Black, white and shades of grey: Why Australia needs to be less reductive in our approach to defence

Over the course of the 20th century, this shifted from the British Empire to the United States, as the global balance of power evolved following the Second World War and the global order established in the ashes of the old world came to prominence.

This would only be reinforced following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the seeming, uncontested triumph of the United States and its liberal democratic economic, political and strategic “rules based” order, which would see Australia firmly playing the role of “loyal deputy” to the United States’ sheriff role.

However, far from the “End of History” we were promised, geopolitics once again proved the old saying that “nature abhors a vacuum”, gradually giving rise to a counter to the United States as the unrivalled global hegemon, with the emergence of multiple, competing centres of economic, political and strategic power, front and centre of which is unfolding on Australia’s doorstep in the Indo-Pacific.

It is precisely this history that has informed Australia’s reductive, “black” or “white”, “all or nothing” way of not only viewing the nation and its role in the region, but also the way in which we plan, respond and engage with our “great and powerful friend” and potential adversaries alike, where all too frequently, Australia’s response is to throw its hands in the air and cry, “It’s all a little too hard” so let’s do the bare minimum required.

VIEW ALL

So much for the nation that prides itself on never shirking its responsibility or running from a challenge, right?

The latest incarnation of this approach was introduced in the 2023 Defence Strategic Review (DSR) and it’s shift from the Defence of Australia’s “Balanced Force” towards a “Focused Force”, designed to prioritise certain capabilities while delivering a “strategy of denial” that will seek to provide Australia with the capacity to “unilaterally deter any state”, marking a dramatic shift in the nation’s approach, at least on paper.

Providing further context, the Defence Strategic Review, states, “Australia does not have effective defence capabilities relative to higher threat levels. In the present strategic circumstances, this can only be achieved by Australia working with the United States and other key partners in the maintenance of a favourable regional environment. Australia also needs to develop the capability to unilaterally deter any state from offensive military action against Australian forces or territory.”

Further codifying this shift is the supporting 2024 National Defence Strategy and Integrated Investment Program, respectively, which have been described as the most ambitious realignment and reprioritisation of Australia’s defence capabilities in decades, with AU$330 billion in spending out to 2033–34, up from the AU$270–275 billion outlined in the 2020 Defence Strategic Update and 2020 Force Structure Plan.

But what does this have to do with the aforementioned “black” or “white”, “all or nothing” way of thinking I have alluded to?

At least we are consistent

All too often recently and increasingly over the past few months, I have read or heard some variation on the theme that adequately responding to the challenges is outside of Australia’s material reach.

Too often I have been told or heard someone say, “It is naive to think Australia can defend itself alone against the might of China” or “Australia will never have the capabilities it needs to defend itself”, or “Australia will never have a viable industrial base again”, or my personal favourite: “Australia needs to accept that it is a minor power in this new world and shouldn’t bother trying to compete.”

At best, these statements are disheartening, at worst, they are defeatist and need to be struck from the public lexicon and psyche as soon as possible. And while it is important to remain realistic, lest we fall into the intellectual trap that Imperial Japan found itself in when facing down the United States, when they defiantly refused to accept that the US could outbuild them, we urgently need to step it up.

Importantly, this belief negates our history, for example, when Australia, following the Fall of Singapore, managed to rally a nation of just under 7 million, managed to for at least a protracted period of time to hold off the might of the Imperial Japanese war machine (while also having significant manpower deployed to the Middle East and Europe), at a time when Japan’s population was 90 per cent larger than our own.

Now yes, there were elements of US and British military power that continued to operate in the region following Pearl Harbor, the Philippines and Singapore, respectively, but, for all intents and purposes, until after the Battle of the Coral Sea, Australia was on its own, depending solely on our own fighting men and women, our own industrial base and own resilience to defend our island, “whatever the cost may be”.

Yet the moment things began to subside and look like peace would return to the world, we reverted back to our cultural norm of dependency upon our “great and powerful friend”, this time the United States, following the devastating realisation that the British Empire was a spent force that could no longer defend our interests at the strategic level.

Despite the brief period of “Forward Defence”, which can best be summarised by a belief that “We should fight them up there before we have to fight them down here”, resulting in the nation taking on a more assertive role in the Indo-Pacific. Australia, in many ways, defaulted to our “factory settings”, seeking to nestle ourselves comfortably into the nurturing and safety of America’s bosom.

