Australian strategist warns of potential for Taiwan flashpoint

At the end of the Cold War, Australia like much of the victorious, US-led "free world" bought into two comforting myths, first the victory of the US meant the "end of history" and the era of great power competition had forever been relegated to the pages of antiquity, and, as China continues to grow, it would shake off authoritarianism and become more liberal. 

Far from Francis Fukuyama's promise of the "end of history", across the globe the US-led liberal-democratic and capitalist economic, political and strategic order is under siege, driven by mounting waves of civil unrest, the impact of sustained economic stagnation across the West, environmental concerns, and the increasing geostrategic competition between the world’s great powers, namely: the mounting US-China tensions. 

Adding further fuel to the fire is the global and more localised impacts of COVID-19, which range from recognising the impact of vulnerable, global supply chains upon national security as many leading nations, long advocates of 'closer collaboration and economic integration', grasp at the lifeboats of the nation-state to secure their national interests. 

Despite its relative isolation, Australia’s position as a global trading nation, entrenched in the maintenance and expansion of the post-Second World War order, has left the nation at a unique and troubling crossroads, particularly as it’s two largest and most influential “great and powerful” friends: the US and the UK appear to be floundering against the tide of history. 

Furthermore, the fragility of these two nations has prompted many global dictators to take advantage of the absence – as the old saying states, “When the cat is away, the mice will play”, leaving Australia and many other allies, including Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, exposed to the whims of nations dedicated to the end of post-war order. 

While the nation's geographic isolation, encapsulated by the 'tyranny of distance', has provided Australia with a degree of protection from the major, epoch-defining and empire ending conflagrations of the 20th century, the economic, political, societal and strategic challenges of the 21st century hit far closer to home. 

Nowhere is this more evident than across the Indo-Pacific as an emboldened Beijing continues to punish Australia for pursuing a global inquiry into the origins and China’s handling of COVID-19, while also leveraging the comparatively diminished presence of the US military in the region to project power and intimidate both Japan and, critically, Taiwan. 

VIEW ALL

For Australian strategic policy expert and academic Alan Dupont, the potential for a cataclysmic conflagration in the Indo-Pacific is solely dependent upon how the two superpowers engage over a hotly contested, heavily populated island in the western Pacific: Taiwan. 

To this end, Dupont sets the scene, stating, "On June 28, 1914, the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir presumptive to the throne of the Austro-Hungarian empire, triggered the most destructive war in human history. Just 25 years later, Nazi Germany’s invasion of Poland, a middling European power, ignited a second global conflagration.

"In the dystopian world of the 2030s, ravaged by war and pestilence, the last remaining students of the once vibrant discipline of history ponder their lecturer’s question. How could small, relatively insignificant Taiwan – denied even the trappings of statehood – have precipitated a cascading series of events that culminated in the outbreak of a third global conflict?"

A flashpoint comparable to the assassination of Franz Ferdinand 

For Dupont, like many other Australian and global strategic policy experts, the Taiwan situation is the great unknown. The comparatively small island, with a vibrant democracy, is under the constant threat of its much larger and more powerful neighbour, the People's Republic of China, which has long pledged to reunify the 'two Chinas' by force if necessary.

A bastion of Cold War politicking, the security of Taipei is almost certainly guaranteed by the tactical and strategic supremacy of the US and has been tested at various points in recent memory, most notably during the mid-1990s, which saw the US exhibit a display of its then incontrovertible military might, however, now the odds are far more balanced. 

This reality has become increasingly apparent as Beijing continues to expand its already impressive array of next-generation conventional and nuclear military capabilities designed to blunt, limit or downright deny the capacity of the US and its allies to come to Taiwan's aid should they be required, throwing into question just how both sides would respond. 

Dupont explains, "The growing concern about Taiwan reflects three worrying trends. First, decades of intermittent attempts to bridge longstanding differences between Taiwan and China have failed. Xi Jinping seeks a legacy as the reunifier of the Middle Kingdom. This would elevate him above Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping in the pantheon of Communist Chinese leaders.

"But time is running out to achieve this dream. So Xi has ditched his Taiwan charm offensive in favour of coercion on a grand scale, putting Australia’s problems with China in the shade. If Taiwan can’t be persuaded to peacefully reunify with the mainland then Xi Jinping is prepared to use force.

