NATO watches on as Turkey-Russia tensions rise over Idlib

The recent airstrike brings the number of Turkish fatalities for the month of February to 50 and is a sign that the 2019 Sochi ceasefire agreement has not achieved the result of preventing conflict between Turkish ground forces, the Syrian Arab Army and Russian forces in the Syrian province of Idlib. 

The relationship between Ankara and Moscow was seen to be becoming more unified as it looked like NATO-aligned Turkey may be moving away from the US, signified in the shunning of the US Patriot air defence missile system in favour of the Russian S-400 air defence system. However, it seems that a clash in strategic interests in the Middle East is bringing the likelihood of intentional or accidental military entanglement is becoming increasingly likely. This is making the future of the situation on the ground in north-western Idlib even harder to predict before Turkey upped its involvement in the province and Syria proper. 

NATO watches on

As a member of the NATO alliance, these tensions become increasingly significant. Firstly, a previous shift by Turkey and President Recep Erdogan away from the US and its allies such as Saudi Arabia has been placing strain on these relationships as Turkey began looking to court Russia due to perceived shared interest in exploiting a seeming lapse or decline in US power in the Middle East region, as well as the image of President Erdogan and President Vladimir Putin both sharing a political strongman persona backed up by autocratic control of power.

Secondly, by being a member of NATO, Turkey through its actions in Syria could have very real consequences for other NATO member countries as they may be called upon to honour their treaty obligations should Turkish sovereignty or its borders be threatened by an expansion of the conflict in Idlib or retaliation by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's regime supported by Russia. What is preventing any NATO action due to its obligations is that the fighting and military actions have been entirely concentrated in Syrian territory after the Turkish invasion, which has created a buffer zone for the Turkish borders and its people. 

Ankara and Moscow: Conflicting interests in the Middle East

Ankara has been actively supporting the last rebel held strongholds in northern Syria as it continues its struggle to overthrow the regime of President Assad. In a report from Reuters, an opposition military source advised that 15,000 Turkish troops had entered north-west Syria as convoys poured across the border.

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Turkish forces are delving ever deeper into Syrian territory as the operation continues setting up forward outposts to serve as observational and defensive positions should rebel forces in Idlib be pushed back towards the Turkish border, as well as targeting Syrian government positions under what it has labelled Operation Spring Shield. 

Through this military action, Turkey is not only looking to assist opposition forces against Assad but to also achieve its goals of securing its southern boarder from a constant influx of refugees as well as any military actions as well as to combat Kurdish militia groups such as the PKK and YPG that it labels as terrorists and prevent them from being able to plan and carry out attacks on Turkish soil. This continued action is coming at a high cost to Turkey as financial and human costs rise.

On the opposing side Russia has long supported the government of President Assad, having deployed significant military resources in an effort to bolster and prop up the Assad regime, including 63,000 Russian troops who have been rotated into the conflict between 2015 and 2018, as well as through a constant air power presence conducting routine air strikes against the rebel strongholds in Idlib, causing huge loss of life and helping to secure major gains over the last few months for the the Syrian Arab Army and the Assad regime. 

With the US attempting to decrease its footprint in costly conflicts in the Middle East, Russia and President Putin can see an opportunity to become the key influence and global power in the region and a failed attempt to prop up the Assad regime would be a huge hit to this new goal. However, in Turkey and President Erdogan, Russia faces a determined middle power attempting to expand its influence and committed to its current actions. 

Connor Dilleen, a former employee of the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Office of National Assessments, in an article for ASPI (Australian Strategic Policy Institute) has outlined these conflicting aims: 

"The problem for both Erdogan and Putin is that they have both invested heavily in pursuing contrary outcomes in the Syrian civil war and neither can afford to be seen to blink. Erdogan has committed much to demonstrate that Ankara can enforce its will across the Middle East, and a failure in Idlib would be a blow to his ego and personal prestige, at home and abroad. Likewise, Putin has made Syria central to his plan for Moscow to supplant Washington as the key mediator in Middle East conflicts. A failure to help Assad reassert Damascus’s control over Idlib would seriously undermine Russia’s credibility in the region.

"Prior to 27 February, Erdogan had appeared willing to de-escalate tensions in Idlib by accepting a proposal from Germany and France for talks with Russia on Idlib in Istanbul on 5 March. But he seems to have taken a firmer line following last week’s events. He reportedly told Putin during a phone call that Russia should stay out of Ankara’s fight with the Assad regime. Ankara also launched Operation Spring Shield targeting Syrian government forces operating in Idlib."

Turkey in no mans Land?

While President Erdogan has expressed his continued commitment to holding back the Assad regime in Idlib, the continued push by the Russian supported Syrian forces are raising doubts that President Erdogan will be able to hold the SAA back and prevent the eventual loss of Idlib and the opposition forces with it.

While Ankara continues its commitment to is operation it has little support from others both in region and across the broader international community.

With the slight against the US still in everyone's mind, Dilleen comments, "Erdogan knows that Ankara is powerless to counter Russian air supremacy in the region. The S-400 air defence system isn’t scheduled to become operational until April. Erdogan’s desperation was apparent in his early February request to Washington for two batteries of Patriot air defence missile systems. Erdogan’s overture to Washington is important – it must have been galling for him personally, given that Ankara’s rejection of the Patriot system in favour of Russia’s S-400 caused the current rupture in its relationship with Washington, but it also showed the lengths he may be prepared to go to regain the upper hand in Idlib."

Turkey is quickly running out of supporters for its actions. US support for any of the rebel forces has waned as accusations of extremist group infiltration and ideology have tinged the remaining rebel groups but Trump has reaffirmed his support for Turkey despite the pull out of US forces. Middle Eastern states, some of which have supported the opposition forces such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt, have condemned the actions as a violation of sovereignty, and Turkey's threats to open its borders with Europe to allow the travel of refugees creating the possibility of yet another refugee crisis is unlikely to win friends in Europe.

Turkey not completely powerless in this asymmetrical relationship with Russia

While Turkey is facing an uphill battle to get its way in Idlib and Syria, it still holds some power to sway the outcome, whether this is through additional deals with Russia and Syria or a return to stable relations with Russia at least. Both countries are heavily reliant on each other for trade with Turkey, being a major importer of Russian natural gas and a key player in the black sea meaning that both countries have an interest in Normalising their relationship.

Soner Cagaptay, the director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute, argues that there are still options for Turkey moving forward. 

"Putin’s goal is to end the war in Syria on terms favorable to him and Assad, ultimately reaching a political settlement through the so-called Astana Process. Turkey’s participation in that process is key if the outcome is to have any sort of international legitimacy. Without Ankara’s imprimatur, the Astana Process would become a 'Friends of Assad' club in the eyes of the world, since its only other current participants are Russia and Iran," Cagaptay said. 

"Putin also knows that turning the screws too hard in Idlib might push Erdogan back into Washington’s arms, thereby repeating Joseph Stalin’s misstep of 1945-6, when Soviet demands for Turkish territory spurred the country to join NATO and become a close US ally. The Kremlin seems to realise that its long-term strategic interests may be better served by offering Erdogan a new deal in Idlib, even if it plans to renege on that deal later on. Putin may even allow Turkey to conduct symbolically powerful strikes on Assad regime targets."

It appears at this stage that if Putin offers an Idlib deal Erdogan will have little option but to accept in order to both save face as well as to continue his objective of securing Turkey's borders and combating Kurdish militia in northern Syria, even if the aim of preventing the Assad regime from reassuming control is impossible.

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