New kit is great, but lets get real about the ADF’s manpower

Australia as both a continent and a nation is unique in its position, enjoying relative geographic isolation from the flash points of global and regional conflagration of the 20th century – blessed with unrivalled resource wealth and industrial potential, the nation has been able to embrace vastly different approaches to the nation's strategic role and responsibilities. 

Modern warfare has rapidly evolved over the last three decades, from high-tempo, manoeuvre-based operations that leveraged the combined capabilities of air, sea, land and space forces to direct troops, equipment and firepower around the battlefield during the first Gulf War, to low intensity humanitarian and peacekeeping operations in southern Europe and the south Pacific, and the eventual rise of asymmetrical, guerilla conflicts in the mountains of Afghanistan and streets of Iraq.

However, the growing conventional and hybrid capabilities of peer and near-peer competitors – namely Russia and China – combined with the growing modernisation, capability enhancements and reorganisation of force structures in the armies of nations including India, Indonesia, Vietnam and Thailand, all contribute to the changing nature of contemporary warfare. 

This perfect storm of factors, swirling like a maelstrom across Australia's northern borders, has largely gone unnoticed by the Australian public, beyond the odd port visit by American or, as recently happened, Chinese naval vessels that seem to cause momentary flurries of concern – meanwhile, Australia's strategic and political leaders appear to be caught in an increasingly dangerous paradigm of thinking, one of continuing US-led dominance and Australia maintaining its position as a supplementary power. 

Shifting the dial 

Prior to establishing a new paradigm and priorities, it is critical to understand the nation’s history of strategic policy making and the key priorities that have defined Australia's position in the Indo-Pacific since federation – traditionally, Australia’s strategic and defence planning has been intrinsically defined and impacted by a number of different yet interconnected and increasingly complex factors, namely:

• Guaranteeing the enduring benevolence and continuing stability of its primary strategic partner – via continued support of their strategic ambitions;
• The geographic isolation of the continent, highlighted by the 'tyranny of distance';
• A relatively small population in comparison with its neighbours; and
• Increasingly, the geopolitical, economic and strategic ambition and capabilities of Australia’s Indo-Pacific Asian neighbours.

This state of 'strategic dependence' has placed Australia at a disadvantage and entrenched a belief that the nation is both incapable of greater independent tactical and strategic action and must consistently support the designs and ambitions of great powers, with little concern for the broader impact on Australia and its national interests as a form of insurance. 

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This growing need for a 'reset' in the nation's strategic and defence planning has gained increasing traction in recent months, with opposition defence spokesperson Richard Marles using the election to commit the ALP to conducting a new Defence Force Posture Review – the first such review since 2012.

Further to this, Air Marshal (Ret'd) Leo Davies and Catherine McGregor have called for a 'reset' of Australia's defence posture – with Davies telling McGregor: "Our existing naval and air ­assets may not be able to defend the country’s sea lines of communication — the primary maritime routes used by military and trade vessels — or fight a hostile foreign power."

"Without a reset we will keep developing it against an outdated set of strategic circumstances," Davies explained further.

One of the core failures of all previous conversations appears to be the discussion about manpower and adequately supporting the Australian Defence Force with the personnel required to sustainably support prolonged tactical and strategic responsibilities in our primary area of focus, the Indo-Pacific. 

The manpower situation

As it stands, the personnel budget for the Australian Defence Force for 2018-19 is $11,776 million, supporting 14,689 for the Royal Australian Navy, 14,295 for the Royal Australian Air Force and 30,810 Australian Army – for a total ADF strength of 59,794 personnel. Additionally, the budget supports 16,393 within the Australian Public Service (APS) and 19,850 reservists.

By comparison, Indonesia, our nearest regional power neighbour, has an active military of 395,500 – broken up into approximately 300,000 in the Indonesian Army, 74,000 for the Indonesian Air Force and 37,850 for the Indonesian Navy.

Looking towards an economic and political comparison – the Republic of Korea has a similarly sized economy and political position to that of Australia, however as a result of its ongoing struggle against North Korea, it has a significantly larger, more muscular military of approximately 599,000 personnel in active service.