Via a belief that if we were seen to be doing “our part” by maintaining regional order through a robust and continuing forward presence, we believed (a belief that still remains truly untested) that it would build “relationship equity” with both the United States and to a lesser extent, the British Empire, typifying in many ways our defaulting to “factory settings” as it were, albeit, with significant new teeth and some capacity to act independently.

So at least we have been consistent in some respects, but at the same time, we understood we had to do more and be more if Australia’s interests were going to be vigorously defended and promoted in the Indo-Pacific. Somehow, we have come to the conclusion that adequately defending the nation “is all just a little too hard”.

And like Homer Simpson, when running for the position of garbage commissioner, our reductive, “black” and “white” view of the world has left us thinking and, indeed, many Australians asking, “Can’t someone else do it?”

In this case and at this point in time, no, someone else can’t do it. Now to thread the needle and hopefully bring this all together with my original thesis.

Saving money or ‘focus’ is making us myopic

The introduction of the “Focused Force” as the basis of our future force posture and identification of priority/ies draws back, in many ways, that focus to establish an entrenched “continental” defence prioritisation, albeit with some minor “expeditionary” focus, mainly through small-scale, niche littoral manoeuvre forces long-range fires and some minor tinkering around the edges of “long-range” maritime sea control.

But once again, the nation’s primary focus has reverted to our myopic default while seeking to offset any increase in “mass” with our eternal pursuit of cheap, “silver bullet” capabilities that would enable Australia to spend ever less money on defence while maximising the capability outcomes.

Like a delusional car purchaser who goes into a Ferrari or Aston Martin dealership with Toyota Camry money, insisting that we can afford the latest 458 Italia or DBS Superleggera, Australia is seeking – through a sleight of hand and sleight of language – to shift our force posture from a “Balanced Force” towards a “Focused Force” to reassure the nation that we’re focusing on the central “priorities”.

This approach once again plays to Australia’s default setting of “black” or “white”, “all or nothing” thinking when it comes to our defence planning and capability development as we seek to home in on cheap areas that are easy to score points or look like we’re taking things seriously while effectively negating the broader reality that is unfolding before and increasingly around us.

Now to be fair, Australia, like many Western nations, is facing increasingly stagnant economic growth (why is a separate argument) and tight fiscal circumstances, further complicated by the rising costs and expectations that government services will continue unabated, with defence and national security being aptly described as a “low investment” priority, that is until we need it.

Accordingly, governments, successive governments have only doubled down on our worst impulses, resulting in both Australian policymakers and the Australian public to seemingly fall for the same line of rhetoric, that our “focus” on niche capabilities will be enough to defend us because “someone else will do it”.

Unfortunately, because of our myopic “focus” and “black” or “white” thinking, Australia is running the risk of finding ourselves ill-equipped to truly respond to the full spectrum of economic, political and strategic challenges that are emerging around us. So maybe it is time for some “shades of grey” thinking to better prepare the nation to defend ourselves independently.

Final thoughts

Australia can no longer afford to drift in complacency. The world is shifting, power is fragmenting and the Indo-Pacific is fast becoming the most contested region on the planet. Yet, too many Australians remain oblivious – or worse, indifferent – to the escalating geopolitical stakes.

Our economic resilience, competitiveness and strategic clarity will define our future as much as they do for the US, the UK or Europe. But to seize the opportunities ahead, we must break free from short-term thinking and start playing for the long game.

This requires a hard, open conversation with the Australian people. They will be the ones called upon to implement change, give their consent, and, if diplomacy fails, defend the nation. A strong economy isn’t just about prosperity – it’s about deterrence. Without economic strength, we remain vulnerable to coercion and aggression.

Yet, a dangerous sense of apathy is taking hold. Economic stagnation, a shifting balance of power and the hyper-politicisation of everyday life have created a climate of disconnection and resignation. Too many Australians – leaders included – seem content to let the nation limp along, avoiding ambition because mediocrity feels safer.

We must ask ourselves: Do we see Australia as a middle power, a regional force – or something greater? And if we dare to claim a seat at the top table, are we ready to do what it takes to get there?

If we continue clinging to the outdated comfort of the “End of History,” we will soon wake-up to a brutal new reality: a world where we are no longer in control of our destiny. The time for passive optimism is over. The time for decisive action is now.

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..