President Xi details PLA modernisation efforts as part of latest Five Year Plan

Like every ascendent economic, political and strategic power, China has used its period of rapid industrialisation and economic expansion to begin establishing its position as an economic, political and strategic power within the broader global context.

Fuelled by a long memory of a "century of humiliation" at the hands of Western imperialism, finally ending with the successful Communist Revolution in 1949, China and its political leaders have dedicated the nation to establishing a new era of Chinese global primacy. 

In response, 'leader for life' President Xi Jinping has resolutely resolved to assert China's influence and ambitions in the Indo-Pacific, while also defiantly responding to any external attempts to interfere with the rising superpower's national interests – a key component to this is responding to the ongoing issue in Hong Kong, potential conflict with Taiwan and the growing capacity of the People's Liberation Army to influence regional affairs.

The Communist Party of China (CPC) and the People's Republic of China (PRC) have used the 14th Five Year Plan recently announced by President Xi to build on the announcements made during the 70th anniversary, detailed in the China and the World in the New Era speech late last year. 

State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China and the World in the New Era states, "The PRC has witnessed profound changes and achieved a miracle of development unprecedented in human history. In just a few decades, China has completed a course that took developed countries several hundred years. China has now become the world’s second largest economy, taken care of the material needs of its nearly 1.4 billion people, and achieved moderate all-round prosperity."

This has seen a growing shift within Beijing's long-term planning practices, with President Xi stepping up the rhetoric and his intentions for the future direction and capabilities of the People's Liberation Army, which he established in the latest Five Year Plan – detailing these developments is Dean Cheng of the US-based Breaking Defense. 

Setting the scene, Cheng explains, "China has laid out the broad goals and objectives for its 14th Five Year Plan (FYP), which will extend from 2021 to 2025, and one of the priorities is 'elevating the level of national security'.

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"While Americans may be inclined to dismiss any budget plan more than a year out, five-year plans are an important part of the planning process for the People’s Republic of China (PRC). When something is incorporated into the FYP this merits a LOT of attention because it reflects broad bureaucratic consensus. No ministry or bureaucracy will submit something for inclusion in the FYP unless it has reached internal agreement. Similarly, they will fight to ensure their goals and objectives are fully funded if challenged."

Still a 'developing nation' with an offer

Both President Xi and the CPC seek to expand the long-standing narrative that China remains the world's largest developing country – a story that China hopes will continue to provide the world with an opportunity for continuing economic growth and development, despite security concerns.

A key component of this emphasis is a shift from Beijing to sure up its dependence on increasingly contested global supply chains, particularly in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic and growing economic tensions between the rising superpower and key raw resource suppliers, including Australia. 

Cheng explains this growing anxiety within China's policy making community and the push to expand growth and national security and resilience at the same time: "Economic, technological, and supply chain security clearly will be priorities. There is concern about preserving societal stability, a key goal of a state that has been beset by persistent and widespread civil disturbances over the last decade.

"For example, there is continued emphasis on urbanisation, while reducing the divide between urban and rural development. This suggests the Chinese leadership sees the growing disparities between the countryside and the cities as a major source of concern.

"Since these gaps also emphasise the imbalance between coastal provinces (which have generally benefited from the policies of 'Reform and Opening' pursued since the days of Deng Xiaoping) and inland ones, any effort to improve rural populations will also likely see benefits accrue to inland provinces."

At the core of these developments is the ever present tactical and strategic anxiety that has shaped the national security policy and doctrine of the People's Republic of China since its formation, particularly driven by concerns regarding the nation's neighbours, namely Japan, South Korea and, intermittently, Russia, as well as the ever present concerns about its great strategic rival: the US. 

Modernising and digitising the PLA to replicate and in same cases rival the technological and information edge enjoyed by the US and its allies remains at the core of this push, to ensure that the traditional advantages across the tactical and strategic domains long enjoyed by potential adversaries are as limited as possible. 

Reshaping the PLA

As part of this push, President Xi detailed renewed attempts to overhaul and reshape the PLA as part of the Five Year Plan, which Cheng describes, saying, "The Chinese have been modernising the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) for more than two decades.

"For a long time, the PLA has been described as 'half-mechanised, half-informationised'. While some units of the PLA employ data links, network-centric sensor-to-shooter system-of-systems, and field a variety of UAVs, electronic warfare platforms, and advanced combat capabilities, other units are still in the midst of simply shifting from towed artillery to self-propelled guns, improving their main battle tanks and becoming fully motorised.

"For the next FYP, the goal is to accelerate military modernisation, so the PLA will be fully mechanised and informationised by 2027. The PLA was founded in 1927, so the 2027 target date is in part an effort to capitalize on the centennial of its founding. Nonetheless, to accelerate informationisation will require either a major reduction in forces, a major budget increase or a shift in the standard of what constitutes 'informationised' units."

