpose, not our differences”.

2. Rebuild the military – aligning threats with capabilities by revitalising the American defence industrial base, reforming the acquisition process (eliminating the “Valley of Death” for new defence companies), modernising America’s nuclear triad, ensuring the Pentagon passes an audit and swiftly deploying emerging technologies.

3. Re-establishing deterrence – with an emphasis on defending the US homeland and a strong focus on partners and allies to “deter aggression in the Indo-Pacific” from what the United States has increasingly described as its “pacing threat” and reinforcing President-elect Trump’s focus on limiting America’s involvement in “forever, foreign wars” to prioritising the nation’s resources to focus on “larger threats”, shifting away from what he described as “reputational deterrence” towards “real deterrence”.

Expanding on these points, Hegseth said, “If confirmed, I would work to ensure first that investments in these three categories are focused on warfighting to enhance the credibility of our deterrent. We should be prioritising resource allocation against the most significant threats and particularly directed towards the department’s plans to deal with those threats.”

As a well-documented disruptor, Hegseth did fire a warning shot, reinforcing comments made by the incoming President, saying, “as President Trump also told me, we’ve repeatedly placed people atop the Pentagon with supposedly ‘the right credentials’ – whether they are retired generals, academics, or defence contractor executives – and where has it gotten us? He believes, and I humbly agree, that it’s time to give someone with dust on his boots the helm. A change agent.”

A key component of his attraction for the Trump camp comes as a result of Hegseth’s time in uniform and on deployment, as well as his priority for both serving personnel and the American veteran community, something Hegseth was at great pains to point out, saying, “My only special interest is – the warfighter. Deterring wars, and if called upon, winning wars – by ensuring our warriors never enter a fair fight. We let them win and then bring them home.

He added, “Like many of my generation, I’ve been there. I’ve led troops in combat … been on patrol for days … pulled a trigger downrange … heard bullets whiz by … flex-cuffed insurgents … called in close air support … led medevacs … dodged IEDs … pulled out dead bodies … and knelt before a battlefield cross … this is not academic for me; this is my life. I led then, and I will lead now.”

All of this rhetoric has interesting and major implications on America’s position in the world, the increasing rate of economic, political and strategic competition between it and the People’s Republic of China and, by extension, the broader post-Second World War order, well worth further consideration and analysis, particularly as he sets about to fundamentally reshape, reprioritise and enhance the accountability of the Pentagon.

China, Russia and ‘global burden sharing’

Given the increasing emphasis on Beijing and its continued rise as the “pacing threat” for the US, Hegseth’s testimony in response to robust grilling from both sides of the political aisle, clearly spelt out priorities, particularly in the Indo-Pacific and a strong emphasis on ensuring allies and partners are capable of carrying their own water.

Hegseth articulated these key points, saying, “The 2018 NDS and 2022 NDS have each identified China as the Department of Defense’s pacing threat. I share this assessment and further believe that a Chinese Communist Party fait accompli invasion of Taiwan is the department’s pacing risk scenario ... To counter this threat, it’s critical that we establish a denial defence in the western Pacific – resourced with the relevant forces postured forward – while strengthening global burden sharing and greatly increasing investment in our defence industrial base to credibly support such a strategy.”

This approach also recognises the growing comprehensive strategic partnership between Beijing and Moscow, which is rapidly accelerating on both the economic, political and strategic fronts, posing a major challenge for the United States and its allies, but particularly Washington as it finds itself increasingly having to prioritise limited resources across the global commons, thus effectively limiting its capacity to respond to credible peer competitors.

Hegseth stated, “Even constrained by the international sanctions regime that has been in place since 2014 and was strengthened during President Trump’s first administration, Russia has been able to maintain and field capable military forces, to deliver strategic capabilities and to increase production of key platforms and materiel. Russia has substantially built up its nuclear arsenal which poses a threat to US homeland and tactical nuclear arsenal threatening its neighbors in Europe and Asia. Russia’s cyber and information operations, undersea warfare and ambitions in space and the Arctic are particularly acute.”

