Are we ready to hear hard truths, or will we continue burying our heads in the sand?

While initially centred on defence, the relationship has expanded to include trade, technology, intelligence and cultural exchanges, reinforcing Australia’s strategic alignment with the US and its role within the broader Indo-Pacific region.

The origins of the alliance can be traced to the Second World War, particularly after the fall of Singapore in 1942. This event shattered Australia’s long-standing reliance on Britain for defence and prompted a strategic pivot towards the United States.

As Japanese forces advanced through the Pacific, Australia turned to the US for military assistance, leading to unprecedented levels of cooperation between the two nations. General Douglas MacArthur, appointed Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the South West Pacific, was based in Australia, reinforcing the US military presence. This period laid the foundation for Australia’s long-term security dependence on the United States.

The formalisation of the alliance came with the signing of the ANZUS Treaty in 1951, a tripartite agreement between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. While initially designed to counter potential aggression in the Pacific, ANZUS became a cornerstone of Australia’s foreign and defence policy throughout the Cold War.

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Australia supported US-led conflicts in Korea and Vietnam, reaffirming its commitment to collective security. However, tensions emerged in the 1980s when New Zealand adopted an anti-nuclear stance, effectively suspending its role in the treaty, leaving the alliance primarily as a bilateral agreement between Australia and the United States.

Intelligence and security cooperation have also been crucial pillars of the alliance. Australia and the United States are key members of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing network, along with the United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand. This collaboration has been instrumental in counterterrorism efforts, regional stability and global intelligence gathering.

Following the September 11 attacks, Australia invoked the ANZUS Treaty for the first time and committed forces to US-led operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. More recently, initiatives like the AUKUS security pact (2021) have further strengthened the defence relationship, particularly in nuclear-powered submarine technology, artificial intelligence and cyber security.

The Australia–US alliance continues to adapt to shifting global dynamics, particularly amid growing strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific. While challenges such as trade disputes, regional tensions and evolving security threats remain, the alliance remains a fundamental pillar of Australia’s foreign policy, shaping its global engagement and strategic outlook for the future.

However despite this history, many have begun to raise concerns about the partnership, driven by a combination of the rising power of other great powers distracting the attention of the US, the comparative economic, political and strategic power of these rising powers in aggregate, and Australia’s historic cultural “fear of abandonment”" that has dominated the nation’s policymaking since Federation.

Adding his voice to the debate is The Australian’s Greg Sheridan, in a provocative piece titled Australia, not Europe, is the biggest freeloader of US power in which he articulated the need for Australia to wake-up to itself and the needs of its own defence.

Step it up or be left behind

The central premise of Sheridan’s piece is his long-held belief that Australia has, in large part, for the better part of the last decade (at least) been skating along on the security guarantees provided by the United States both regionally, within the Indo-Pacific, and more broadly in a global context since the end of the Second World War.

However, as America has continued to face an increasing number of competing security priorities across the globe, and it became apparent that the “End of History” narrative was little more than a comforting fiction, Australia, like many Western nations, failed to account for the now seismic shifts taking place around the globe.

In particular, the rise of multiple competing centres of economic, political and strategic gravity in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Europe and South America all serve to fundamentally reshape the global balance of power, and most importantly, both Australia and America’s positions within it.

From Australia’s perspective, this elicits a deep sense of existential dread as the nation is once again confronted with the reality that its “great and powerful friend” won’t always be capable of defending us, or our interests, particularly should they face their own direct and material challenges.

Yet for whatever reason, this reality seemingly remains controversial for contemporary Australia public discourse, particularly among our strategic policy community, which should be at the forefront of this debate, no matter how uncomfortable the conversation is.

For Sheridan, this needs to be addressed, before President Donald Trump turns his attention, now firmly fixed on Europe, to Australia. Sheridan stated, “The real lesson is to understand that every tough bit of scolding Trump has applied to feckless Europeans, in terms of defence capability, applies to us only a hundred times more strongly.”

“US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth told NATO that Europe’s security would no longer be America’s No.1 priority. European nations had been freeloaders on America for too long. As sure as night follows day, a US administration will eventually say the same thing to Australia, but with more justification, and much more devastating consequences,” Sheridan added.

This belief comes despite repeated assurances by successive Australian governments that the nation was taking its own defence needs seriously, would meet its (arbitrary NATO floor) spending obligation to spend 2 per cent of gross domestic product on defence, and frequently “paying into” the insurance policy of the US alliance via supporting it in every major conflict of the 20th century and into this one.