While China's China's National Defense in the New Era white paper was quick to identify what it defines as a purely "defensive national defence policy" – reality is often different to what is articulated – even when clearly defined commitments to use force to "reunify" China are present. 

This articulated focus on developing and enhancing the "defensive nature" of the Chinese military strategy, force structure modernisation and capability acquisition program seemingly contradicts developments in the Indo-Pacific, the South China Sea in particular and the clearly apparent Chinese ambitions and designs of regional dominance. 

To this end, China identifies a "military strategic guideline for a new era" that directly adheres to the principles of: defence, self-defence and post-strike response; and adopts what China defines as "active defence", which is responsible for the modernisation, recapitalisation and expansion of China's military capabilities ranging from advanced cyber and space capabilities, to conventional power projection capabilities including ground and air combat forces, naval power projection units like aircraft carriers and supporting strike groups, and a modernisation of China's nuclear deterrence force.

This modernisation and recapitalisation has also expanded to China's development of tactical and strategic levelling capabilities, namely the active development and militarisation of reclaimed islands in the South China Sea and the development of advanced, integrated anti-access/area denial defence networks throughout the region – both of which are designed to counter and hinder the tactical and strategic mobility of US and allied forces in the western Pacific. 

Further influencing China's military modernisation, recapitalisation and expansion of capabilities is what the rising superpower defines as "international strategic competition" – driven largely by a resurgence in the US and its direct approach to dealing with China across the economic, political, diplomatic and, increasingly, strategic domains throughout the Indo-Pacific. 

Building on this, China also focuses its attention on the US' regional allies, namely Japan, Korea and Australia, as part of a gaggle of seemingly 'petulant children' negligently modernising and expanding their own respective military capabilities in response to childish concerns about China's own military capabilities: 

"The US is strengthening its Asia-Pacific military alliances and reinforcing military deployment and intervention, adding complexity to regional security. The deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in the Republic of Korea (ROK) by the US has severely undermined the regional strategic balance and the strategic security interests of regional countries.

"In an attempt to circumvent the post-war mechanism, Japan has adjusted its military and security policies and increased input accordingly, thus becoming more outward-looking in its military endeavours. Australia continues to strengthen its military alliance with the US and its military engagement in the Asia-Pacific, seeking a bigger role in security affairs."

This direct focus on both the US and its regional partners has been identified by many in the Australian media as a direct threat, particularly when viewed within the context of China's expanded commitment to reunite Taiwan with force and its continued assertive positioning in the South China Sea.

Cheng expands on this, stating, "At the same time, this additional effort will simply be continuing a process underway since the 12th (2011-2015) and current 13th (2016-2020) FYPs. During the past decade, the PLA modernised much of its equipment; today, it has the world’s largest navy and air force.

"Crucially, it has significantly evolved its doctrine, adopting concepts such as 'integrated [or unified] joint operations' and 'civil-military fusion'. It has also undergone a radical reorganisation (announced on December 31, 2015), with new services such as the PLA Strategic Support Force and the establishment of new 'war zones' or 'theatre commands' to replace the old military regions.

"All of these steps marked the initial phase of PLA modernisation. The next seven years will likely see adjustments as the PLA assesses the success of these modernisation efforts, undertakes course corrections, and otherwise prepares the PLA to enter its next century of development.  

Adding to this, Cheng states, "China’s efforts at improving its own security are neither simply military, nor occurring at a breakneck pace as new requirements outstrip resources. As Beijing has demonstrated over the past decade, it is undertaking modernisation at a measured pace, securing resources (through programs such as the Belt and Road Initiative) while not antagonising too many other states.

"Only in the past year-and-a-half, with the advent of 'Wolf Warriors', as well as more peremptorily dealing with partners and aid recipient nations, has China’s reputation lost some of its lustre."

Questions for Australia

Despite Australia’s enduring commitment to the Australia-US alliance, serious questions remain for Australia in the new world order of President-elect Joe Biden's America, as a number of allies have been targeted by the maverick President Trump for relying on the US for their security against larger state-based actors, which has seen the President actively pressuring key allies, particularly NATO allies, to renegotiate the deals.

Australia cannot simply rely on the US, or Japan, or the UK, or France to guarantee the economic, political and strategic interests of the nation. China is already actively undermining the regional order through its provocative actions in the South China Sea and its rapid military build-up.

To assume that Australia will remain immune to any hostilities that break out in the region is naive at best and criminally negligent at worst.

As a nation, Australia cannot turn a blind eye to its own geopolitical, economic and strategic backyard, both at a traditional and asymmetric level, lest we see a repeat of Imperial Japan or the Iranian Revolution arrive on our doorstep. It is clear from history that appeasement does not work, so it is time to avoid repeating the mistakes of our past and be fully prepared to meet any challenge.  

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