‘Up for grabs’ an Australian century in the Indo-Pacific? Stranger things have happened

From its early colonial ties to Britain and trade links with Asia to its deepening security alliance with the United States in the 20th century, Australia’s foreign policy has evolved in response to changing regional and increasingly global realities.

Throughout the post-war period, Australia’s economic and political relationships in the Indo-Pacific expanded significantly. The rise of Japan as a key trading partner in the 1950s, the economic transformation of south-east Asia and the emergence of China as Australia’s largest trading partner in the waning decades of last century have all reinforced the nation’s economic integration and relations with the region.

This “new reality” has only been reinforced by the post-Cold War era of globalisation driven by free trade agreements, multilateral institutions such as ASEAN and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, which in turn were reinforced by strategic alliances that have strengthened Australia’s role in the Indo-Pacific economy.

However, these ties are not without challenges. The increasing assertiveness of China, shifting US regional commitments and the growing influence of middle powers such as India and Indonesia highlight the complexities of navigating an increasingly contested region.

VIEW ALL

Strategically, Australia has maintained a strong security alliance with the United States under the ANZUS Treaty while also deepening defence ties with regional partners. The creation of AUKUS, a trilateral security cooperation with Japan and the US, and closer defence relations with south-east Asian nations reflect a response to the shifting balance of power.

Yet, as great power competition intensifies, particularly between the US and China, Australia faces the challenge of maintaining its sovereignty, security interests without jeopardising its economic partnerships in the region, and more broadly in an increasingly competitive global environment.

In this era of uncertainty, Australia must adopt a cohesive national response that balances economic resilience, strategic engagement and regional cooperation. This requires strengthening diplomatic relationships, investing in defence capabilities, enhancing economic diversification and playing a proactive role in regional security frameworks.

As the Indo-Pacific undergoes profound transformations, Australia’s ability to adapt and assert its interests will be crucial to not only maintaining its influence and stability in the region but also expanding the opportunities ripe for the taking in the 21st century. However, this isn’t without its challenges, as Australia must grapple with the relative decline of the United States on the global stage and the power vacuum, this decline is creating.

It is the rise of China and the Indo-Pacific, more broadly, that has driven much of the political, economic and strategic narrative around the “Asian Century” taking over from the 20th century that was known as the “American Century”, placing Australia in a unique conundrum, torn between our history and the possibilities of our future.

In light of this, how Australia responds to these emerging challenges and opportunities will increasingly become a major political debating point and interestingly (if not anecdotally), a topic of discussion around the dinner table as many Australians become increasingly aware of the challenges, threats and, importantly, opportunities that are increasingly “up for grabs”.

Highlighting this is distinguished policy fellow at the Asia Society Australia and former deputy secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Richard Maude, in a piece for The Australian Financial Review, titled Australia’s Indo-Pacific destiny up for grabs in a new world order, in which he detailed that while “Australia may have to give up on the idea of a strategic equilibrium and settle for something messier and less grand“, it is here that the opportunity abounds.

Now it does need to be said, Maude isn’t openly advocating for an “Australian Century”; that is something that I have inferred from the substance of his analysis and the key points he articulated. With that out of the way, let’s dive in.

The Trump factor

First and foremost, the increasing unpredictability of the United States under Trump 2.0 presents one of, if not the most significant challenge to Australia in the 21st century, and most importantly, our investment in the post-Second World War status quo, which is undergoing sustained (and long-needed) assault and reform.

Separate to the Trump factor is Australia’s reluctance to accept the rapidly evolving state of regional and global power dynamics which have been evident as far back as the mid to late 2000s, while Australia, like many of its Western allies, was increasingly distracted and bogged down in the Middle East and Central Asia.

This has only accelerated as Beijing, under Xi Jinping, has become an increasingly hostile, aggressive and revisionist actor in the Indo-Pacific, and supported globally by Putin’s Russia, Iran and other “developing” nations that are eager to challenge the global order.

Maude is quick to highlight the impact of this confluence of factors, saying, “The task now is to consider what can be salvaged from the wreckage and, especially, what Trump means for Australia’s primary national security challenge – a nationalist, authoritarian China with the power to reshape regional and global affairs more to its liking and less to ours.

“The questions that demand answers could hardly be more consequential. Is the United States committed to a military balance of power in the Indo-Pacific that deters China from the use of force? How much more likely now is Chinese hegemony in Asia? Could Australia survive under Chinese hegemony? And does Trump’s America make war in Asia more or less likely?”

