Can we get serious now? Chinese task group raises serious questions about Australia’s capacity to defend itself

People's Liberation Army Navy Cruiser Lhasa tied up alongside at Qingdao. Source: PLA Navy

The recent revelation that elements of the People’s Liberation Army, Navy, and Air Force, respectively, have been operating in close proximity to Australian forces, and now the mainland, should ring major alarm bells, despite the rhetoric out of government.

The recent revelation that elements of the People’s Liberation Army, Navy, and Air Force, respectively, have been operating in close proximity to Australian forces, and now the mainland, should ring major alarm bells, despite the rhetoric out of government.

It is not hyperbole for me to once again say that on every major metric of national power, relevance and influence, Australia is a nation well and truly in a state of decline, despite the narratives to the contrary.

On the economic front, Australians have stood by (largely without too much push-back) as our nation’s economic and industrial complexity and diversity have steadily collapsed since the mid to late 1990s and early 2000s, becoming dependent on an ever-shrinking pie of productive sectors.

At the per capita level, despite repeated insistence that the good times for the “Lucky Country” will continue to roll, even when there were small “unforeseeable” blips like the COVID-19 pandemic, Australia’s per capita wealth has continued to crumble, only accelerating in recent years.

These measurements of “hard power” in the economic context gives way to the nation’s position in an increasingly competitive, contested multipolar world, characterised by a number of competing great powers and centres of economic, political and strategic mass, a growing number of which are close to home.

But what does all of this have to do with the nation’s defence, I hear some of you ask?

Well, quite a lot, particularly when Australia finds itself facing this competition closer to home, as evidenced by recent provocative actions by the world’s rising superpower, the People’s Republic of China in the South China Sea and, FAR closer to home in the Coral Sea.

With revelations that a Royal Australian Air Force P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol and anti-submarine warfare aircraft was dangerously intercepted and intimidated by a People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) J-16 fighter aircraft, the latest such incident in recent years.

True to form, Australia’s Defence Department issued a moderately worded statement, saying, “For decades, the ADF has undertaken maritime surveillance activities in the region and does so in accordance with international law, exercising the right to freedom of navigation and overflight in international waters and airspace.”

“This was an unsafe and unprofessional manoeuvre that posed a risk to the aircraft and personnel. Australia expects all countries, including China, to operate their militaries in a safe and professional manner,” the Defence statement added.

Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles told ABC News Breakfast host James Glenday, “I certainly am not sanguine about this. And we have observed that the sort of work that we do in the South China Sea but in our broader region is being done with increasing risk. But it’s really important work to do.”

“I mean, why we’re there and the reason our Navy is there as well is to assert the rules-based order, to do freedom of navigation, and to make it clear that freedom of navigation on the high seas remains the way in which the law of the world, and that’s important because we are a trading nation where a greater proportion of our national income is being derived from trade,” the Deputy Prime Minister added.

Bringing us to the revelations that a (comparatively) small People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) surface action group – made up of a Renhai Class (Type 055) guided missile cruiser, a Jiangkai II Class (Type 054A) guided missile frigate and a Fuchi Class (Type 903) replenishment vessel – was operating to the “north-east of Australia” and elements of which had travelled through waters to the “north of Australia”.

The Deputy Prime Minister said, “This is a Chinese navy task group. It comprises of three ships, one a cruiser, another a frigate and then a tanker which supplies oil to or fuel to the ships. The frigate, the smaller of the two service combatants, detached from the rest of the group and traversed across the north of Australia, went through the Torres Strait on Tuesday. It’s rendezvoused with the tanker in Australia’s exclusive economic zone and the cruiser is further to the north.

In response to this, the Deputy Prime Minister, seeking to calm the masses said, “I’ve instructed that Navy and Air Force assets be deployed to make sure that we are watching exactly what the task group is doing. We’ll do that in a manner that is safe and professional. That’s very much our right. And whenever this mission is over, we will assess it to understand exactly what the Chinese were trying to achieve.”

But again, on every metric, if this were a combat scenario, Australia is outclassed by our principle adversary, with NO nearby support from our “great and powerful friend” in the United States. Now, this is not a criticism of the United States by any stretch of the imagination, what it is, is a criticism of the hubristic almost quasi-religious belief that Australia will ALWAYS be able to rely on the strategic cover of the US in our region.

Recognising this uncomfortable reality, we also have to accept one important factor: Australia is hilariously outgunned and continues to double down on platforms and capabilities that will, in aggregate, continue to be outclassed by an increasingly qualitatively and quantitatively superior force, unless we course correct now.

What exactly do I mean?

