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Opinion: After a long period of relative peace between the major global powers, a war involving Russia broke out involving new technology that offered insight into how future wars might be fought. Sounds familiar?
I am referring to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05. It was the first war fought on a large scale with the new technology of machine guns and rapid firing artillery, which led to bloody and difficult trench warfare – a precursor to how World War I would be fought a decade later.
Next month marks the third anniversary of the start of the war between Russia and Ukraine. As was the case in 1904, it is being fought with new methods, in particular, the widespread use of armed combat drones and precision guided rockets and artillery that no doubt offers insights into how we should prepare for future wars. Insights which Australian defence planners seem studiously unwilling to learn, perhaps best illustrated by the ongoing absence of any Australian military observers in Ukraine due to the failure of the federal government to reopen our embassy in Kyiv for three years.
Perhaps the key insight from this conflict can be gleaned from the very fact that this was a third anniversary. The war, or as Russian President Vladimir Putin originally referred to it, Russia’s “special military operation”, has lasted much longer than he and many others anticipated. Most wars do.
Russia started the war attempting a lightning attack on the Ukrainian capital in order to impose a new government more amenable to Moscow. Such a result was not impossible. Some wars are over quickly and decisively, such as Israel’s victory in the Six-Day War in 1967 or the rapid defeat of Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War, due to superior techniques or the element of surprise. But most wars last longer, much longer, than planners predict, and the new military technology being used in Ukraine made a quick and decisive outcome even less likely.
The maths is simple. The equipment needed to mount an effective offence, like tanks and other armoured fighting vehicles, costs millions of dollars, yet can be destroyed or incapacitated by drones or accurate munitions at a fraction of that cost. The war has bogged down with the front lines now barely moving.
Australia’s defence planners claim we are in the most challenging strategic circumstances since World War II, in large measure because of the heightened risk of conflict in our region with an emergent China, perhaps in the event of an invasion of Taiwan.
It is possible that such a military operation could be over quickly. With either China rapidly defeated by the defenders and their allies, or with the island quickly conquered. But history and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine would suggest this would be an unsafe bet. There is every likelihood that such a conflict would drag on or expand into something much larger and longer.
Yet Australia has made a reckless bet that any future war we are involved in will be a short one.
Australian defence policy for decades has been to maintain a well-trained but small defence force, equipped with a small number of highly capable but complex and expensive platforms acquired from overseas suppliers, with miniscule stockpiles of ordnance. Australia has no ability to replace losses quickly, no ability to resupply our military from our own resources, and no ability to ramp up the scale of our military forces.
The Ukraine war should be the wake-up our defence planners need to readjust pre-existing assumptions and start preparing for how a future war might actually be fought. The Institute of Public Affairs’ (IPA) Defence of Australia research series sets out a blueprint for the next government to turn around the parlous state of our defences. Some of its key recommendations address the fundamental issue of how to better prepare for a protracted conflict.
One recommendation is for the next Australian government to commit, within the next term of Parliament (three years), to deploying a domestically designed and built armed combat drone. The Ukraine war and other conflicts are demonstrating drones are the future. It is also comparatively cheap and easy to produce them. Exquisite equipment like F-35 fighters have their place but we cannot replace them in wartime. But Australia can develop a domestic industrial base for other equipment that is proving highly effective in overseas conflicts.
The Ukraine war highlights the key importance of strong and dependable allies in waging a protracted war. Ukrainian defence relies on the support of Western partners. Although Australia must be more militarily self-reliant, our long-term and very strong alliance with the United States is a key pillar to our national defence. There is much we need to do to improve and strengthen our alliance with the United States, particularly with a new administration in Washington. But one practical proposal is to expand the US Marine Corps rotational presence in northern Australia from the current number of around 2,000 to 16,000 – a full Marine Expeditionary Brigade. This would not only improve cooperation and coordination with our key ally, but in a crisis would offer the quickest way to increase our defence capabilities that money could buy.
Speaking of money, defence is not cheap. There is much waste and inefficiency within our defence budget that should be addressed. But Australia’s defence preparedness is the weakest it has been since the end of World War II. Turning this around will require real defence budget increases. The IPA has called on both sides of politics to increase the Australian defence budget to, at least, 3 per cent of gross domestic product. A peacetime budget of 2 per cent or lower is no longer enough for an island nation that needs to prepare for a potential regional conflict that is likely be protracted.
Of course, nobody wants to fight such a war. But wishful thinking will not prevent it from happening – quite the opposite. The best way to prevent a long war is to deter it from happening, and the best way to do that is to prepare to win it.
John Storey is the director of law and policy at the Institute of Public Affairs and the author of Big Wars – Why do they happen and when will the next one be?
