Responding to Beijing's growing might requires a considered Australian response

At the end of the Cold War, Australia, like much of the victorious US-led alliance, believed that the “end of history” was upon us, that the era of great power competition had forever been relegated to the pages of antiquity. We now know that to be wishful thinking. 

Australia embraced the potential and opportunity presented by this new future and the lessons learned during the Cold War, particularly the impact of interventionism and sought to capitalise upon its relationships with “great and powerful” friends like the US to guarantee its security. 

However, the rise of the Indo-Pacific, in particular the emergence and, in some cases, re-emergence of many potential great powers, each with their own conflicting ambitions, economic, political and strategic designs and often ancient enmities are serving to dramatically undermine the balance of power and stability.

The nation’s approach to strategic policy continues to be heavily based upon the formalisation of the Defence of Australia (DoA) policy as identified in the 1986 Dibb report and then enshrined in the subsequent 1987 and 1994 Defence White Papers in particular, with tweaks made in every Defence White Paper to date.

This largely isolationist policy focused entirely on securing the sea-air gap as a strategic “buffer zone” for Australia, enabling the reorientation of Australia’s strategic and broader defence industry posture, which now serves to leave the nation at a critical crossroads as the region continues to rise. 

While successive Australian governments have sought to evolve the Defence of Australia doctrine, the very premise of the doctrine continues to inform the foundation of Australia’s strategic policy to this day. 

Now while the recent announcements made by Prime Minister Scott Morrison and Defence Minister Linda Reynolds in the 2020 Defence Strategic Update and the supporting 2020 Force Structure Plan make progress toward rectifying decades of under-expenditure in the nation’s defence capability, the rising capacity of regional neighbours, particularly China, continues to leave Australia at a critical juncture. 

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In a piece penned for the Australian Journal of Defence and Strategic Studies titled, “The ambitious reform plans of the People’s Liberation Army: Progress, prospects and implications for Australia”, strategic analysts Bates Gill, Adam Ni and Dennis Blasko identify the key factors that will serve to impact Australia’s own expansive defence modernisation and could concerningly leave us ill-prepared. 

Beijing’s strategic guidelines for modernisation

Since the end of the Cold War, Beijing has – as many other nations have – watched the way in which the United States and its Western allies conduct warfare operations, ranging from strategic power projection as conducted against Beijing during the Taiwan Strait Crisis in the mid-1990s to direct high-intensity warfare operations against near-peer, state-based competitors in the Middle East and North Africa. 

Accordingly, Beijing has sought to learn these lessons and in some way adapt and mold them to better suit “the Chinese way” of war while also combining concepts like the joint force, multi-domain operations and directly challenge the key force multipliers, including airborne and space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, and integrated command and control organs to fully modernise the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

In particular, these capabilities, and the supporting “strategic guidelines” are shaping the Chinese Armed Forces into an immensely powerful, capable and technologically comparable fighting force, as explained by Gill, Ni and Blasko: “Broadly speaking, two important objectives drive the reforms. The first, a political objective, aims to strengthen Chinese Communist Party control over the PLA.

“The second, an operational objective, seeks to transform the PLA from an untested, degraded and stove-piped military to a force increasingly capable of conducting joint operations, fighting and winning intensive conflicts against technologically sophisticated foes, and doing so farther from Chinese shores.

“To achieve these objectives, the PLA reforms are shaped and driven by: (1) a set of overarching strategic guidelines; (2) important political motivations; (3) operational and capabilities-based aspirations; and (4) the fundamental changes in organisational structure. The following sections take up these important drivers, all of which intend to transform the PLA into a more effective military force,” the group explain. 

It is critical to explain that unlike the United States who has entrenched itself at the head of the post-Second World War economic, political and strategic security order, Beijing doesn’t have the same “global” security responsibilities and can thus more directly focus its interests and the full spectrum of state-based power on key spheres of influence, namely the Indo-Pacific. 

“To begin, China’s national strategy remains primarily strategically defensive in nature, prioritising deterrence and defence of the homeland and China’s near seas over global expansion of its military capabilities.

“As such, ‘active defence’ is still considered one of the PLA’s most basic and longstanding strategic guidelines. In a nutshell, China’s national strategy is to ‘win without fighting’, that is, to achieve its national objectives without going to war. However, it is critical to understand that the doctrine prepares and allows for offensive action at all levels of war if and when the situation demands.