Shifting focus to the regional power dynamics at play, Maude added, “Australian governments have not, as it happens, been oblivious to these deeper currents. Aspirations for a defence force with more strike power, efforts to shore up Australia’s influence and interests in the Pacific and south-east Asia, and closer relations with India and Japan are all partial responses both to Chinese assertiveness and a changing America. This is quietly hedging our bets, even if Australian governments won’t use that term.”

These factors all combine to present a series of significant challenges to Australia, yet in order to overcome these challenges we need to begin having the conversation, both within the halls of power and in the dining rooms across the nation, because it will be the average Australian and their family that will prove key to delivering any sort of an “Australian Century”.

However, to more accurately predict what will be required of Australia, we need all of the variables to better solve the equation. In order to do this, Australia needs to accept that America’s power is not only declining relative to the region’s emerging powers and that the long-vaunted “strategic equilibrium” provided by the United States no longer exists.

While Australia has sought to offset this through multilateral partnerships under the guise of and separate to the Quad, Australia will need to take more responsibility for its own security and the defence of its own national interests, regardless of our partnerships in the region.

Maude said, “Trump repudiates the core proposition of decades of US grand strategy – that America will do better in a world that is, as much as possible, more orderly and more democratic than the hard years between 1914 and 1945. For Trump, strength comes instead from an unapologetic and ruthless pursuit of narrow US interests – strong countries inevitably will do what they will, and trying to shape global order has made the United States weaker and poorer. This suits the MAGA far right, which wants to demolish not just the US administrative state but the fabric of American empire and worries only that Trump won’t go far enough in burning down the old order.”

Going further, Maude detailed the rise of the multipolar world, and the return of “spheres of influence” that must ultimately figure into the calculations of Australian policymakers and the Australian public, if they are to accept the greater personal (at a national level) agency now required.

“There has been speculation of a G2 world or a return to spheres of influence, with the United States, China and Russia the key poles. Trump treats the leaders of those countries as peers, even Putin, much to the dismay of allies and friends. He wants a grand “deal” with Beijing. The new US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, once a hardliner on China and Russia, has fallen into line, albeit while looking increasingly miserable. Rubio says that a world of multiple poles must be accepted – ‘it is not normal for the world simply to have a unipolar power’,” Maude said.

While this isn’t all bad news for Australia, it isn’t without an elephant in the room: China.

Peace, prosperity or war and poverty depends on Beijing’s intentions

Ultimately, the difference between enduring peace and prosperity and war and poverty in the Indo-Pacific is the intentions and the willingness of the People’s Republic of China to increase its coercive efforts at a minimum and actively prosecute acts of war in the Indo-Pacific while Australia, like the United States and other regional powers, has little, if any, influence over this (despite what many would have us believe).

Now yes, there is an element to which the individual military power of the US, and at a pinch, the combined military power of other nations, will figure into the calculations of Beijing’s policymakers. It is ultimately in their hands and if they are confident in their own capability, they will use it, hell be damned.

This reality, uncomfortable as it might be, also serves as an important variable that needs to be accounted for by Australian policymakers, particularly Beijing’s intentions to establish a sizeable “sphere of influence” in our immediate proximity.

Maude highlighted this, stating, “Based on what China’s leaders say and do, we can reasonably conclude that China aspires to a large sphere of influence around its borders in which it feels secure and countries defer to its interests and authority, either automatically or by coercion. This is seen as a reasonable expectation for a great power.”

While much has been made of Beijing’s over, military and paramilitary efforts to coerce neighbours and establish a regional “sphere of influence”, more subtle and more covert is Beijing’s rapid economic expansion and the spread of its economic tendrils through organs like the Belt and Road Initiative and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation that figure centrally in both Chinese domestic and international politics.

Maude articulated the juncture of these two pillars, saying, “In a turbulent world, economic security is as important to Xi and the party as other forms of security. China pursues policies to make itself less reliant on the world, and especially less reliant on the United States, and the world more dependent on it for industrial products and advanced technologies. This ‘beggar they neighbour’ approach creates ever greater global trade imbalances and drives economic nationalism in the US and Europe.

“Xi believes that to achieve these objectives, China must focus single-mindedly on building the wealth and hard power necessary to encourage or force compliance with China’s interests. Xi believes time is on China’s side (‘the East is rising and the West is declining’, as the party likes to say) and, while not ruling out the use of force, would prefer to achieve his strategic objectives peacefully.”

This combined approach, now increasingly recognised as “grey zone” or “hybrid" warfare, is being actively wielded against nations across the region, of which Australia is increasingly at the forefront of experiencing, with the more overt and “traditional” factors of warfare to have a major and irrevocable impact on Australia, our peace, prosperity and stability.