Sheridan detailed our shortcomings, saying, “How does Australia compare? We face, in China, an infinitely more capable strategic competitor than Russia. We face the worst strategic circumstances since World War II. Apart from New Zealand, which has no defence capability to speak of, we have no nearby allies…

“Like Europe, we’ve had decades of warnings, but our feeble, tiny defence force is less capable today than it was three years ago. We have just three capable warships and they are by no means tier-one combatants. The Albanese government has made one big decision about our most capable service, the air force, which is to cancel the fourth squadron of F-35 jets...

“We could, by following an asymmetric military strategy, make ourselves a very tough nut indeed. We do none of that because, like the Europeans, we won’t make a tough resourcing decision. All the security cheques we write are meant to be cashed by our great and powerful friend, Uncle Sam. We consume vastly more American security than Washington consumes Australian security. We’re not in the US alliance to please Washington. The US alliance is the alpha and omega, the absolute totality, of our security policy. We’ve chosen to be impotent," Sheridan stated provocatively.

Looking at the state of play, particularly following repeated provocations by the People’s Republic of China, specifically the sailing of a relatively small (by Chinese standards anyway) surface action group through Australia’s economic exclusion zone, and our lack of serious comparable capability to push back if required really serve to reinforce Sheridan’s message.

This, once again, raises questions about the quantum, quality and efficacy of Australia’s defence spending, and indeed the nation’s commitment despite repeated warnings that we “live in the most dangerous period since the Second World War”.

If we won’t, who will?

An equally important question that Australians, like our European counterparts, will have to ask is, “If we won’t defend ourselves, why should America?” And while that may seem like blasphemy to many who remain firmly entrenched in the naive belief that America will always be there to save the day, the reality is, in a world of increasing great power competition, we will undoubtedly need to do more.

This conveniently brings me back to my analysis piece from late last week (linked above) regarding Australia’s cultural “fear of abandonment” which received a lot of criticism, particularly around my reference to Australia being a girlfriend with an anxious attachment style.

First, no offense was meant by using that metaphor, I was referencing my own personal, lived experience. I can’t speak to that experience from another perspective. Second, the point that few, if any, of the comments actually engaged with the intellectual substance of my thesis serves to show how blinded by the trivial we are as a society and only serves to reinforce Sheridan’s thesis.

That isn’t to pick a fight, it is, however, a much-needed rebuttal to much of the criticism I faced, because if at a time when the wolf is very visibly at the gate, maybe we should be looking to uplift ourselves and rising to the challenge by recognising the “tough love” approach President Trump and his administration are taking with America’s global allies, in recognition that both the nation and its people are tired of carrying the burden of global peace and stability while their lives at home are torn asunder.

Something, he hinted at, saying, “More than 100,000 Americans died defeating Japan in World War II. They secured Australian freedom. No other nation has done anything like that for us. One day, a president will ask: Why should American blood and treasure defend Australia, when Australia will not defend itself?

“We have no answer to that question,” Sheridan said, and maybe that should be the real focus of our anger, the fact that successive governments have failed to deliver in their most sacrosanct responsibility, leaving us as a nation that is de-industrialised to the point of economic obscurity, solely dependent on the continued benevolence of the global environment for all of our major requirements as a functional nation, unable, or perhaps unwilling to invest in what we need to defend ourselves and devoid of any ambition or desire to correct course.

Final thoughts

Meanwhile, for generations, young Australians in the early to middle stages of their careers – at a time when they should be settling down and starting families – have faced a system that is inherently stacked against them.

Is it any surprise that alternative approaches to politics, policy and economics become appealing when they promise vast rewards with little effort? At the same time, we have witnessed growing social and cultural dislocation, a sense of individual aimlessness, and the resulting impact on personal identity and mental health among younger Australians.

To reverse this stagnation and decline, policymakers must provide a unifying vision – one that is dynamic, filled with opportunity and driven by purpose. This can empower Australians to take charge of their future and build a resilient, competitive nation in an era of intensified global rivalry between autocracy and democracy.

Equally important is the need to expand and enhance opportunities while strengthening economic resilience. A strong economy acts as a deterrent against economic coercion and ensures we can safeguard our nation and interests from external threats.

If Australia is to thrive as a prosperous, secure and free nation in this era of great power competition, we must break free from short-term thinking and adopt a long-term vision – one that serves both current and future generations.

So I am left wondering, are we, as a nation, ready to truly hear the hard truths, or will we continue to bury our heads in the sand hoping someone else will save us?

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..