Well, taking a closer look at the individual components of the small PLAN naval task group now operating in the Coral Sea, the flagship, the Renhai Class guided missile cruiser Zunyi as a single vessel (the PLAN currently has eight active, is building four and is planning an extra four) would require (at least) 2.5 of our “Tier One” Hobart Class destroyers to counter in terms of firepower.

Meanwhile, looking at out-planned “Tier One” Hunter Class frigates, we would require (at least) 3.5 ships to counter this single vessel. The same goes for whichever ship wins the multibillion dollar “Tier Two” SEA 3000 general purpose frigate and the large optionally crewed surface vessels (LOSVs) to counter the same single ship on a firepower basis.

However, those last three vessel types are still a while off being fielded (either individually or en mass), so best to look at our venerable Anzac Class frigates, right? Well, that is EVEN more embarrassing, because combined, all eight (or is it seven now?) of our Anzac Class ships would have just 57 per cent of the firepower of the single Zunyi.

When it comes to the Hengyang, a Type 054A frigate, on a firepower metric, a single Hobart outclasses it, but barely, while the Hunters, proposed general purpose frigates and the LOSVs are at parity, while for the Anzacs, we would require four just to match the firepower of that single ship.

Hardly an efficient or effective use of our “limited resources”, wouldn’t you say?

It is also at this point that all of the arguments that "firepower and VLS count are not the sole or most crucial measures of capability" is being used as an attempt to justify this glaring and illogical flaw, and well and truly go flying out the window, with any proponent of this fallacious argument needs to be held publicly accountable for placing our nation in such a precarious and vulnerable position.

I also feel the need to clarify (because there will undoubtedly be those that screech at me about it), that of course firepower and VLS count are not the only metric by which we should measure capability, but in any kinetic conflict, the capacity of a warship to stay in the fight due to magazine depth is surely a key metric!

Finally, Australia also has to accept that we no longer can be assured of having the qualitative advantage over our potential adversaries, particularly as once-developing nations increasingly enjoy greater economic capacity, complexity and wealth compared to us (largely as a result of self-sabotage, but that is an entirely different conversation).

Yet despite all of these factors and being repeatedly reminded that Australia lives in the “most dangerous period since the Second World War”, the nation, its leaders and its people have done little to nothing to quantifiably respond to these threats.

I'm not the only one who has these concerns, ANU National Security College Expert Associate and former Naval officer, Jennifer Parker explained, "Australia’s naval modernisation plans are a definite step up from where we were a year ago. The key to responding to events like this is presence, and for a country with Australia’s vast maritime domain, that requires a significant boost in surface combatant numbers. SEA 3000, alongside the Hunter-class frigates, is designed to deliver that uplift.

"The challenge, however, is whether this buildup will occur in time to match the rising regional threat and the increasing demands on the RAN. While no one has a crystal ball, it’s clear that the current fleet size is insufficient. Given that growth won’t realistically start until the mid-2030s, there’s a clear mismatch between our capability and the threat—a direct result of decades of underinvestment and delayed decision-making," Parker explained.

Parker detailed that expectation that Beijing will continue to ramp up its regional presence and the challenges it will present to Australia, saying, "While the PLA-N’s presence is not a direct threat to Australia, China has the right to operate and conduct exercises in other countries’ exclusive economic zones. However, its growing expeditionary operations signal a shift in regional dynamics. If such deployments become more frequent—as they likely will—it could strain the ADF’s ability to maintain RAN presence operations, particularly as fleet availability declines due to major upgrades to the Hobart-class and minor upgrades to the ANZAC-class."

Finally, Parker stressed the need for rapid action, saying "Wargaming consistently shows a tendency to delay action, as participants resist acknowledging shifts in the status quo. Australia cannot afford such paralysis. Instead, it must confront these challenges head-on with targeted investment and rapid expansion of both the number and types of naval capabilities."

We heard throughout the COVID-19 pandemic that it “would be Australia’s wake-up call”; the revelation that Australia had shortages of personal protective equipment, vaccine manufacturing capability and a host of other, frankly more advanced manufacturing capabilities, yet little-to-no progress has been made, because we’re all far too happy to get “fat, rich and happy” on the easy way out.

Because as it stands, despite all of the platitudes, one can’t help but default to the statement of “trust the actions, not the words” when it comes to how seriously our leaders, policymakers and broader Australians are taking the threat environment we increasingly face and the managed decline Australia and Australians continue to endure.

As a young Australian, as a young father and husband, who will potentially be asked to defend the nation and sacrifice his life, can we PLEASE get serious now?

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