Maude highlighted this, saying, “For Australia, an autocratic, hegemonic China could mean, among other things, higher expectations of compliance with China’s interests and greater risk of coercion. China might feel even freer to interfere in Australia’s politics and society. The CCP’s anxious extraterritorial pursuit of ideological security demands support China’s version of the truth on all issues important to its interests.”

Going further, Maude added, “Beijing could demand privileged access to Australian resources, markets and infrastructure. Economic ties could be held to ransom more regularly. China could gain complete control of the South China Sea, with the power over trade. China might be more willing to use force to achieve unification with Taiwan, especially if it judges the United States will abandon Taiwan as it has Ukraine.

“If China were to take Taiwan by force, the blow to American prestige would be immense. China would have free rein inside the first island chain. Japan and South Korea might feel compelled to become nuclear weapon states. Conversely, the defeat by the US and its allies, and Taiwan, of an attempted invasion would create an angry and humiliated China and a long new Cold War. The blow to the Australian economy and our standard of living would be immense.”

So how in hell did I get to the idea that Maude is advocating for the idea of an “Australian Century” when the outlook’s so openly hostile? Well, these are the challenges but herein lies the opportunities.

An ‘Australian Century’ isn’t without its challenges

Despite grand political rhetoric, the reality for many Australians is far from promising. While Australia boasts vast natural resources and strategic advantages, it is failing to fully harness its potential. Declining economic opportunities, rising geopolitical tensions and the increasing politicisation of daily life have left many feeling disconnected and powerless.

Modern Australia has been largely shielded from the hardships of conflict, with generations never experiencing food, energy or medical rationing. Yet, as global instability grows, Australians must confront difficult realities that could redefine the nation’s security and prosperity.

Maude highlighted this, saying, “Four long years of Trump, and the aftershocks that will follow will require Australia to rethink or re-gear elements of its foreign and defence policy and make more determined investments in national resilience. This must be first order business when the dust settles on the federal election. The work won’t be easy. As the late Allan Gyngell wrote in Fear of Abandonment, his classic history of Australia in the world, foreign policy requires vision and hard work. He might have added strong leadership and deep pockets.

“Australian policymakers have favoured pursuing a balance of power favourable to our interests in the Indo-Pacific, as ambitious as that objective is because good alternatives are in short supply.”

To safeguard its future, Australia must build the capacity to act as an independent power, strengthening economic, diplomatic and military capabilities in line with great power expectations.

This shift would reinforce national sovereignty and position Australia as a key player in regional security. Breaking free from a mindset of “it’s all too difficult” would unlock new economic and strategic opportunities, reducing vulnerabilities to external pressures.

The Indo-Pacific is rapidly becoming the world’s most contested region. Rising powers like China, India, Vietnam and Indonesia, alongside the re-emerging influence of Japan and South Korea, are reshaping the strategic landscape.

However, it is worth stating, that Maude does once again, like many of his “establishment” compatriots fall into the same reductionist rhetoric and belief, that Australia must have the US alliance, or nothing at all, and that Australia cannot and must not amount to anything within the confines of our alliance with the United States.

This simply isn’t true and does risk leaving Australia and Australians an “also-ran” in the competition sweeping across the Indo-Pacific. He articulates this reductionist approach, saying, “We should spare ourselves vapid talk of a more ‘independent’ foreign policy if that means walking away from the Alliance. It remains in the national interest to work pragmatically with the Trump government, to find alignments where we can while standing up strongly for the things we believe in, and to protect military and intelligence cooperation.”

But it is becoming clearer by the day that Australia can no longer afford short-term thinking. Without sustained investment, reform and strategic foresight – our own “Rocky montage” moment – the nation risks falling behind, with diminished economic leverage and security autonomy.

Conveniently, this brings me to Maude’s final two paragraphs, in which he said, “Australia needs a comprehensive strategy for dealing with a world of rising economic nationalism. If one exists, beyond heroically optimistic talk of a ‘stable and open global trading system’, it is not evident.

“Finally, a clearer understanding of what national resilience and economic sovereignty look like in the current era and what realistically can be funded in difficult budgetary circumstances would help guide future policy and investment by governments and businesses. This requires a national discussion led by the federal government and should also be a priority after the election,” and it is from these two points I infer his advocacy for an “Australian Century” in the Indo-Pacific.

For too long, Australian policymakers have prioritised immediate economic gains and reactive policies over long-term strategy. That must change. The critical question is not whether challenges exist but when Australia will develop a clear, decisive response. When will leaders articulate a coherent plan to ensure the nation remains competitive and resilient in an era of intensifying great power rivalry?

The decisions made today will determine whether Australia thrives – or is merely swept along by the tide of history.

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..