This is broken up into 464,000 for the Republic of Korea Army, approximately 70,000 for the Republic of Korea Navy (including Marines) and 65,000 for the Republic of Korea Air Force.

In light of the relatively small numbers fielded by the ADF, the question about personnel numbers becomes an increasingly important one – with the key question becoming: as the Indo-Pacific becomes increasingly contested and Australia's interests are challenged, is the ADF large enough to reliably execute the mission in a radically evolving geo-political and strategic order?

It is important to recognise that while Australia does comparatively “punch above its weight”, the nation has since the end of the 1990s continued to reduce its capability to actively and assertively project sustainable, tactical and strategic presence in the Indo-Pacific, thus limiting Australia’s capacity to act independently. 

Dr Malcolm Davis of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute poses an important question, telling Defence Connect, "It is time for us to throw open the debate about our force structure. It is time to ask what more do we need to do and what do we need to be capable of doing."

Political will versus a changing strategic reality

Despite the economic and political similarities between Australia and Korea – one thing that becomes glaringly apparent is the latter's direct exposure to an ever-present and existential threat has prompted the development of a highly capable and sizeable military with increasing expeditionary capabilities and significant flow-on benefits for the Korean economy, which is now the world's 11th largest with a GDP per capita of approximately US$25,000. 

This raises yet another question: is it a lack of political will or public will preventing the development of the armed forces and supporting industry that Australia is going to require in the coming decades? 

This is particularly relevant as the qualitative and quantitative edge of the US narrows in light of developments by peer and near-peer adversaries in China and Russia – two nations with their own economic, political and strategic ambitions for both the Indo-Pacific and the broader global order. 

As an example, if Australia was to increase the combined strength of the Australian Defence Force to 100,000, this would still represent approximately 0.4 per cent of the Australian population serving in the military – it would, however, enable a broader range of tactical and strategic capabilities and would serve to develop a truly independent Australian defence capability in an increasingly troubled period in modern history. 

Building on this, if Australia were to increase the combined strength of the Australian Defence Force to 150,000, it would represent approximately 0.6 per cent, while a combined force of 250,000 would represent approximately 1 per cent of the population in uniform. 

Your thoughts 

Dr Davis summarises the predicament perfectly, when he told Defence Connect: "We need to burden share to a much greater degree than before, and accept that we can no longer base our defence planning on the assumption that in a major military crisis or a period leading up to a future war, the US will automatically be there for us.

"In fact, if we want to avoid that major military crisis, we have to do more than adopt a purely defensive/denial posture, and be postured well forward to counterbalance a rising China or to be able to assist the US and other key allies, notably Japan, to respond to challenges. We can’t be free-riders."

The nation is defined by its relationship with the region, with access to the growing economies and to strategic sea lines of communication supporting over 90 per cent of global trade, a result of the cost-effective and reliable nature of sea transport.

Indo-Pacific Asia is at the epicentre of the global maritime trade, with about US$5 trillion worth of trade flowing through the South China Sea and the strategic waterways and chokepoints of south-east Asia annually.

For Australia, a nation defined by this relationship with traditionally larger yet economically weaker regional neighbours, the growing economic prosperity of the region and corresponding arms build-up, combined with ancient and more recent enmities, competing geopolitical, economic and strategic interests, places the nation at the centre of the 21st century’s “great game”.

Enhancing Australia’s capacity to act as an independent power, incorporating great power-style strategic economic, diplomatic and military capability, serves not only as a powerful symbol of Australia’s sovereignty and evolving responsibilities in supporting and enhancing the security and prosperity of Indo-Pacific Asia.

Shifting the public discussion away from the default Australian position of “it is all a little too difficult, so let’s not bother” will provide unprecedented economic, diplomatic, political and strategic opportunities for the nation. 

In this multi-part series, Defence Connect will contribute to the ongoing debate around Australia's force structure, long-term acquisition programs and paradigm shift from a 'defence force' towards an 'armed force' discussing potential force structures based on 150,000 and 200,000 personnel respectively. 

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia's future role and position in the Indo-Pacific and what you would like to see from Australia's political leaders in terms of increasing the budget, manpower and capabilities available to the ADF in the comments section below, or get in touch with This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..