“A key operational aspect of this strategy is the importance it places on deterrence. As Dennis Blasko, has pointed out, ‘most foreign interest naturally focuses on developments in PLA warfighting and technological capabilities and does not explore with equal enthusiasm the deterrence effects of the same developments’. This is true, he writes, even though authoritative Chinese writings on military strategy place ‘military deterrence’ on a par with ‘warfighting’ and ‘military operations other than war’ (MOOTW, 非战争军事行动) as one of the three basic ways by which militaries use force,” Gill, Ni and Blasko explain. 

Structural modernisation, technology evolution and joint force operations

Just as the United States, UK, Australia and other comparable Western militaries are undergoing a technological, operational and doctrinal revolution, the PLA is learning the lessons and following the lead established by its potential adversaries as it seeks to establish itself as a premier, “fifth-generation” joint, multi-domain fighting force. 

This has resulted in a sweeping overhaul and modernisation of the PLA in a “root and branch reform” model including command and control organisations, streamlining command and control structures and operational units to ensure clear lines of command authority, as explained by Gill, Ni and Blasko: “To begin, the PLA’s command structure was completely reorganised. The command structure is now flatter and has clearer lines of authority. The revamped command structure is defined by Chinese authorities as ‘CMC in overall command, theatre commands operations, service headquarters direct force development’.

“Second, the organisational structure of the PLA has been dramatically changed. Under the new structure, the four PLA General Departments were disbanded and their work was mostly subsumed within 15 new functional organs including the Joint Staff Department, under the direct control of the CMC. These sections comprise seven departments or offices, three commissions and five affiliated bodies.

“In addition, the seven Army-centric Military Regions were dismantled and replaced with five joint theatre commands... The new joint theatre commands are: Eastern Theatre Command (headquartered in Nanjing); Western Theatre Command (Chengdu); Southern Theatre Command (Guangzhou); Northern Theatre Command (Shenyang); and Central Theatre Command (Beijing).

“The reorganisation established a new Army Headquarters; upgraded the former Second Artillery Force to a fully fledged service arm with a new name, the PLA Rocket Force; established the PLASSF for national-level cyber, space, electronic warfare, and other information-related operational support; and created the PLA Joint Logistics Support Force. The restructuring also resulted in 300,000 personnel cuts, half of them officers,” add Gill, Ni and Blasko. 

This modernisation effort also focused upon the tactical and operational level units, seeking to further streamline and enhance the combat capabilities of the PLA more broadly: “In April 2017, the PLA began its ‘below the neck’ reforms focused on transforming operational and tactical units from army to division, brigade, regiment and battalion levels. Nearly every unit in all services and forces has been affected by ‘below the neck’ reforms. This tranche of reforms was expected to be completed by 2020, but additional adjustments and reforms are expected over the following three decades.”

Additionally, these reforms more broadly include:

• One of the most important Army reforms has been to designate combined arms battalions as the ‘basic combat unit’ to conduct independent missions within combined arms brigades. As a result of the many changes that every PLAA brigade and battalion underwent, units have focused on establishing individual soldier and small unit proficiencies from squad to battalion level during the annual training cycles since 2017;
• The PLA-N is speeding up the transition from near seas defence to far seas protection missions and is ‘improving its capabilities for strategic deterrence and counterattack, maritime maneuver operations, maritime joint operations, comprehensive defence and integrated support’. At the same time, the PLA-N is working towards the objective of ‘joint operations at sea’ by increasing training with elements from the Army, PLA Air Force (PLAAF or Air Force) and Rocket Force. Army helicopters now practice operations over water, sometimes working in cooperation with PLA-N ships;
• Like the rest of the PLA, PLAAF is focused on reforming training practice by reducing and eliminating unrealistic training, formulating training systems, improving the use of technology in training and introducing realistic scenarios. Moreover, the PLAAF’s combat patrols have an important training aspect in addition to their operational and deterrence utility. Since 2015, PLAAF has sent strategic bombers (the H-6K) on long-range over-water flights throughout the Asia–Pacific region on at least 40 occasions; 
• The establishment of the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) and the modernisation of China’s conventional and nuclear missile forces are important developments in China’s military modernisation and its evolving approach to joint warfighting and deterrence. In addition to developing more realistic training, the PLARF also faces a human talent and resources challenge. Missile force operations require high-quality human input in the form of experienced commanders, operators, technicians, scientists and other support staff; and
• Newly created at the end of 2015, the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), is among the most groundbreaking institutional changes in the current round of PLA reforms. As the PLA’s strategic information force with a mandate to support joint operations, and conduct military space, cyber, electronic and psychological warfare operations, the PLASSF will be crucial to warfighting, coercion and deterrence. The PLASSF is both the product and driver of China’s shifting military thinking, which emphasises the importance of technology and information systems and the integration of capabilities.

