Reassessing the US Middle East scale down and its impact on Australia

In the aftermath of the Second World War, the US emerged as the single greatest economic, industrial, political and strategic power in the Western sphere of influence – supplanting the British Empire as the pre-eminent global power, challenged only by the Soviet Union. 

Buoyed by its unrivalled economic prosperity and capability and supported by the Bretton Woods Conference and creation of the United Nations, the US quickly established itself as the primary economic, political and strategic partner of choice for war-torn nations throughout Europe and Asia as the two rival superpowers and former allies jockeyed for position. 

The creation of strategic partnerships like NATO and direct strategic partnerships like the ANZUS treaty further served to underpin the long-term strategic security and prosperity of these nations well into the early 21st century. 

While the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War promised "the end of history" and what became known as the American Peace, or "Pax Americana". However, despite these promises, the rise of China, resurgence of Russia and broader development of the Indo-Pacific, combined with the ever pervasive asymmetric threats like violent extremism and non-state actors, all challenged this reality. 

Fast forward to today and the increasing economic, political and strategic competition both the US and its 'new world order' partners, including the UK and Australia, find themselves in is challenging the capability of the US to maintain its position as the pre-eminent global power, subsequently impacting the post-Second World War order. 

Enter the mercurial US President Donald Trump, who promised to withdraw the US from what he describes as "endless foreign wars", particularly in the Middle East, which have drained America's blood and treasure and, seemingly, resolve of the nation to provide the strategic umbrella for allies throughout Europe and the Indo-Pacific. 

This has been exemplified by the recent withdrawal of the US from parts of Syria, which has resulted in an emboldened Turkey attempting to re-establish itself and its sphere of influence within the confines of the former Ottoman Empire at the behest of the equally mercurial Turkish President Recep Erdogan, raising important questions for many nations, particularly Australia. 

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Recognising this, Dr Malcolm Davis, senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute spoke to Defence Connect, saying, "I think that we need to avoid conflating a withdrawal by Trump from Syria with a US pullback globally. It’s tempting to do so, and Trump talks about ending US commitment in what he calls ‘endless wars’, but a vital strategic relationship such as US-Aus is different from a discrete expeditionary deployment by the US into a conflict in the Middle East.

"With that caveat in mind, I do think that Trump has done real damage to the US’ international credibility by his actions in Syria, in abandoning a key ally, and he has in effect, directly assisted Russia and Iran to achieve their strategic objectives. I think the Syria issue relates more directly and more worryingly with Trump’s relationship with Putin, and secondly his unwillingness to listen to his key military experts and intelligence professionals – that speaks to his personal psychology as a leader more than anything else."

Challenging times ahead 

While ANZUS, the Cold War-era treaty signed between the US, Australia and New Zealand in 1951, remains a central pillar of Australia's long-term strategic planning, it is critical to recognise that the primary economic, political and strategic competitor, China, is an entirely different opponent to that of the Soviet Union. 

China, unlike the Soviet Union, has the economic capacity, political vision – despite internal security challenges – to directly challenge and in some cases out compete even the mighty, previously unmatched industrial, political and strategic capability of that great beacon of democracy the US, placing Australia at a critical juncture and precipice. 

In response, Dr Davis believes that no matter the long-term impact of President Trump's commitment to limiting America's entanglement in foreign conflagrations, Australia needs to be prepared to take greater responsibility for its national security in the Indo-Pacific, outlining a number of key points for Defence Connect:

"I’d argue that the US relationship with Australia will survive Trump – even another four years of Trump. The relationship is much deeper than one individual and is complex and multidimensional across many levels. We engage with the US across many policy levels, and our military to military relationship is never better and growing stronger by the day. I’m not seeing a collapse in the US-Australia alliance on the horizon. 

