A return to normality or the middle course? Lowy raises questions about Biden

For many in both the US and around the world, the election of Donald Trump in 2016 was an aberration, elected on the back of seemingly nationalist "America First" policies and commitments of restoring a "lost" greatness to the US, which had declined, particularly under the Obama administration. 

Focused on returning "stolen" jobs to the long forgotten rust belt of middle America, rebalancing the lopsided trade relationship with the nation's largest economic, political and strategic competitor in China, cracking down on "lazy" allies in across the globe, Trump's policy approach was focused on one thing: Making America Great Again.

This wrecking ball of a President flew in the face of all established convention and etiquette directly confronting the media, Republican and Democratic powerbrokers and world leaders seemingly without reprieve as he disrupted the global norm, causing many in the media, strategic policy community and governments around the world to shudder in fear lest they draw the wrath of the mercurial leader of the free world. 

While both sides of the political spectrum, both within the US and increasingly around the world, have taken up arms against one another, as is evidenced by mounting social, economic and political tensions in the aftermath of the 2016 election, the President has largely stood true to his word.

Trump moved quickly to hold Communist China more accountable for the economic manipulations and strategic ambitions in the Indo-Pacific, while seeking to make long dependent US allies across Europe and in parts of the Indo-Pacific, more accountable and invested in their collective security, bringing teeth to president Obama's own push to hold allies more accountable. 

On the opposite side of the political aisle in Washington, presumptive President-elect Joe Biden would seemingly be a known, stabilising quantity for the global community and Australia's public policymakers in particular, with a long history of foreign engagement and a recent history to inform the approach of a potential Biden administration. 

Biden draws on extensive foreign policy experience dating back to the Cold War, with the presumptive President-elect playing a pivotal role in the Obama administration's apparent policy reset after the George W. Bush administration, one that many would debate the efficacy of, particularly in the realm of great power competition. 

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In particular, the virtually uncontested Russian annexation of the Crimea, an unprecedented era of drone strikes across the Middle East and north Africa, the Libya and Syria interventions and, closer to home, the "Pacific" Pivot announced in 2013 to much fanfare, supposedly heralding a US return to the Indo-Pacific in order to counter an increasingly belligerent and determined Beijing. 

However, while the world waits with bated breath to see the final outcome of the election, Daniel Flitton, in a piece for the Lowy Institute's Interpreter, titled, 'Joe Biden: Big questions and great expectations'  raises some important questions for Australian consideration, particularly as a new President will bring new designs for the Indo-Pacific. 

Meanwhile, retired US Marine Corps officer and former US diplomat, currently a senior research fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies and the Center for Security Policy, Grant Newsham, and associate professor in practice at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore James Crabtree remain skeptical of the presumptive President-elect's stance on the Indo-Pacific. 

What are Biden's first moves and how do the world's major powers respond?

For Flitton, Prime Minister Scott Morrison's push to familiarise himself with the prospective Biden administration should come as no surprise, however, as he explains, it is important to recognise that the Prime Minister will have to take a ticket, as many around the world scramble to attract the attentions of the new administration. 

"Scott Morrison wasted no time. He wants Joe Biden to visit Australia next year to mark 70 years since the ANZUS Treaty was signed ... But such questions are only the beginning of what Australia will want to know about how a Biden White House will position America in the world. And what Australia wants to know is only a tiny part of a great global anticipation to see what changes a new president might bring," Flitton explains. 

Flitton, for his part, identifies key questions regarding Biden's broader foreign policy push and the key focal points in the early days of a Biden administration, stating: "The coming weeks will be filled with speculation about Biden’s moves to unwind the Trump approach. Already there is a promise of executive action, especially on the pressing need for sustained and serious focus in tackling the Covid-19 pandemic at home. Yet in foreign policy, what will other nations make of a US effort to re-engage with the World Health Organisation?

"Whether the world will be receptive to a US attempt to reassert global leadership after the crassness of Trump’s 'America First' can only be judged as events unfold. Some big questions are on the line.

