The unthinkable option: Australia’s nuclear possibilities

Australia's earliest strategic relationship with the British Empire established a foundation of dependence that would characterise all of the nation's future defence and national security relationships both in the Indo-Pacific and the wider world.

As British power slowly declined following the First World War and the US emerged as the pre-eminent economic, political and strategic power during the Second World War – Australia became dependent on 'Pax Americana', or the American Peace. 

Recognising this, Australia's strategic and defence planning has been intrinsically defined and impacted by a number of different, yet interconnected and increasingly complex factors, namely:

• The dominance, benevolence and continuing stability of its primary strategic partner;
• The geographic isolation of the continent, highlighted by the ‘tyranny of distance’;
• A relatively small population in comparison with its neighbours; and
• Increasingly, the geo-political, economic and strategic ambition and capabilities of Australia’s Indo-Pacific Asian neighbours.

While the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War cemented America's position as the pre-eminent world power – this period was relatively short lived as costly engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq, peace-keeping interventions in southern Europe and enduring global security responsibilities have drained American 'blood' and 'treasure' – eroding the domestic political, economic and strategic resolve and capacity of the US to unilaterally counter the rise of totalitarian regimes and peer competitors in both China and Russia.

The broader economic, political and strategic rise of Indo-Pacific Asia further compounds the US and its ability to secure Australia's strategic interests, challenging the nation's long-held belief that it will never really need to do its own heavily lifting in a tactically and strategically challenging environment.

While all of these events unfolded, Australia positioned itself as an 'indispensable' US ally and partner, essential for the ongoing economic, political and strategic stability of the Indo-Pacific – in return for a record setting period of economic growth and security, Australia benefited from the protection of the US nuclear umbrella and was never required to do the heavy lifting. 

Surveying the lay of the land

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Enter widely respected Australian strategic and defence policy analyst Hugh White, who has recently kicked the hornets nest of debate with his new book, How to Defend Australia, and a series of supporting opinion pieces. 

White set the scene for the Australian public, presenting perhaps one of the most asinine questions of recent strategic debate: "Should Australia defend itself? Our choice is not an easy one. Just because we probably can build the forces to defend ourselves does not mean we necessarily should. As we have seen, the costs would be very high, and it is not a foregone conclusion that the benefits outweigh those costs."

White has used his position of prominence to advocate for a range of force structure, acquisition, modernisation and capability restructuring and developments shifting from the major acquisition programs identified as priorities of the Australian government's record $200 billion investment in capability, including: 

• Scrapping the $35 billion Hunter Class program – selling the Hobart and Canberra Class vessels; 
• Increasing the acquisition plans of the Attack Class submarines from 12 to 36; 
• An increase in Australia's purchase of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and long-range strike capabilities; and
• A consideration of Australia developing or acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities. 

While this represents a quick summary of White's proposal, it broadly encapsulates his modus operandi – that is the path of least resistance and a belief that Australia is incapable of affecting its own future. 

However, his most controversial option, the possibility of Australia developing or acquiring a domestic nuclear capability, remains an interesting conundrum for Australia's political and strategic leaders and public to consider as the region we are increasingly dependent upon continues to evolve and challenge our preconceptions of how we think the world should work. 

Shifting the dialogue on nuclear weapons

While floating the idea, White specifically states he "neither predicts nor advocates" for the development of a domestic nuclear arsenal, yet it has been met with increasing debate and dialogue, with many taking to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute to discuss the options and the very idea of Australia's own nuclear arsenal, and the supporting doctrine required. 

A key component of this discussion is reshaping the debate, ASPI senior fellow Rod Lyon clearly articulates this in what he describes as "crossing the nuclear Rubicon": 

• "Australians to think differently about nuclear weapons — as direct contributors to our defence rather than as abstract contributors to global stability;
• a bipartisan political consensus to support proliferation, during both development and deployment of a nuclear arsenal;
• a shift in Australia’s diplomatic footprint, to build a case for our leaving the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and abrogating the Treaty of Rarotonga, while still being able to retail a coherent story of arms control and nuclear order;
• serious investment in the technologies and skill-sets required to construct and deploy, safely and securely, both nuclear warheads and appropriate delivery vehicles; and
• a strategy which gives meaning to our arsenal and an explanation of our thinking to our neighbours and our major ally."

Lyon also goes on to expand on White's central premise for considering an Australian nuclear option, what White calls "nuclear blackmail", defined more simply as nuclear coercion by a nuclear armed and conventionally well-equipped great power, providing examples of Chinese, Indian, Pakistani and, most relevant for Australia, French concepts of 'minimum deterrence'. 

