Competitive coexistence, the ‘Fight Tonight’ force and Australia’s growing multipolar predicament

This competitive coexistence has served to create some of the greatest rivals in history, from Greece and Persia to Rome and Carthage, Britain and France, Korea and Japan and, more recently, Germany and France, and the United States and Soviet Union, former allies who turned on one another driven by ideological differences and competing ambitions for the world.

However, following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990 and the dismantling of the “Evil Empire”, America emerged as the world’s sole superpower, unrivalled, giving rise to the real Pax Americana or American Peace, formalising the post-Second World War economic, political and strategic order established in the waning days of the conflict.

Fast forward nearly four decades and the heady days of the 1990s are now well and truly gone, with the emergence of not just one major power to contest the dominance of America, but multiple nations across the Indo-Pacific, Europe and South America of similar economic, political, strategic and demographic weight and potential.

This is now giving rise to a period of fractured, contested and competitive coexistence as the world’s established nations and emerging powers alike will increasingly grapple with and serve to reshape the way in which Australia and its allies across the Indo-Pacific, in particular, will need to improvise, adapt and overcome in record time.

At the forefront of this analysis is Robbin Laird, celebrated American military and security analyst and prolific author, in a piece titled Competitive coexistence in a fractured world order, Authoritarianism, and the kill web revolution, detailing the way this new era of multipolar competition is rapidly limiting the efficacy and capacity of Australia’s “Fight Tonight” force.

Our strategic environment is setting the scene for a major showdown

VIEW ALL

Australia’s strategic environment is undergoing a profound shift. The long-held post–Cold War assumption of Western primacy has given way to a fractured global order where rising authoritarian powers are systematically building parallel economic and military institutions.

Beijing, Moscow and their partners have quietly forged a transactional “authoritarian axis” – from China’s Belt and Road finance to Russian–Iranian arms deals that blunts Western deterrence.

At the same time, Ukraine’s bitter war has validated a “kill web” revolution in warfare, where distributed sensors, mass-produced drones and networked precision weapons can overwhelm even the most advanced platforms. In this new era of “cooperation–competition–conflict” as recent Australian doctrine notes, competition is the constant condition.

Donald Trump famously described US–China relations as a “sort of competitive coexistence” rather than outright conflict, a concept now resonating across Indo-Pacific capitals, Canberra included.

For Canberra, these global shifts pose a stark dilemma. Australia cannot rely on the old safety net of automatic US support or the liberal economic order alone.

As Laird observed, “the comfortable assumptions of the post–Cold War era are dissolving” and Australia’s traditional alliance model trading bases and political support for an American security guarantee is ultimately proving inadequate.

Indeed, as one Australian strategist bluntly put it in recent discussions, Canberra must plan to deter and even fight on its own if necessary: “We can’t rule out … major operations to deter … even China, if the United States decides it’s going to sit on its hands.”

In short, the era of crisis management is over and Australia faces an age of permanent competition.

Authoritarian alignments and Australia’s strategic dilemma

China’s rise has fuelled much of the uncertainty. Instead of liberalising as was widely predicted in the immediate aftermath of Deng Xaio Ping’s economic liberalisation efforts, Beijing has spent two decades building indigenous capabilities (under programs like Made in China 2025) and exporting influence, shaping ports, telecommunication standards and finance in its image.

Western policymakers are now grappling with the fact that Beijing’s “dual circulation” strategy has quietly created a parallel economic order resistant to sanctions. Russia’s economy, once set on the dollar, has been dragged into a yuan-centred orbit by Chinese energy sales and financial integration. This means sanctions are less crippling and pressure points harder to find.

For Australia, this authoritarian consolidation means being caught between two great powers. Canberra still seeks strong ties with both Beijing and Washington, but the rules have changed.

As Laird noted, democracies must now accept China (and a post-Putin Russia) as enduring powers whose core interests cannot be ignored – while still imposing “enforceable limits to territorial coercion”. In practice, Australia is doubling down on both diplomacy and deterrence: shoring up its own industrial capacity and striking new partnerships across the Indo‑Pacific.

Recent high-level moves, from deepening ties with the Philippines and Indonesia to stepping up trilateral drills with the US and Japan, reflect a pivot towards forward defence. Canberra understands that south-east Asian neighbours are its first line of defence and is investing in “capacity-building” there so that if conflict erupts closer to home, Australia’s own territory remains less exposed.

This balancing act embracing deep economic links while hedging against coercion is exactly what competitive coexistence demands.

Rather than seeking a sweeping ideological victory, Australia must be ready to compete on every front: militarily, economically and culturally, without descending into open war.

As experts noted, treating strategic competition as a constant condition can actually shape it in a sustainable way. In one analysis of strategic mental models, scholars argued that by accepting perpetual competition, we can channel it through law, norms and “competitive coexistence” frameworks, avoiding full-blown conflict even as rivals vie for advantage.

For Australia, this means building enough deterrence to make aggression unthinkable but also maintaining lines of communication and limited trade where possible, so as not to provoke instability.

The kill web and Australia’s ’Fight Tonight’ force

Ukraine’s war has been a brutal laboratory for modern warfare, proving that small, networked systems can negate big platforms. Laird highlighted how Ukraine married Western precision weapons (High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, F-16s, Patriots) with indigenous drone swarms and AI-guided targeting to create “intelligent mass”.

