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The latest paper in the Institute of Public Affairs and Strategic Analysis Australia’s Defence of Australia series has called on the next Australian government to focus on serious economic development and energy security as the key factors in mobilising Australia’s capacity to mount a “whole-of-nation” effort to defend the nation.
It is now a well-known reality that both the nation and our military face a growing and glaring list of clear vulnerabilities by 2025 that could undermine its ability to maintain operations in a conflict involving major powers in our region.
These vulnerabilities must be addressed to ensure that Australia can both deter aggression and, if necessary, defend its interests and protect its citizens. The traditional view of Australia’s secure isolation is outdated, as the proliferation of long-range weapons and drones now poses a direct threat to Australian territory. This shift demands the inclusion of homeland defence in Australian defence policy, an issue that needs urgent attention and a public conversation led by the government.
For much of the post-World War II period, Australian defence was designed around the idea that our military would be deployed remotely, with a home industrial base supporting those operations. However, a major regional war now presents threats that extend beyond remote conflict zones, pulling Australia itself into the conflict. The expanded role of all sectors of the Australian economy in supporting both military and civilian targets underscores the need for a more integrated, comprehensive approach to defence. In this context, the security of military bases alone is insufficient.
Highlighting this reality, the latest paper in the Institute of Public Affairs and Strategic Analysis Australia’s Defence of Australia series focused on fixing Defence infrastructure and securing national energy vulnerabilities as fundamental inputs for national power and security in an increasingly contested and volatile period in regional and global history.
John Storey, director of law and policy at the Institute of Public Affairs, unpacked this, saying, “Australia’s economy is a critical part of our national defence. A weak economy, an unreliable energy system and Defence’s continued prioritising of expensive, long-term niche systems, as well as net zero, leave us vulnerable to conflict in our region.”
The broader security of the Australian population and infrastructure must be prioritised alongside the protection of military establishments. China’s growing military power, capable of reaching across air, maritime, space and cyber domains, reinforces this necessity. As regional security risks intensify, Australia must adapt its defence strategy to anticipate these threats and reaffirm its commitment to safeguarding the nation against direct risks to its territory and people.
Critically driving the nation’s lacklustre response is the reality that for decades, Australians and their governments viewed defence as an “away game” – forces deployed to distant theatres with a safe homeland left unchallenged. Today, however, the potential for an Indo-Pacific war, where adversaries deliberately target civilian infrastructure alongside military assets, calls for a complete reassessment of our security posture.
Importantly, a modern conflict would blur the traditional lines between military and civilian targets, leaving the entire nation exposed to the disruptive effects of warfare. This has been accelerated by the rapid expansion of military power in our region – especially from China – which has served to fundamentally shift the strategic landscape.
Recognising this, the fifth paper articulated a number of key recommendations for consideration and implementation for the next-term of government, including:
- The development a Homeland Defence Strategy to protect key civilian population centres and critical infrastructure from long-range missile and drone attacks.
- Hardening Australian military bases to withstand direct strikes, shifting budget priorities to protection of key assets and making room for allies to operate from them.
- The mobilisation of national infrastructure for Defence use to ensure key commercial ports, airfields and transport networks are available for military use during wartime.
- Enhancing fuel security through the urgent establishment of onshore national fuel reserves and the strategic dispersion of fuel stocks across Defence bases, particularly across the nation’s north.
Storey explained the importance of these recommendations, saying, “The growing military capabilities of regional adversaries, particularly China, mean that Australia’s historic reliance on geographic isolation for security is no longer viable.
“The reality is that in a future Indo-Pacific conflict, Australian cities, military bases and infrastructure will be at risk. A failure to act now will leave our defence forces unable to function and our economy exposed to strategic paralysis.”
Our security agencies now acknowledge that Australia’s once-reliable shield of remoteness is no longer adequate. Homeland defence must evolve to protect not only our military bases but also our population and critical economic infrastructure. This pressing challenge requires a national conversation, led by the federal government, to reimagine our defence strategy for the realities of 21st-century conflict.
“There has been limited government and corporate action to bolster our vulnerable liquid fuel supply chains. Refineries capable of producing these essential fuels have been closing, leaving only two refineries in operation. We need an urgent fix in the next three years.
"We must maintain significant onshore stocks of diesel and aviation gasoline, not just to support the ADF in military operations but to enable the functioning of Australian society during conflict,” Story said.
To download the report Fixing Defence infrastructure and energy vulnerabilities, click here.