Lyon states the French Cold War nuclear doctrine, which "called for an arsenal that could ‘rip the arm off’ a superpower, leaving it an amputee among its more able-bodied peers", fits in well with Australia's existing conventional doctrine, which is focused on controlling the sea-air gap and limiting a hostile nation's attempts to coerce the otherwise isolated nation. 

Building on this, Lyon articulates: "So, should Australia build its own nuclear arsenal? I think the answer is, ‘Yes, if it needs to.’ That’s a big ‘if’ — indeed, a series of big ‘ifs’: if the regional strategic environment becomes appreciably darker; if US extended nuclear deterrence is no longer available, or patently incredible; and, perhaps just as importantly, if there’s bipartisan Australian acceptance of the need for an indigenous arsenal."

The options - Leased nuclear weapons or a model based on France or Israel?

Lyon's French option is one that requires closer consideration and study as France's nuclear doctrine is dependent upon large, nuclear-powered, ballistic missile submarines that serve as a continuous-at-sea-deterrence doctrine similar to the model used by the British Royal Navy and its own nuclear deterrence strategy. 

More broadly, throughout NATO the US 'loans' free-fall nuclear weapons to key non-nuclear NATO allies including Belgium and Germany to serve as key force multipliers in the region, while also basing nuclear weapons out of Incirlik Air Base in Turkey – a site of contention between the US and Soviet Union during the Cold War. 

Shifting to the Middle East, Israel, while not a 'declared' nuclear weapons state (NWS), received early support from France and has an estimate arsenal of between 80 and 400 warheads spread across free-fall nuclear bombs, submarine-launched cruise missile stationed onboard their fleet of five, modified, German designed and built Dolphin Class conventional submarines and the Jericho series of intermediate to intercontinental range ballistic missiles. 

Both the French and Israeli models provide interesting concepts for Australian consideration, should the nation seek to pursue a domestic nuclear arsenal – particularly the submarine leg of their respective nuclear deterrence forces could be extrapolated for implementation on Australia's existing Collins Class and future Attack Class vessels to serve as an Australian force multiplier and strategic leveller in the face of a rapidly evolving regional order. 

It is important to recognise that any decision to acquire or develop nuclear weapons is not an easy decision to make and should not be taken lightly and should be done in full view of the Australian public following the presentation of the facts for the public's consideration. 

Your thoughts

The nation is defined by its relationship with the region, with access to the growing economies and to strategic sea-lines-of-communication supporting over 90 per cent of global trade, a result of the cost-effective and reliable nature of sea transport.

Indo-Pacific Asia is at the epicentre of the global maritime trade, with about US$5 trillion worth of trade flowing through the South China Sea and the strategic waterways and chokepoints of south-east Asia annually.

For Australia, a nation defined by this relationship with traditionally larger, yet economically weaker regional neighbours, the growing economic prosperity of the region and corresponding arms build-up, combined with ancient and more recent enmities, competing geopolitical, economic and strategic interests, places the nation at the centre of the 21st century's 'great game'.

Enhancing Australia’s capacity to act as an independent power, incorporating great power-style strategic economic, diplomatic and military capability serves not only as a powerful symbol of Australia’s sovereignty and evolving responsibilities in supporting and enhancing the security and prosperity of Indo-Pacific Asia. 

Shifting the public discussion away from the default Australian position of "it is all a little too difficult, so let’s not bother" will yield unprecedented economic, diplomatic, political and strategic opportunities for the nation. 

A domestic nuclear capability is part of developing a great power-style strategic economic, diplomatic and military capability and may serve as essential for guaranteeing Australia's sovereignty and long-term economic, political and strategic integrity as the 21st century and its great power competition continues to evolve.

Former South Australian governor and retired Rear Admiral Kevin Scarce issued a challenge for Australia's political and strategic policy leaders, saying: "If we observe that the level of debate among our leaders is characterised by mud-slinging, obfuscation and the deliberate misrepresentation of the views of others, why would the community behave differently ... Our failure to do so will leave a very damaging legacy for future generations."

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia's future role and position in the Indo-Pacific and what you would like to see from Australia's political leaders in terms of shaking up the nation's approach to our regional partners.

We would also like to hear your thoughts on the avenues Australia should pursue to support long-term economic growth and development in support of national security in the comments section below, or get in touch with This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.or at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..