From ‘war on terror' to ‘great power competition’: A role change for special ops?

From the beginning of the war on terror, special operations forces (SOF) have been the cornerstone of counter terrorism efforts around the world with high profile missions including Task Force 145’s successful tracking of the infamous leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq Abu Musab al Zarqawi in 2006 or the renowned SEAL raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound in 2011, and more recently the killing of ISIS caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2019. These missions dramatically display SOF’s centrality in the US counter terrorism machine.

In nearly 20 years of constant deployment throughout the world, the SOF of the US military, in close partnership with the intelligence community, have developed into a highly efficient and effective counter terrorism force with globe-spanning reach.

In the eyes of the public only the image of a drone taking out a key al-Qaeda connection in places such as Yemen can outdo these teams of operators as the emblematic instrument of the war on terror. Indeed, the use of these covert masters of special operations has paradoxically become routine and expected.

History of special ops

Modern special forces as they exist were created during World War II, however military establishments considered them misfits of only peripheral utility. SOF units became another competitor within the military’s inter- and intra-service rivalries over missions and resources.

The US military’s general view was that SOF should serve as an auxiliary component, such as conducting deep reconnaissance, in support of the main conventional effort in the planned wars of Europe or north-east Asia. However, the special operations community, often over the fierce objections of traditional military leadership, benefited from key political patronage and protection to grow and expand within the military establishment.

The independence of SOF only grew throughout the Cold War, in particular the US Army Special Forces (Green Berets) was tasked with countering the Soviet-supported guerrilla movements that sprang up across Africa, Asia and Latin America through unconventional warfare.

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The 9/11 attacks brought on yet more focus on SOF's. The “war on terror” meant that for the first time in modern American history, the greatest threat to national security was not a nation-state but a network of groups and individuals within a larger global movement.

The unique security challenges of terrorism are ideally suited to the strengths of special operations forces. JSOC, as the parent of the United States’ premier counter terrorism units that also already enjoyed an established cooperative relationship with the intelligence community, logically took a leading role in this new war.

SOF's in the new millenium

In their paper, published by The Washington Quarterly titled, 'The New American Way of War: Special Operations Forces in the War on Terrorism', Daniel Byman and Ian Merritt outline the state of special forces operations during the war on terror.

"Although less dramatic than the killings or arrests of high-value terrorists, the liaison and training skills that SOF honed in the anti-communist counterinsurgency era became invaluable again against jihadist-linked insurgencies around the Muslim world. With the exception of the major American war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, SOF were (and still are) often in a supporting role working 'by, with, and through' partner nation forces — be they national militaries or local militias — that do much of the heavy lifting in counter terrorism and counterinsurgency operations," Byman and Merritt state.

"In Africa alone, the US SOF presence has grown almost exponentially since 2006, to a current [2018] presence of 1,700 personnel operating in 20 countries in nearly 100 different training, advising, and assistance missions.2 In 2016, as part of the global campaign against al-Qaida, the Islamic State, and their many affiliates and offshoots, American operators were present on every continent except Antarctica, primarily in small training and liaison roles to support partner nation capacities in their respective fights against jihadist-inspired terrorism and insurgency."

SOF into the 2020s shift to the great power competition.

In the opening paragraphs of the 2018 National Defense Strategy lies a statement signalling a great shift is to occur in the world of special operations. It states: "Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in US National security." 

Through this document the Trump administration suggested a strategic re-emphasis with far-reaching consequences for the missions and activities of the nations SOF.

Since 9/11, America has more than doubled the size of its SOF and tripled its budget. With this shift occurring it may require intricate details and guidance about changes, cuts, priorities as well as mission structures and overall strategies for SOF to remain relevant as security concerns and doctrine shift towards new goals.

Changes may already be changing as President Donald Trump is seemingly keen to exit "never ending wars" in the Middle East and reduce the American footprint in Africa as forces there continue to fight the global jihadist movement on the ground in places like Yemen, Somalia and the Sahel; military operations that came to public light after the death of four American special operations soldiers in Niger. Since then, President Trump has been toying with the idea of reducing the number of forces in Africa to free them up for use in the new objectives of power competition. This has not been without criticism, for example this month Jim Inhope, a Republican senator, wrote for The Washington Post outlining the importance of continued operations in the African continent for counter terrorism as well as highlighting its role in the power struggle with China and Russia.