"Having said that, I do think that Australia should be prepared to do the following to mitigate risks posed by the Trump factor (assuming he somehow survives in office) or longer-term uncertainty on the US side which could emerge post-Trump: 

1. We need to burden share to a much greater degree than before, and accept that we can no longer base our defence planning on the assumption that in a major military crisis or a period leading up to a future war, the US will automatically be there for us. In fact, if we want to avoid that major military crisis, we have to do more than adopt a purely defensive/denial posture, and be postured well forward to counterbalance a rising China or to be able to assist the US and other key allies, notably Japan, to respond to challenges. We can’t be free-riders.

2. That means that our defence strategy, based around an emphasis on ‘air-sea gap’ needs urgent and comprehensive review, and the objective should be to consider how Australia can play a more forward and robust role in the Indo-Pacific region alongside the US and other key partners. 

3. That then has implications for a) ADF force posture; b) force structure and capability development beyond the 2016 IIP; and c) future levels of defence spending above the nominal 2 per cent GDP figure alluded to in DWP16. It also has huge implications for readiness, mobilisation and force sustainment. We must assume that we are going into a more dangerous and contested future that will have a higher operational tempo than in the past, with dramatically reduced warning times – and I think Dibb is correct – we are in ’strategic warning’. I’d go so far as to say it’s possibly a ‘pre-war period’. 

4. We need to think much more deeply about how we deal with political warfare being carried out by the Chinese state, and how we respond to ‘grey zone’ threats.

5. We need to build much closer defence relations with key partners other than the US, and here I’m focusing on Japan, Indonesia, India and, potentially, UK and possibly France. Building new defence relationships to strengthen our ability to counterbalance against China, and respond to regional crises is essential. 

6. Finally, we need to start thinking about what people call ‘Plan B’ if things do go badly wrong. I don’t see Plan B being more of Plan A, but we need to consider what our options are. Certainly, there should be no consideration whatsoever of strategic alignment with or acquiescing to Beijing, so with that essential requirement in place, what are our options if, for example, either Trump is re-elected in 2020 and then does real damage to essential US strategic relationships, or a post-Trump administration reprioritises international posture and presence or defence spending in favour of fixing growing and endemic domestic challenges in the US (how would a Warren-Sanders admin respond to growing international challenges or sustaining military modernisation v serious domestic problems?)." 

Your thoughts

The nation is defined by its relationship with the region, with access to the growing economies and to strategic sea-lines-of-communication supporting over 90 per cent of global trade, a result of the cost-effective and reliable nature of sea transport.

Indo-Pacific Asia is at the epicentre of the global maritime trade, with about US$5 trillion worth of trade flowing through the South China Sea and the strategic waterways and chokepoints of south-east Asia annually.

For Australia, a nation defined by this relationship with traditionally larger, yet economically weaker regional neighbours, the growing economic prosperity of the region and corresponding arms build-up, combined with ancient and more recent enmities, competing geopolitical, economic and strategic interests, places the nation at the centre of the 21st century's 'great game'.

Enhancing Australia’s capacity to act as an independent power, incorporating great power-style strategic economic, diplomatic and military capability serves as a powerful symbol of Australia’s sovereignty and evolving responsibilities in supporting and enhancing the security and prosperity of Indo-Pacific Asia. 

Shifting the public discussion away from the default Australian position of "it is all a little too difficult, so let’s not bother" will yield unprecedented economic, diplomatic, political and strategic opportunities for the nation. 

Rear Admiral Kevin Scarce also issued a challenge for Australia's political and strategic policy leaders, saying: "If we observe that the level of debate among our leaders is characterised by mud-slinging, obfuscation and the deliberate misrepresentation of the views of others, why would the community behave differently ... Our failure to do so will leave a very damaging legacy for future generations."

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia's future role and position in the Indo-Pacific and what you would like to see from Australia's political leaders in terms of shaking up the nation's approach to our regional partners.

We would also like to hear your thoughts on the avenues Australia should pursue to support long-term economic growth and development in support of national security in the comments section below, or get in touch with This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.or at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..