Less kowtowing, more cowboy: ASPI head

With each passing day the impact of the coronavirus upon global supply chains is becoming painfully apparent, with Australia’s economy teetering on the edge of disaster, national resilience declining and public support for a co-ordinated response growing.

However, viewing the impact of the pandemic in isolation to Australia’s broader national security and national resilience further exposes the nation at a point in time when such distinctions are increasingly blurred. 

Australia is unlike virtually every other developed nation, it has enjoyed a record near three decades of economic prosperity and stability, buoyed by the immense mineral and resource wealth of the landmass and the benevolence of the post-Second World War political, economic and strategic order.

As a result, both the public and government are relatively unaccustomed to the economic, political and strategic realities of mass social isolation, a comparatively mild form of rationing and what seems to be a relatively low, albeit tragic body count, however, it isn't all doom and gloom as the COVID-19 predicament seems to have shaken the Australian public's confidence in the public policy status quo.

Across the Indo-Pacific, competing economic, political and strategic interests, designs and ambitions are beginning to clash, flying in contrast to the projections of many historians at the end of the Cold War – further compounding these issues is the continued instability caused by the coronavirus and concerns about ecological collapse.

Driven by an unprecedented economic transformation, propelling once developing nations onto the world stage, the region, the globe and its established powers are having to adjust to a dramatically different global power paradigm – one committed to undermining and influencing the fabric of Australian and Western democracies.

In this new era of increasing nation-state competition, driven largely by the great power competition between the US and China and the subsequent impact on nations, Australia is finding itself at the epicentre of the new global paradigm with unique economic, political and strategic implications for the nation’s national security.

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This has prompted an increasing number of strategic policy experts, journalists and politicians to increasingly vocalise the growing demands from the Australian public to do more to ensure Australia's economic, political and strategic integrity.

Recently, Paul Kelly penned a piece drawing together the major players in the growing debate surrounding the development and implementation of a co-ordinated response to ensure Australia's long-term national resilience, security and sovereignty in an increasingly disrupted world, namely former Defence and ASIO chief Dennis Richardson. 

In response, ASPI executive director Peter Jennings has responded to the thoughts and commentary put forward by Richardson, furthering the debate with a piece titled 'Better safe than sorry on China', in which he calls for Australia to embrace its maverick soul to better position the nation for the era of disruption. 

Uncomfortable truths of an ever more competitive world

Jennings is quick to set the scene, articulating the slow draw that has encapsulated Australia's public policy and strategic policy apparatus, organs that have been enraptured with the post-Cold War 'American Peace' and the seeming limitless dominance of the post-Second World War liberal-democratic, capitalist West. 

However, that has changed, and COVID-19 is merely the catalyst that is bringing that era of naiveté and wishful thinking to an end, Jennings articulates, "As the head of the Department of Defence’s strategic policy branch in 1998, I was given the job of writing a classified assessment of regional security.

"This was in the aftermath of a murderous civil war on Bougainville Island, the Sandline crisis, which came close to triggering a coup in Port Moresby, and rising violence in East Timor.

"I wrote in the assessment that Australia was facing the consequences of a deterioration in regional security. That judgment was set upon by others. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade took it as a criticism of its diplomatic skills and the intelligence agencies saw it as a negative judgment about their predictive abilities.

"As 1998 turned into 1999 it became clear that the assessment would never see the light of day. The Canberra bureaucracy could not conceive that the world was changing faster than its pragmatic incrementalism could handle.

"The report was shelved. Soon after, I was helping to run a new group called the East Timor policy unit in the weeks before Australia’s biggest military operation since the Vietnam War. Some deterioration!

"The Timor crisis looks like a mosquito bite compared with the strategic changes now underway. Richardson dismisses as far-fetched the idea 'that Australia’s circumstances are so dire, almost at the point of war, that we need a national security focus dominating the totality of what the government does'."

For Jennings, the writing is on the wall, mounting nationalist rhetoric from within the People's Republic of China, increased naval provocations and actions in the South China Sea, the Yellow Sea and into the western Pacific, combined with a growing chorus for the forceable reunification of Taiwan all send alarm bells blaring. 

"The risk of conflict is not far-fetched. The Chinese Communist Party is pushing the boundaries of acceptable international behaviour in the skies and seas around Taiwan, Japan, South Korea and in the South China Sea. This is not a state secret. It’s readily observable by reading Chinese newspapers that the party is stoking nationalist sentiment, diverting attention away from its mismanagement of the virus, and setting the groundwork for a crisis over Taiwan," Jennings said. 

