Beijing only has itself to blame for the return of the Quad

At the end of the Cold War, Australia, like much of the victorious US-led alliance, believed that the 'end of history' was upon us, that the era of great power competition had forever been relegated to the pages of antiquity – the strategic anxiety now transforming the regional balance of power reveals that to be wishful thinking.

Australia embraced the potential and opportunity presented by this new future and the lessons learned during the Cold War, particularly the impact of interventionism, and sought to capitalise upon its relationships with 'great and powerful' friends like the US willing and able to guarantee its security. 

However, the rise of the Indo-Pacific, in particular the emergence and, in some cases, re-emergence of many potential great powers, each with their own conflicting ambitions, economic, political and strategic designs and often ancient enmities, are serving to dramatically undermine the balance of power and stability.

The nation's approach to strategic policy continues to be heavily based upon the formalisation of the Defence of Australia (DoA) policy as identified in the 1986 Dibb report and then enshrined in the subsequent 1987 and 1994 Defence White Papers in particular, with tweaks made in every Defence White Paper to date. 

This largely isolationist policy and the ensuing strategies developed in response, focused entirely on securing the sea-air gap as a strategic "buffer zone" for Australia, enabling the reorientation of Australia’s strategic and broader defence industry posture, which now serves to leave the nation at a critical crossroads as the region continues to rise. 

While successive Australian government's have sought to evolve and, in some ways, modify the Defence of Australia doctrine, the very premise of the doctrine continues to inform the foundation of Australia's strategic policy to this day. 

Meanwhile, as Australia continues to contemplate how best to respond to the rapidly deteriorating regional balance of power and the very real challenges to the economic, political and strategic order the nation's prosperity is built upon, the war of words, economic coercion and territorial expansionism continues to mount.

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Equally critical in this equation is Australia's culture of dependence upon larger powers, first the British Empire and since the Second World War, the US, which allowed us to fumble and make mistakes, because 'big brother' always had our back.

Now, that is diminishing as the reality of the Indo-Pacific is beginning to sink in for Australia's policymakers and, increasingly, the Australian public.   

However, Australia isn't alone in facing these challenges. The rise of Beijing and its increasingly belligerent approach toward the region, particularly Taiwan, nations bordering the South China Sea and those bold enough to question the authenticity of Beijing's claims about the COVID-19 pandemic, has created a degree of strategic anxiety. 

In response, the nations of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, made up of Australia, India, Japan and the US, have stepped up their co-operation and reinvigorated the multinational relationships to better prepare for a potential confrontation with Beijing. 

This increasing level of co-operation and capability aggregation has drawn attention and backlash from Beijing, which increasingly sees itself as a target for "Western" bullying, a narrative that President Xi Jinping is seeking to leverage at a national level. However, for Princeton University’s Yan Bennett and Charles Darwin University’s John Garrick, Beijing only has itself to blame. 

You can't put your military on high alert and then blame everyone else

The global and regional aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic has seen an increasing war of words and even outright attempts at economic coercion has seen a range of responses, but Beijing's has been true to form for President Xi, one that boils down to: "The West doesn't want China to assume its rightful position as the world's premier power and wants a repeat of the Century of Humiliation."

In response, President Xi has made increasingly inflammatory comments, seeking to prepare the Chinese military for the potential for direct confrontation with any number of nations, but mainly the US, Japan, India, Australia and broader regional and global alliance frameworks. 

Indeed, while speaking to Chinese troops recently, President Xi called on all Chinese troops to "put all (their) minds and energy on preparing for war".

However, for Bennett and Garrick, it is this language, combined with the strategic, economic and political coercion, that is driving "like-minded nations" to collaborate among themselves in an effort to enhance collective security, with both stating: 

"Chinese President Xi Jinping recently told the People’s Liberation Army Marine Corps to ‘put mind and energy on preparing for war’ as the US announced plans to sell three advanced weapon systems to Taiwan, an island China considers to be its ‘lost province’ following the Nationalists’ defeat in the Chinese civil war.

"In his speech, given in Guangdong Province only a few hundred kilometres from Taiwan, President Xi emphasised that the Chinese marines are an ‘elite amphibious combat force’ responsible for ensuring ‘territorial integrity’. The message was clear: the PLA Marine Corps would be vital in an invasion of Taiwan."

Adding to this, Bennett and Garrick state, "Wary of a new world order revolving around China’s authoritarian regime, the US, Japan, Australia and India have reactivated the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue after more than a decade of somnolence.