"Second, the Taiwanese increasingly reject reunification with China. They have drawn the obvious lessons from Xi’s ruthless crackdown on Hong Kong’s once vigorous democracy, which has exposed the hollowness and deceit of the 'one country, two systems' formulation supposed to pave the way for peaceful reunification.

"Third, Donald Trump has reversed decades of cautious US policy on Taiwan by ramping up arms sales to Taipei. Trump and his Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, have made it abundantly clear the US will not sit idly by if Taiwan is attacked."

Adding to this, Dupont says, "Some worry another Taiwan crisis is imminent. The catalyst could be Trump overreach in the waning days of his presidency or Xi opportunistically taking advantage of the chaos in Washington to take Taiwan by force. Neither scenario can be dismissed. But the Taiwan issue is more likely to fester short of conflict pending Xi’s assessment of President-elect Joe Biden’s overarching China policy.

"Although his administration will be more measured in tone, Biden is unlikely to reverse Trump’s support for Taiwan given the strength of anti-China sentiment in congress. Expect the risk of a military clash to grow and with it the potential to escalate into a wider conflict. We need to prepare for such an outcome.

"As a democracy, the chief determinant of Australia’s response will be public opinion, which will be shaped by perceptions of responsibility for the crisis. If China is seen as the instigator, public sentiment will be strongly supportive of Taiwan’s own lively democracy."

Regardless, a potential conflict over Taiwan presents serious challenges for Australia, as the nation will be faced with immense challenges, each raising concurrent questions, three of which are critical to assessing the nation's next move, namely:

• Should the People's Republic of China forcibly attempt to reunite Taiwan, will Australia support the US and regional allies in resisting the invasion? 
• Will a Biden Administration forcibly resist a potential invasion? If so, to what degree?
• If the US does intervene, what happens to its position and status as the region's "security partner of choice" if it is unwilling, or perhaps more concerningly, unable to resist the armed occupation?

Dupont explains, "Expect the risk of a military clash to grow and with it the potential to escalate into a wider conflict. We need to prepare for such an outcome. As a democracy, the chief determinant of Australia’s response will be public opinion, which will be shaped by perceptions of responsibility for the crisis. If China is seen as the instigator, public sentiment will be strongly supportive of Taiwan’s own lively democracy.

"Canberra’s problem is that China will deploy every instrument of state power to prevent other countries siding with Taiwan. Reunification is a core issue for Beijing.

"Xi knows that once committed to military action, failure to achieve this holy grail could unleash a virulent domestic backlash that could be terminal for his rule. Chinese threats will be amplified by domestic voices urging the government to stay out of the conflict to avoid reprisals that would further damage trade and send the relationship into a long-lasting deep freeze. There is also the real possibility of significant Australian casualties should we deploy ships and aircraft to the fight."

Potential for catastrophe

Dupont is very clear in what a potential loss of Taiwan would mean for democracies throughout the Indo-Pacific and for Australia in particular, explaining, "Strategically, the loss of Taiwan would be disastrous for the region’s democracies. Taiwan is the linchpin in a chain of islands that constrains China’s ability to dominate the whole of the western Pacific.

"Its fall would enable the People’s Liberation Army to isolate Japan, push the US back towards the central Pacific and consolidate its hold over the northern approaches to Australia and the critical Strait of Malacca, gateway to the world’s most important trade route."

Such an outcome would be disastrous for Australia, with the nation's key regional strategic partners, the US and Japan, effectively neutralised in relatively short order, while also leaving the nation economically, politically and strategically exposed throughout the region, but more specifically, south-east Asia. 

In light of these mounting tensions, many from not only Australia's strategic policy community, media and political circles, but also the global community, have entered the debate, with unique and nuanced advice for how Australia can best respond. Not least of these is the famed Australian strategist Paul Dibb, author of the Dibb report and the basis of the Defence of Australia (DoA) policy.

For Dibb, it is time for the nation's leaders and the Australian public to confront an important question: 'Is Australia ready for regional conflict?'. 

Setting the scene, Dibb states, "It has become fashionable to speculate about the risk of a coming war between China and America. Former prime minister Kevin Rudd, in a recent article in Foreign [Affairs] titled 'Beware the Guns of August – in Asia', claims that we are confronting the prospect of not just a new Cold War, but a hot one as well with actual armed conflict between the US and China appearing possible.