The implications for Australia

Gill, Ni and Blasko are quick to shift their focus to the tactical and strategic implications Beijing’s modernisation and recapitalisation efforts will have upon Australia’s own defence readiness, particularly as the capabilities fielded by Beijing continue to improve at a qualitative and quantitative level. 

This is something all three highlight as critical priorities for China’s leaders and should be key points of investigation for Australian and allied strategic and defence planners, stating, “The PLA’s ambitious reform agenda thus far exhibits both steady progress and persistent problems. The reforms are designed to strengthen the Party’s leadership of China’s armed forces, improve command and control systems, and allow for improved joint operations, and steps are being made in this direction.”

This is reinforced by Beijing’s own, self-stated objectives, namely: “By mid-century, according to Beijing’s officially stated timetable, the PLA aspires to become a ‘world-class military’, presumably meaning on a par with other great powers such as the United States.”

Turning their attention specifically to Australia, Gill, Ni and Blasko articulate the growing capabilities that should be focus points for Australia’s strategic planners in the coming decade, namely, “These findings underscore the need for Australian defence planners to carefully assess and respond to the PLA reform process over the coming decades, and particularly over the next 15 to 20 years. Given this relatively short time frame, the ADF needs to seriously consider the following developments for its own defence planning and procurement cycles.

“In spite of the near to medium term obstacles for PLA modernisation, it would be prudent to expect that the reforms can succeed with time, transforming the PLA to a far more capable force between 2035 and 2050. At a minimum, Australian defence planning should anticipate a much higher threat environment in contingencies involving the PLA.

Gill, Ni and Blasko add, perhaps most concerningly, “Given the importance of these developments for Australian security, greater investments will be needed to expand understanding of PLA strategy and evolving operational concepts, Party-military relations, internal politics and capabilities, especially in relation to more effective force projection within and beyond the first island chain. For example, in the maritime realm at present, the PLA’s far seas and expeditionary capabilities beyond the first island chain do not meet the standards of a ‘world-class military.’

“However, looking ahead, the ADF should expect a steadily increased focus of Chinese military activity in the Southwest Pacific, Indian Ocean and eastern part of South China Sea.”

Critically, the three identify a continued need for Australia to collaborate with key strategic allies, namely the United States in countering key force multiplying and strategic capabilities, stating: “Australian defence planners will need to collaborate with the United States and other close allies to develop both defensive and offensive systems to anticipate, identify, disrupt, deter and shield against Chinese conventional missile, cyber, counterspace and disinformation threats and attacks.

"It will be particularly important to keep close track of the PLA’s missile, space and cyber warfare capabilities – most prominently housed within the PLARF and PLASSF – not only to evaluate the PLA’s progress in joint operations but also to identify vulnerabilities and ascertain possible targets for monitoring, pre-emption, deterrence and disruption.”

However, in light of these differing points of view, is the $270 billion announced by the Commonwealth enough to put Australia ahead of the curve, or is it simply a case of getting the nation’s defence capability to where it needed to be at the beginning of the 2010s?  

Your thoughts

The nation is defined by its relationship with the region, with access to the growing economies and to strategic sea lines of communication supporting over 90 per cent of global trade, a result of the cost-effective and reliable nature of sea transport.

Indo-Pacific Asia is at the epicentre of the global maritime trade, with about US$5 trillion worth of trade flowing through the South China Sea and the strategic waterways and choke points of south-east Asia annually.

For Australia, a nation defined by this relationship with traditionally larger yet economically weaker regional neighbours, the growing economic prosperity of the region and corresponding arms build-up, combined with ancient and more recent enmities, competing geopolitical, economic and strategic interests, places the nation at the centre of the 21st century’s “great game”.

Enhancing Australia’s capacity to act as an independent power, incorporating great power-style strategic economic, diplomatic and military capability, serves as a powerful symbol of Australia’s sovereignty and evolving responsibilities in supporting and enhancing the security and prosperity of Indo-Pacific Asia. 

Australia is consistently told that, as a nation, we are torn between our economic relationship with China and the longstanding strategic partnership with the US, placing the country at the epicentre of a great power rivalry – but what if it didn’t have to be that way?

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of shaking up the nation’s strategic approach to our regional partners.

We would also like to hear your thoughts on the avenues Australia should pursue to support long-term economic growth and development in support of national security in the comments section below, or get in touch with This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.or at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.