• Surely few nations would object to Biden’s pledge to rejoin the Paris Agreement on climate change. But plenty of observers wonder at the pressure this could create on Australia’s carbon emissions policy? (For Morrison’s part, he believes 'we have a strong story to tell about our achievement'.)
• Would Iran truly welcome the US un-snapping the snapback to sanctions over the nuclear deal that Trump unilaterally sought to undercut? Could Biden manage such a move without alienating Middle East partners, including those now signed up to Trump’s 'Abraham Accords' with Israel? And will an effort to re-engage with Palestinian issues be supported?
• Will a circuit-breaker be found in the US-China trade war, leaving Australia the victim of a 'zero-sum game'? Will Taiwan see recent high-level diplomatic visits wound back? Will there be additional pressure in the South China Sea?
• What of North Korea’s hopes to continue the policy of summit diplomacy? Or South Korea’s ambition for inter-Korean normalisation?
• Could the US again join a 'Trans Pacific Partnership', under whatever name? Again, for Morrison, 'I would simply say to the United States, the door has always remained open on the TPP'."

In contrast, both Newsham and Crabtree, Biden's election could see a return to the Obama-era and that administration's impotence when confronted by comparable great powers, namely Russia and the People's Republic of China, spelling major trouble for allies like Australia. 

Newsham, explains, "Sixteen months ago I wrote that China’s DF-21 missiles, J-20 stealth fighters, hypersonic weapons and aircraft carriers had America’s attention, but Beijing might add another awesome weapon to its arsenal: the R-2020.

"R-2020? The Restoration 2020. If Beijing waited 16 months and Trump lost the next election, we would see a restoration of the China hands whose policies had created the current difficulties with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). A letter was about to come out – placed in a major newspaper and signed by dozens of American Asia specialists, civilian and military – lambasting the Donald Trump administration for its allegedly counterproductive China policy.

"Competing foreign policy approaches are nothing new in Washington. Nor are ill-tempered full-page ads in major newspapers. But in the case of that particular letter, one of the approaches to dealing with China could be vetted against 45 years of empirical evidence."

Building on this, Newsham expands, "Rather than liberalising, the PRC was a totalitarian state – backed up with advanced technology, some of it American – beyond Orwellian in its totalitarianism. And all this had happened before Donald Trump’s election.

"This was not inevitable. Rather it was the result of lovingly-crafted policies by a couple of generations of so-called China hands who were convinced they knew China and how to 'manage' its rise."

For Newsham, the election of Trump in 2016 and the ensuing wrecking ball approach toward Beijing, which starkly contrasted with the approach of the Obama administration, provoked a direct response from the diplomatic and intelligence corps that had authored the aforementioned letter. 

Newsham explains, "A month before its [the letter] release, retired US diplomat Susan Thornton had delivered a speech in Shanghai telling the audience they would have to wait for the next election before things could be righted between the US and PRC.

"Recall that Thornton had nearly become the State Department’s top Asia official in 2018 before tripping over charges of being too soft on China. Yet, within a year after retiring, she had gone to China and instructed the PRC government in how to foil American policy: Just wait a while and those nasty people who are upsetting you will be gone and replaced by more flexible, nuanced people to whom you were accustomed."

Newsham rather provocatively expands on this approach to engagement with Beijing and the fallout from the shift from Obama to Trump, explaining, "With the PRC, if one isn’t in a position of strength, willing to walk away and to fight if necessary, the only thing to 'work out' is the terms of surrender. 

"And that’s also what the much-discussed 'Thucydides Trap' is all about. Give in to the PRC – there being no other alternative to thermonuclear war. So when the restorationist letter appeared, the pedigrees, resumes and titles were impressive.

"But I thought it best to look at the results of their 'productive' approach of the previous near-half century. In my view, a restoration would be cause for celebration only in Beijing."

Back to the future?

Shifting the focus to associate professor in practice at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore, James Crabtree, writing for Foreign Policy, who foresees a major "credibility crisis" for a prospective Biden administration and its key relationships in the Indo-Pacific. 

Crabtree explains, "To a degree that will surprise many in Washington, the United States’ friends in the region are quietly anxious about a Biden victory, and that counts even more for vital partners such as Japan and India. In the United States, Trump’s critics on both the left and right find him offensive and despair of his politics — and assume that any right-minded foreigner would, too.

"That may be the case in much of Europe, but not so in much of Asia: Officials in Tokyo, Taipei, New Delhi, Singapore, and other capitals have grown relatively comfortable with Trump and his tough approach on China. The prospect of a Biden presidency, by contrast, brings back uncomfortable memories of an Obama era that many Asian movers and shakers recall as unfocused and soft toward Beijing. Whether or not that memory is correct is beside the point. Biden has an Asian credibility problem — and one that may prove tricky to solve."