With this threat posed reinforced by the heightened level of collaboration between Russia, China, Iran and North Korea adding further scope for concern, something Hegseth was at pains to detail saying, “Recent actions taken by China, Russia, Iran and North Korea in Ukraine and elsewhere suggest a cooperative approach to undermine US influence and its alliances around the world.”

Securing the ‘ultimate high ground’ and the cyber domain

Given the growing importance of the space domain for national security, first cab off the rank, was in fact the newest of the US Armed Services branches, the Space Force, which has becoming increasingly important in recent years given the rapid proliferation of advanced peer and near-peer anti-space capabilities, as well as kinetic and non-kinetic space denial technologies which threaten both the US and allies access to space and critical, enabling space-based infrastructure.

While Hegseth was quick to reaffirm America’s commitment to ensuring the peaceful and unmolested access to space for the global community, however, he did stress, “I will direct that the new NDS ensures that space is safe for our civil, commercial and international partners to operate as part of a broader American push into space, in addition to providing critical capabilities to the Joint Force.”

Adding to this, he added, “Winning the competition in space and establishing space superiority is critical for continuing the American way of life through the 21st century. Great power competitors are making notable strides in their respective space capabilities which are designed to deny our freedom of action and potentially to establish their own space superiority, to include traditional space missions, offensive and defensive space control capabilities, enabling capabilities and end-user service.”

Building on his emphasis on “rebuilding” American deterrence, Hegseth marked a shift in policy and posture for the Space Force, saying, that, “If confirmed, I would support America embracing a balanced space deterrence force structure that includes offensive and defensive space control capabilities.”

This emphasis is coupled with a recognition that America’s traditional defence and aerospace industry has increasingly failed to deliver the capability on time, on budget and to the standard expected of it by the US Armed Forces, paving the way for other disruptors, like Elon Musk’s SpaceX and Jeff Bezos’ Blue Origin to emerge as serious contenders for lucrative Pentagon contracts, something that Hegseth recognises as a key component of rebuilding the broader US defence industrial base.

Identifying this, Hegseth stressed the need for both incumbents and new partners to work together in competitive tension to deliver the desired outcome for the US warfighter, saying, “will work with Congress, the military services (particularly the US Space Force and its National Space and Intelligence Center), relevant IC agencies (eg, ODNI, DIA, CIA, NRO, etc.), and commercial partners to re-examine threats to our space systems and ensure credible deterrence and defence”.

Shifting focus to the cyber domain – an increasingly prominent battleground for state-based and asymmetric security threats targeting sensitive military information and a capacity to damage critical economic, political and strategic infrastructure – Hegseth recognised the growing need for America to sharpen its cyber tool kit and work more collaboratively across government in an effort to “defend forward” and maintain “persistent engagement” against peer and near-peer threats like Russia and China.

Hegseth explained, “I would review the status of the Cyber Mission Force and ensure that the department is postured appropriately, in partnership with DHS and law enforcement, to protect the nation from cyber attacks.

“The PRC poses a broad and pervasive cyber espionage threat. It routinely conducts malicious cyber activity against the United States as well as our allies and partners ... It undertakes cyber intrusion and surveillance efforts against individuals living beyond its borders, including US citizens, whom it considers enemies of the state. Russia remains an acute threat to the United States in cyber space. Russia has undertaken malign influence efforts against the United States that aim to manipulate and undermine confidence in our system."

Going further, Hegseth said, "If confirmed, I will ensure that appropriate resources and policy are committed to cyber space, as it has truly become a warfighting domain. DOD and its broad and deep capabilities in cyber space require continued investment and coordination with the myriad of USG partners as it defends forward against all nation-state and other cyber threat actors.”

This push to boost a “whole-of-government” response seeks to strengthen the US cyber ecosystem, while also supplementing efforts to counter foreign interference and the undermining of US security without compromising constitutional rights held dear by Americans.

Defence industry, one of the key targets for cyber espionage, didn’t escape criticism, but it wasn’t without its elements of support, with Hegseth saying, “While cyber space operations are the responsibility of a relatively small number of cyber professionals, cyber risk is a challenge that should be shared across the defence enterprise.