"I hope a military crisis doesn’t happen but it is the responsibility of national security agencies in Australia to think through the consequences of high-risk scenarios."

Closer to home increased instances of economic and diplomatic brinkmanship, active economic coercion and gangster-like bullying tactics targeting Australian agricultural and resource exports, along with statements made by Beijing's ambassador in Canberra regarding the withdrawal of Chinese students at Australian universities, it appears the game is afoot. 

In response, Jennings disputes claims made by Richardson regarding standing up to China: "This is why Australia needs a national security strategy. Even if it were possible for Australia to avoid direct military involvement in a Taiwan crisis (a big if), we would certainly feel the impact of fuel supply chains from north Asia shutting down.

"Would China be supplying us with medical equipment as normal? If China is locked in a hostile standoff with the US over Taiwan, will we still be welcoming PRC purchasing of our critical infrastructure?

"These questions point to the inadequacies of current policy approaches that were designed for a more benign era, when more people bought the fiction that a wealthier China was going to become a more open country to deal with.

"We do indeed have 'a muddle of policies that don’t align with one another', as Richardson puts it. But don’t expect many in Canberra to acknowledge that because they own the muddle.

"In calling for a national security strategy I am not saying that we should put a 'national security umbrella over the totality of government' — whatever that means. Australia still will trade, take foreign investment, train overseas students and establish research links with other countries, but we need to understand what these actions mean from a national security perspective."

Kelly adds, "Richardson warns government cannot be turned over to a sweeping national security agenda ­fuelled by anti-China sentiment, pandemic-induced multiple security alarms, protectionist industry policy and changes to elevate security over economic and foreign investment necessities.

"He says reviews to enhance Australia’s resilience are necessary post-pandemic and backs an increase in defence spending beyond 2 per cent of GDP. But he delivers three stark warnings — self-reliance is counter-productive if it weakens the economy; substantial Australian self-reliance only comes with a high financial cost; and no justification exists for ­recasting foreign investment through a lens that prioritises national security.

"Richardson warns against a 'mono-dimensional view of government' when, by contrast, the success of Australia’s democracy has long been the ­balance it has struck across competing public needs."

Richardson spells out some points for consideration within the development of a broader, integrated approach to developing national security, resilience and sovereignty, stating, "A strong economy is foundational to national security. 

"But when it comes to putting a whole range of things under the national security banner, my response is ‘no way’. First, it is unnecessary. Second, it would unduly hinder economic growth after the pandemic.

"You don’t want people with national security expertise to be put over and above economists when it comes to economic policy or above medical experts when it comes to pandemics. Putting most things under a national security umbrella would significantly dilute the quality of advice and expertise going to ­government."

In response, Jennings sets an incredible precedent in uncertain times, stating, "I will happily accept Richardson’s mantle of being a 'national security cowboy'. Right now, Australia needs more cowboy and less kowtow, more principle and less of the 'pragmatism' that has brought us to this sorry point."

Your thoughts

Australia’s position and responsibilities in the Indo-Pacific region will depend on the nation’s ability to sustain itself economically, strategically and politically.

Despite the nation’s virtually unrivalled wealth of natural resources, agricultural and industrial potential, there is a lack of a cohesive national security strategy integrating the development of individual yet complementary public policy strategies to support a more robust Australian role in the region.

Enhancing Australia’s capacity to act as an independent power, incorporating great power-style strategic economic, diplomatic and military capability serves as a powerful symbol of Australia’s sovereignty and evolving responsibilities in supporting and enhancing the security and prosperity of Indo-Pacific Asia.

However, as events continue to unfold throughout the region and China continues to throw its economic, political and strategic weight around, can Australia afford to remain a secondary power or does it need to embrace a larger, more independent role in an era of increasing great power competition?

Further complicating the nation’s calculations is the declining diversity of the national economy, the ever-present challenge of climate change impacting droughts, bushfires and floods, Australia’s energy security and the infrastructure needed to ensure national resilience. 

Let us know your thoughts and ideas about the development of a holistic national security strategy and the role of a minister for national security to co-ordinate the nation’s response to mounting pressure from nation-state and asymmetric challenges in the comments section below, or get in touch with This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..