Cheap first-person view quadcopters and long-range loitering munitions, combined with satellite and electronic intelligence, allowed Ukrainian units to strike Russian tanks, ammunition depots and even strategic bombers at minimal cost.

One Ukrainian operation launched hundreds of commercial drones at Russian airbases, destroying dozens of billion-dollar warplanes for the price of a few thousand dollars in drones.

Even if 80–90 per cent were shot down, the cost-exchange ratio heavily favoured Ukraine.

This kill web approach has direct lessons for Australia’s force design. Traditional Australian Defence Force structures have been platform-centric and slow-moving.

But in a world of competitive coexistence, Canberra needs agility, mass and scale.

A recent Australian Defence College essay urged the ADF to build adaptive “kill webs” across all domains: integrated sensors, air defences, naval drones and cyber tools that work as one system. In practice, this means rapidly boosting capabilities that can be brought online now, not years away.

As analyst Ian Langford wrote, Australia must shift from dreaming of a 2030s “future force” to preparing for conflicts in the next 12–18 months. Immediate priorities include expanding distributed air defences (like National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System batteries in the north), acquiring swarming drone and missile systems, and accelerating cyber/electronic warfare tools.

These assets would enhance deterrence by complicating an aggressor’s calculations and provide the modular threats Laird calls “multiple, simultaneous threats” to keep adversaries off balance.

A “Fight Tonight” force also means deeper integration with allies’ intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) networks. For Ukraine, the flow of satellite imagery (from partners like the US and even Japan) into front-line targeting cells was a game changer. Australia is seeking similar multilateral sensor sharing.

For example, federating allied satellites under initiatives like NATO’s space surveillance program and extending those ties to Pacific partners would help Australia cover vast ocean approaches in real time. In short, the ADF’s “rear areas” now stretch across alliance networks and Canberra is moving to knit its systems into that fabric.

Building Australia’s industrial base and sovereign capability

Underpinning this readiness push is a recognition that industrial strategy is now grand strategy. Australia’s small population and limited budgets mean it cannot match China or Russia tank for tank. Instead, it must invest in “high leverage” weapons that pack a punch for their cost.

The new Anduril-designed and built Ghost Shark unmanned submersible program is a case in point: a cheap, mass-producible underwater drone rather than a handful of multibillion-dollar submarines. Laird noted that scaling such systems (e.g. 180 Ghost Sharks versus 15 manned subs) profoundly changes an adversary’s risk calculus.

But high-tech hardware must be matched by robust supply chains. Relying on foreign components can leave Australia exposed as demonstrated by China’s earlier punishments of Australian exporters during the COVID-19 era.

Canberra is therefore gradually pushing onshoring of critical tech: batteries for drones, domestic advanced electronics and munitions manufacturing.

This “defence industry renaissance” echoes Ukraine’s wartime experience, where thousands of small firms and even hobbyists created new weapons and repairs under fire. Australian policymakers are adopting that lesson: mobilising industry (well before crises hit) so that in a war, the factories hum, not sputter.

The defence imperatives of ’Competitive Coexistence’

What does all this mean for Australia’s defence posture under competitive coexistence?

In practice, Canberra must pursue a middle path. It will continue deepening alliances (US, AUKUS, Quad, south-east Asia) because collective action amplifies deterrence.

Yet it must retain enough autonomy to act if allies hesitate. Laird called this “strategic independence”, a deliberate build-up of credible capabilities so we are not entirely in another country’s pocket.

For Laird, key imperatives include:

• Readiness now (“Fight Tonight”) – prioritise proven, quickly deliverable systems (air defences, drones, cyber) over distant-future programs.
• Integrated kill webs – invest in distributed sensor-shooter networks, both domestically and with allies, rather than relying solely on big-ticket platforms.
• Industrial resilience – rebuild sovereign production (munitions, microelectronics, AI tools) so that Australia can mobilise in wartime without crippling imports.
• Allied ISR and support – embed Australian forces in multinational surveillance systems (space and cyber) as the backbone for targeting and situational awareness.

These steps acknowledge that we will be locked in competition with authoritarian powers for decades. It is not about appeasing them; it is about making conquest and coercion expensive and unlikely.

As Laird puts it, the goal is not to eradicate authoritarian regimes (an impossible task under nuclear deterrence and interdependence) but to manage the rivalry in a stable way – ensuring democracies like Australia maintain the credible force to defend their interests.

Final thoughts

Australia’s defence posture is being recast by the logic of competitive coexistence. The new strategic landscape with a durably authoritarian bloc on one side and a networked coalition of democracies on the other demands that Canberra be both tough-minded and innovative.

The ADF is pivoting from high-end “future” platforms towards agile, scalable systems that can “fight tonight”. It is forging closer ties and shared ISR networks with allies while simultaneously building up independent “industrial weight” at home.

In this age of enduring competition, deterrence will be grounded not in speeches or assurances but in demonstrated readiness and resilient capabilities.

Australia’s leaders are finally confronting the hard truth that success in a multipolar, competitive world requires serious preparation before the next crisis, investing now in the force structure and industrial base that will make possible a credible deterrent “competitive coexistence” rather than wishing the old order would return.

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..

Stephen Kuper

Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.