"He warns that the presidents of China and the US both face internal political pressures that could tempt them to pull the nationalist lever, which 'could all too easily torpedo the prospects of international peace and stability for the next 30 years', the irony of which is Xi Jinping's China has been marching under the banner of increasingly levels of nationalism since his ascendency."

Adding to this, Dibb says, "Carl Bildt, the noted European authority on international affairs and a former prime minister of Sweden, observes that as the 1914 assassination of Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo set in train events that culminated in World War I, so the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea might become a future flashpoint.

"Then to top the league of pessimism, there is Graham Allison, who has become famous by asserting that, based on his analysis of historical events, China, as the rising power, will inevitably go to war with America, the declining power.

"The fundamental weakness with this line of reasoning is the deterrence of nuclear weapons. If any two countries in world history should have gone to war it was the former USSR and the US. But each side knew that, even under a surprise attack, it could deliver sufficient retaliatory nuclear strikes to eliminate the other side as a modern functioning society." 

While nuclear deterrence and the balance of power between the two superpowers maintains a degree of stability in relations, Beijing's growing territorial assertiveness and ambitions, particularly regarding the reunification of Taiwan and its continued expansion of outposts in the South China Sea, are more concerning potential flashpoints that could trigger a conventional regional conflict. 

Dibb explains, "Much more likely than nuclear war, in my view, is the prospect of a major regional conflict – such as over Taiwan – or a miscalculation over a local confrontation in the South China Sea or the East China Sea. China perceives its key national security interests as being involved in each of these three places. The situation is especially risky because of rising Chinese nationalism, with the attendant risk that Beijing does not fear the consequences of reckless behaviour."

As the potential for miscalculation and rapid escalation continues to unravel the regional balance of power, Dibb also highlights the threat of 'surprise' offensives and 'grey zone' attacks in the form of cyber attacks, economic or political coercion. 

Dibb explains, "Nevertheless, the risk of a sudden attack 'out of the blue' is the intelligence nightmare for the unprepared side. The likelihood of surprise attack is higher in an era such as today’s with increasing nationalism, assertion of territorial claims, and increased deployment of military assets close to each other. The principal cause of surprise is generally not the failure of intelligence but the unwillingness of political leaders to believe intelligence or to react to it with sufficient dispatch.

"It is far from clear whether defence organisations in today’s potentially dangerous era are focusing on this issue with sufficient intensity and reducing the probability of surprise by making plans, strategies, and operational doctrines effective in the event of a surprise."

Dibb adds a poignant and troublesome final assessment: "Such potentially high-intensity conflicts will require radical changes to the ADF, including the acquisition of long-range strike, cyber attack and area denial systems. The ADF’s logistics, stockholding of missiles and munitions, fuel supplies and military bases all require fundamental improvement. These are deficiencies that the Defence Strategic Update acknowledges as being a priority for investment. But it remains to be seen if they are going to be treated urgently enough. Time is not on our side."

Your thoughts

Australia is defined by its economic and strategic relationships with the Indo-Pacific and the access to the growing economies and to strategic sea lines of communication supporting over 90 per cent of global trade, a result of the cost-effective and reliable nature of sea transport.

Indo-Pacific Asia is at the epicentre of the 21st century’s era of great power competition and global maritime trade, with about US$5 trillion worth of trade flowing through the South China Sea and the strategic waterways and chokepoints of south-east Asia annually.

For Australia, a nation defined by this relationship with traditionally larger yet economically weaker regional neighbours, the growing economic prosperity of the region and corresponding arms build-up, combined with ancient and more recent enmities, competing geopolitical, economic and strategic interests, places the nation at the centre of the 21st century’s “great game”.

Enhancing Australia’s capacity to act as an independent power, incorporating great power-style strategic economic, diplomatic and military capability serves not only as a powerful symbol of Australia’s sovereignty and evolving responsibilities in supporting and enhancing the security and prosperity of Indo-Pacific Asia. 

Australia is consistently told that as a nation we are torn between our economic relationship with China and the longstanding strategic partnership with the US, placing the country at the epicentre of a great power rivalry – but what if it didn’t have to be that way?

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of shaking up the nation’s approach to our regional partners.

We would also like to hear your thoughts on the avenues Australia should pursue to support long-term economic growth and development in support of national security in the comments section below, or get in touch with This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.or at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..