“The department pledged to take action to foster a culture of cyber security and cyber awareness. It also stated that it would establish an expectation that senior military and civilian leaders possess a baseline fluency in cyber security issues and committed to developing, funding and implementing technical curricula across various levels of professional military and civilian education, emphasising general officer and senior executive service leadership courses.”

This would be complemented by tighter collaboration and partnerships with the US private sector in an effort to capitalise upon skills existing within the civilian technology sector while also enhancing the opportunity for cross-pollination of technology and skills to enhance the resilience of the whole US cyber workforce, something Hegseth was particularly strong on, saying, “The Cyber Mission Force could benefit greatly from better access to, and assistance from, top technical talent from civilian technology companies. I applaud recent experiments by organisations like the Defense Innovation Unit to develop solutions to facilitate placing such individuals in military reserve status, allowing them to put their technical skills and knowledge to work in support of national security.

“I think we should do a much better job of enlisting the talent and expertise of patriotic Americans working at civilian technology companies to upgrade and enhance our capabilities and skills. If confirmed, I will take a hard look at our nation’s current classified offensive and defensive cyber operations capabilities and will work with Congress on any recommended solutions.”

The ‘original’ three

When it comes to the “original” three branches of the US Armed Forces, the Army, Navy (including Marines) and Air Force, the “traditional” domains of warfighting and deterrence, Hegseth, drawing on his time in uniform and his experience in the “sandbox” will focus on trimming the fat, prioritising finite US resources to ensure that the American warfighter has what they need to defeat any adversary.

Beginning with the Air Force, a branch currently in a host of modernisation and recapitalisation programs, Hegseth was quick to stress the importance of maintaining a “72 fighter aircraft” per year standard to ensure that the US Air Force can maintain its operational mission sets, with the senators raising particular questions about the “correct balance” of fourth and fifth-generation aircraft in the future force.

While Hegseth has remained firm that he is not beholden to any specific contractor, program or platform, his nuanced answer regarding the future force structure of US Air Force’s combat force was particularly important when set against the backdrop of the ongoing troubles with the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program, slated to replace the F-22 Raptor force.

Hegseth stressed, “The Air Force needs a mix of fourth and fifth-generation aircraft balancing advanced capabilities and affordability to increase our fighter inventory, as called for in the 2018 ‘The Air Force We Need’ plan rolled out during President Trump’s first administration ... If confirmed, I will carefully review the findings of the Air Force’s recent analysis of the mission relevance of the NGAD and our overall need to improve the capability and capacity of the Air Force, to develop a balanced and affordable plan to grow the tactical fighter aircraft fleet that is prepared to win the ‘fight tonight’ against a peer adversary.”

The common thread through all of Hegseth’s responses is an overwhelming emphasis on readiness and a capability to “fight tonight” against a peer adversary and win through a qualitative overmatch, or as he terms it, an “unfair advantage”.

However, this isn’t possible without air mobility and integrated command and control structures to provide the US Air Force with much-needed situational awareness and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, alongside aerial refuelling needed to stay on station, or, critically when operating in the Indo-Pacific to get to the target with enough fuel.

Recognising this importance, he detailed, “The service is committed to delivering 183 airplanes by FY2029. If confirmed, I will direct a review of the KC-46 and NGAS programs with a view to establishing a capability roadmap to provide needed capability on time through and beyond the 2029 time frame ... The E-7 ‘Wedgetail’ prototyping effort continues that trajectory with the hope that the relatively mature platform would offer timely capability to augment the rapidly ageing AWACS (Air MTI) and J-STARS (Ground MTI) fleets.”

However, it wasn’t all good news for the E-7 Wedgetail fleet, with Hegseth identifying the growing arm and role of space to fill some of the role provided by the Wedgetail, saying, “Space-based capabilities such as radar and electro-optical sensors can offer an alternative from low-Earth orbit if near continuous target coverage is available on orbit. Recent collaborations between government and the private sector indicate that we will have sufficient proliferation to enable space-based MTI.”