"The Quad is an informal grouping that involves summits and information exchanges and this year will include combined military drills known as the Malabar exercises. By inviting Australia to participate in the Malabar drills, New Delhi has upgraded its security relationship with Canberra, even though building such alliances antagonises Beijing."

Critically, Bennett and Garrick explain the foundations of the Quad, stating, "Against this ominous backdrop, the Quad presents itself as having a positive agenda — a diplomatic network that assists democracies, as Australian Foreign Minister [Marise] Payne puts it, ‘to align ourselves in support of shared interests … governed by rules, not power’.

"The Quad formed in 2006 as a discussion forum on the rise of China and India and maritime issues in the Indo-Pacific. It met once in 2007, but the informal alliance became dormant due to Australia’s and India’s reluctance to undermine what had been healthy bilateral relations with China. Beijing’s moves since 2012, however, have altered the calculus in how much and how far to challenge China."

Off the back of these statements and provocative actions directed at Taiwan, India and Japan as well as smaller regional nations, Bennett and Garrick are very clear in who is to blame for the re-emergence of the Quad: "As China rapidly rewrites international rules to better reflect its desires, it’s hardly surprising that others are responding by protecting their own interests. Already, geostrategic and military alliances beyond the Quad are being worked out.

"Looking ahead, a space alliance between Quad members may also become feasible. The ‘Quad-Plus’ — the four Quad nations and Vietnam, South Korea and New Zealand — has already met to discuss co-ordinated responses to the pandemic."

Friends who share common challenges

The Quad is in some ways a case of strange bedfellows, but equally, perfect bedfellows, as each grapple with a common series of challenges, albeit in radically different environmental contexts. 

India faces down China across the Himalayas, while Japan squares off against an increasingly capable and confident Chinese Navy in the western Pacific, while the other two corners of the Quad, Australia and the US are relatively removed from immediate and direct threat, yet are intrinsically linked, economically, politically and strategically to the enduring balance of power and stability in the Indo-Pacific. 

Explaining these points, Bennett and Garrick detail the seemingly odd nature of the Quad, yet the ways in which this collaborative relationship provides avenues for future collective security, stating, "The US, Japan, Australia and India now share the common challenge of deteriorating relations with China. India faces border clashes in the Himalayas; Australia experiences economic and political coercive pressure; Tokyo is in dispute with Beijing over Chinese vessels patrolling near the Japanese-controlled Senkaku Islands, which China claims. 

"Australia, Japan and the US have also spoken out against China’s crackdown on the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong, mass detention of ethnic Uyghurs in Xinjiang, and contested claims in the South China Sea. These nations’ relations with China are at rock bottom. But they can sink further; China has already denounced the Quad as an ‘elite clique’ attempting to contain its rise.

"That China finds the Quad as such a challenge reveals a fragility to its ascendancy as it seeks to alter the world order to reflect its interests. For its part, the US has embraced the Quad as a way to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific and to promote and retain a liberal world order, policy goals articulated in its 2017 national security statement. In addition to these goals, Japan, Australia and India seek a balancing of approaches to China’s coercive policies in the region."

Your thoughts

The nation is defined by its relationship with the region, with access to the growing economies and to strategic sea lines of communication supporting over 90 per cent of global trade, a result of the cost-effective and reliable nature of sea transport.

Indo-Pacific Asia is at the epicentre of the global maritime trade, with about US$5 trillion worth of trade flowing through the South China Sea and the strategic waterways and chokepoints of south-east Asia annually.

For Australia, a nation defined by this relationship with traditionally larger, yet economically weaker regional neighbours, the growing economic prosperity of the region and corresponding arms build-up, combined with ancient and more recent enmities, competing geopolitical, economic and strategic interests, places the nation at the centre of the 21st century's 'great game'.

Enhancing Australia’s capacity to act as an independent power, incorporating great power-style strategic economic, diplomatic and military capability, serves as a powerful symbol of Australia’s sovereignty and evolving responsibilities in supporting and enhancing the security and prosperity of Indo-Pacific Asia. 

Australia is consistently told that as a nation we are torn between our economic relationship with China and the long-standing strategic partnership with the US, placing the country at the epicentre of a great power rivalry – but what if it didn’t have to be that way?

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia's future role and position in the Indo-Pacific and what you would like to see from Australia's political leaders in terms of shaking up the nation's strategic approach to our regional partners.

We would also like to hear your thoughts on the avenues Australia should pursue to support long-term economic growth and development in support of national security in the comments section below, or get in touch with This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.or at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..