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Australia’s defence planning should extend beyond the development of warfighting capability, incorporating broader efforts to build national resilience as part of a new integrated strategy, according to a RAAF commander.
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While acknowledging the importance of investment in next-generation combat technology, Ulas Yildirim, a wing commander and deputy director of force structure design with the Royal Australian Air Force, believes efforts to deter malign actors should also involve building resilience in the commercial sector, particularly across energy, manufacturing, and infrastructure.
“Defence of the nation involves a lot more than weapons, and the deterrent effect the government seeks to achieve through the Australian Defence Force’s high-end warfighting capabilities is inextricably linked with broader national resilience,” he writes in a piece published by ASPI.
“That connection has often been taken for granted in defence planning.”
WGCDR Yildirim references the supply chain vulnerabilities exposed by the COVID-19 pandemic, which disrupted manufacturing processes in the defence industry.
The RAAF wing commander points to software and computer chip shortages for semiconductor manufacturing, with just Samsung in South Korea and the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company capable of producing five-nanometre chips.
“The lack of resilience in the semiconductor supply chain has exposed vulnerabilities in the commercial sector, such as car and mobile-phone manufacturing. But it has also exposed military operations around the world, because Taiwan is the sole producer of the Xilinx chips used in the F-35 joint strike fighter,” WGCDR Yildirim observes.
“This illustrates the deep connections between commercial and public interests when it comes to national defence.”
He continues: “Relying solely on the ADF to create a deterrent effect is a lopsided approach. The purpose of deterrence is to complicate the calculations and raise the costs of action for an adversary while attaining a continuing advantage for one’s own forces.”
As such, the ADF’s ability to deter malign actors, WGCDR Yildirim writes, depends on national resilience beyond the boundaries of military bases and establishments.
He notes Australia’s dependence on imports of refined liquid energy, which, if exposed, would impact the reach and duration of reach and duration of ADF operations.
“Any disruption to sea lines of communication could severely undermine the credibility of the deterrent effect of these high-end warfighting capabilities,” WGCDR Yildirim warns.
“Establishing sovereign capabilities to produce and store fuel from indigenous feedstock would help resolve this concern by ensuring that a single action by a malign actor won’t cripple the nation.”
WGCDR Yildirim also points to Australia’s dependence on fossil fuel imports, given its limited refining capacity.
“While the general population and the ADF depend on combustion technologies for everyday use, fossil fuels will continue to be a major part of Australia’s energy demands, requiring a transition plan rather than a step-change towards net-zero emissions,” he writes.
“Yet, due to the vexed narrative around the use of fossil fuels, energy security and climate change are treated as discrete elements.”
To address this, WGCDR Yildirim proposes that Australia explore alternative industrial-scale processing methods, like the Fischer-Tropsch method used in Qatar and South Africa, which converts coal and natural gas into liquid fuels.
“The Fischer-Tropsch process can be competitive when the price of oil ranges above US$55 per barrel,” he notes.
“Such methods can form the basis of Australia’s transition from fossil fuels to 100 per cent renewables while solving its fuel import dependency.
“That makes it attractive to consider the mining industry as part of the nation’s deterrence framework through its ability to create liquid energy security without any negative impact on the economy or long-term climate ambitions.”
WGCDR Yildirim argues that such endeavours should be tied into defence policy frameworks, like the 2020 Defence Strategic Update, rather than remaining tethered to economic objectives.
“A holistic approach to national deterrence can create a thriving manufacturing sector that generates revenue and jobs,” he adds.
“When viewed as part of an integrated system, these capabilities can be more effective than the sum of the parts in deterring malign actions against Australian interests.”
WGCDR Yildirim concludes: “The government continues to fund many different deterrence programs. Now we need to consider each as a component of a complete capability to achieve credible deterrence.”
The views expressed do not reflect the official position of the RAAF, the Department of Defence or the Australian government.
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