The US Army, much like its Australian counterpart, is itself undergoing a major modernisation and recapitalisation period, replacing often 1980s-era equipment (and sometimes older) with emphasis on combing precision, long-range fires, a next-generation fleet of ground combat vehicles, future vertical lift, air and missile defence capabilities and a host of other lethality enhancements designed to provide an “overmatch” on the battlefield.

Drawing on lessons learned in the Ukraine conflict, Hegseth stated, “Recent events have shown that the cyber realm, autonomy and precision fires, among others, will play key roles in future near-peer conflicts, and the Army modernisation effort is critical to ensuring that our soldiers retain overmatch capabilities in those conflicts.”

However, Hegseth was at great pains to stress that the proliferation of advanced and even simple technologies like commercially available drones was not an Army-specific problem and rather, countering these capabilities was a “whole-of-defence” effort to appropriately defend deployed forces by learning the lessons from Ukraine and the Middle East. He expanded on this, saying, “The conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine have reinforced the need for the department to effectively counter small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS), and that is inherently a joint effort. If confirmed, I will wholeheartedly support the effort to effectively counter sUAS to ensure that the Joint Force has the protection it needs. I will closely examine how the department can best further that mission and counter larger UAS, including any potential reallocation of roles and responsibilities with respect to the JCO.”

Finally, bringing us to the US Navy and Marine Corps, both of which will be front and centre for the US in the Indo-Pacific and form a key part of America’s pushback against the increasingly multipolar and contested global environment.

A central focus is on rebuilding America’s well-documented atrophied shipbuilding capacity, particularly in an effort to expand the US battle fleet to 355 ships by 2038, a comparatively slow delivery time frame at a time when Beijing continues to rapidly expand its surface and submarine fleet with increasingly capable warships and submarines; however, delivering this capability requires a thorough rebuilding of America’s hollowed out industrial base.

This itself has long been a key pillar of President Trump’s brand of politics and is reinforced as a central priority by Hegseth who responded, stating, “As President Trump has warned, the decline of the US industrial base and manufacturing capability is a critical economic challenge, but it is also a severe handicap to maintaining national security, particularly given the urgency to grow the Navy for deterrence in the Pacific...

“Our plan to improve shipbuilding must address the size and modernisation of public and private shipyards, the depleted shipbuilding workforce and the number and quality of suppliers and subcontractors. I will work with the Secretary of the Navy and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment to increase the use of multi-year contracts and reduce requirements creep that can lead to cost and schedule overruns.”

This emphasis is particularly important in light of the growing concerns about the capacity of the US to fulfil its obligations under Pillar 1 of the AUKUS partnership to provide Australia with between three and five Virginia Class nuclear-powered submarines, at a time when US submarine building capacity is, like its British counterpart, at breaking point, trying to build their own submarine fleets, respectively.

Perhaps surprisingly to some, Hegseth, who has long been a critic of the US Navy’s emphasis on over-investing in super carriers at the cost of smaller, more numerous yet still capable aircraft carriers, has remained optimistic for the future of the US Navy’s aviation force – itself the second largest air force in the world – and reinforced the importance of its own modernisation efforts, particularly the introduction of the F-35, modernisation for the Super Hornet fleet and the introduction of a growing number of P-8 Poseidon aircraft.

It is clear from the extensive detail and serious consideration given in each of Hegseth’s answers to the questioning senators that he is well and truly across the detail and, while there is room for improvement, his emphasis and commitment to three, clearly articulated, easily identifiable and quantifiable objectives, he is well placed to fulfil the role of “change agent” to the world’s most powerful military.

However, we have to remember that Rome wasn’t built in a day, and in order to make an omelette, one has to break a few eggs and that if he is truly committed to modernising the processes, the procedure, the doctrine and culture of the US Defense Department, particularly in is acquisition and sustainment space, a lot of fur and feathers will go flying and there will no doubt be some “winners” and “losers” as the second Trump administration sets about to capitalise on its resounding electoral mandate to “Make America Great Again”.