"Americans can’t afford for them to lose [American trained local forces combating terrorist groups]. Terrorists hate freedom everywhere, but they hate the United States the most. If they’re allowed to operate in failed states or ungoverned territory, they’ll be planning, training and launching terrorist attacks against our allies — and eventually us," said Inhope.

"The need to be involved in Africa is about more than just countering the terrorist threat. If we don’t maintain — or, frankly, even expand — our commitment there, we will cede influence and access across the continent to Russia and China. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping see what I see: the strategic importance of Africa. But as the United States is considering pulling back, Russia and China are surging in their investment."

This example of contention or disagreement signals the difficulty of knowing the balance needed to maintain current operation while shifting to new goals, or if this is even possible at the same time, and is highlighted in growing difficulty of local defence forces in combating a growing Jihadist movement in north and west Africa led by al-Qaeda and Islamic State affiliate groups, such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic Maghreb, Ansar Dine, Boko Haram and Al Shabaab.

Alice Friend and Shannon Culbertson, writing for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, provide a number of possible scenarios that could occur with this shift in doctrine:

1. Business as usual – Without explicit changes in missions, deployments or force structure, special operations may be inclined to continue with what has been the status quo for 20 years. The forces have spent a vast majority of their years focused almost exclusively on terrorism and insurgency, continuation would be comfortable. It may also be very agreeable to policy makers who still fear the threat of terrorism and wish for a group such as SOF to continue to focus on counter-terrorism despite the shift of conventional forces elsewhere.

2. Home alone – With a lack of clarity about its role in the new strategic landscape SOF may be able to forge its own way forward distinct from the shift of conventional forces. This entrepreneurship may be expressed through minor changes such as internal recalibration of resources and activities, however this may lead to increased  disconnect between civilian leadership and SOF leading to increased friction. When left on their own there is no doubt SOF elements can be engines of innovation, but without guidance of frame work this could possibly drive them in the wrong direction alienating them from civilian leadership and more conventional military planning.

3. The art of the possible – SOF has the capability to play a major role in strategic competition. For example, in robust nuclear deterrence relationships force on force confrontations are highly unlikely, leading to a push into the grey zone where irregular warfare takes pre-eminence and could be highly valuable. With the use of economic power and the use of private military companies in areas like Ukraine, the strategic power competition is already highly irregular as it stands.

If greater conflict was to occur, SOF could play a key role, for example by limited demonstrations of force to take out targets previously thought to be beyond reach such Qassem Soleimani, or in war to use its capabilities to capture key targets such as airfields, conduct sabotage, complete reconnaissance, and by targeting enemy leadership.

To support such a shift to a campaign of competition would require invention of new mission areas, a reprioritisation of current funding and forces, as well as a high level of innovation to find its capabilities within the new strategy. This would be an extremely lengthy and difficult task.

4. Supply side of SOF – For the first time in almost 20 years, SOF will be faced with flat rather than growing resources, increase in one area may need to be met with cuts in another. For example, cuts may need to occur in African and Middle Eastern operations to enable resources to be stretched for new objectives. This would at the least lead to review of current operations to fit into the new strategic nexus. However, current operations may be reshaped or re-marketed to support new goals, for example a continued presence in Africa, Iraq or Afghanistan could be argued is within the interest of the great power competition by stabilising the region and helping to combat influence from China and Russia.

What these examples demonstrate is that there is not yet any clear guidance in the way that SOF are to be deployed as greater strategy changes, and it is not until guidance in the way of concrete new policy that the role of SOF and how it may transition can be determined.

Australian special operation forces and your thoughts

With the global strategy of our most important ally seemingly shifting and the role of SOF into the future in question, what does this mean for our own special forces operations. Does it mean that our focus should shift if counter-terrorism operations give way to a great power competition oriented strategy? Or would this leave us vulnerable to terrorist threats by lightening pressure on organisations that are seeking new relevance and new locations with power vacuums to exploit.

Let us know your thoughts on whether the role of special operations forces needs to shift towards the great power competition or whether counter terrorism is still the most important focus of these type of specialised forces, as well as whether you think Australia should have a completely different role for its special ops forces that meets our needs rather than the needs of our allies, or whether the needs are one and the same. As always, comment below or email This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..