For Crabtree, this lack of foreign policy direction, particularly in the Indo-Pacific and in response to the rising antagonism and belligerence of Beijing by the Biden team was clearly on display during Biden's speech to the Democratic convention, where the presumptive President-elect identified four priorities for his administration, "including tackling COVID-19 and promoting racial justice. Managing China, a vital concern among Asian foreign policy elites, did not make the list".

This major oversight was something Tokyo in particular was not fond of, despite the bombastic, mercurial nature of President Trump, something Crabtree articulates: "Japan’s views on Trump were nicely encapsulated in an April article in The American Interest.

"The essay, 'The Virtues of a Confrontational China Strategy', was written by an anonymous Japanese foreign ministry official and was scathing about an Obama-era China policy, whose 'priority mission was always to engage China', not compete with it.

"Trump’s policies were imperfect, the author argued, but his more robust approach to Beijing was welcome. 'Do we want, if possible, to go back to the world before Trump?' the Japanese official asked. 'For many decision-makers in Tokyo, the answer is probably no, because having a poorly implemented but fundamentally correct strategy [under Trump] is better than having a well-implemented but ambiguous strategy [under Obama]'."

These concerns are echoed throughout the capitals of India, Taiwan and others, which Crabtree explains, "Speaking last year, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, India’s cerebral External Affairs Minister, pushed back against those who thought Trump had damaged ties with India. 'What I have seen with Trump in the last two or three years was not at all the traditional American system,' he said. 'You actually got big bold decisive steps in a range of areas.'

"As it grapples with rapidly deteriorating Sino-Indian ties, New Delhi is increasingly likely to value Trump’s chaotic but forceful anti-Chinese policies. At the very least, Biden’s arrival could complicate India’s strategic position, as foreign affairs commentator Raja Mohan argued recently when he predicted that Biden would be less confrontational with China while ending Trump’s lenient approach to Russia."

Shifting focus to what could potentially become a major flash point between the two superpowers, Taiwan remains concerned about the reality of a Biden administration and its response to Beijing. Crabtree explains, "Similar worries are found in Taiwan, where foreign affairs officials are understandably sensitive to changes in US China policy, and where the recent visit of US Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar underlined deepening ties with Washington. 'Taiwan has benefited during Trump’s first term,' said Chieh-Ting Yeh, vice chairman of the Global Taiwan Institute, a Washington-based policy group. He said many in Taiwan would back 'the current course over untested campaign promises'."

For Australia, the anxiety felt by regional partners and like-minded nations shouldn't be overlooked, rather they should be analysed and prepared for accordingly. Regardless the final outcome of the 2020 election, the US will remain Australia's strategic partner of choice, however its commitment to the Indo-Pacific should be reassessed in light of regional concerns. 

Your thoughts

Australia is defined by its economic and strategic relationships with the Indo-Pacific and the access to the growing economies and to strategic sea lines of communication supporting over 90 per cent of global trade, a result of the cost-effective and reliable nature of sea transport.

Indo-Pacific Asia is at the epicentre of the 21st century’s era of great power competition and global maritime trade, with about US$5 trillion worth of trade flowing through the South China Sea and the strategic waterways and chokepoints of south-east Asia annually.

For Australia, a nation defined by this relationship with traditionally larger yet economically weaker regional neighbours, the growing economic prosperity of the region and corresponding arms build-up, combined with ancient and more recent enmities, competing geopolitical, economic and strategic interests, places the nation at the centre of the 21st century’s “great game”.

Enhancing Australia’s capacity to act as an independent power, incorporating great power-style strategic economic, diplomatic and military capability serves as a powerful symbol of Australia’s sovereignty and evolving responsibilities in supporting and enhancing the security and prosperity of Indo-Pacific Asia. 

Australia is consistently told that as a nation we are torn between our economic relationship with China and the longstanding strategic partnership with the US, placing the country at the epicentre of a great power rivalry – but what if it didn’t have to be that way?

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of shaking up the nation’s approach to our regional partners.

We would also like to hear your thoughts on the avenues Australia should pursue to support long-term economic growth and development in support of national security in the comments section below, or get in touch with This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.or at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..