Exploring South Korea’s emergence as a key geostrategic ally

Last week, South Korea-based defence company Hanwha signed a $1 billion contract with the Commonwealth government for the supply of Huntsman self-propelled artillery systems and armoured ammunition resupply vehicles to the Australian Army under the LAND 8116 Phase 1 program.

The vehicles are set to be manufactured in Australia at a new facility operated by the firm’s local Victoria-based facility.

Just days later, Australia and South Korea formally committed to bolstering co-operation in the space domain under a new collaboration agreement.

The announcements coincided with South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s fourth meeting with Prime Minister Scott Morrison, signalling a shift in the nature of Canberra and Seoul’s long-standing relationship.

Prime Minister Morrison, who was joined by President Moon at a signing ceremony at Parliament House in Canberra to announce the Hanwha deal, noted the importance of the nations’ Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, adding that bolstering industry collaboration would support efforts to address “mutual security challenges”.

Meanwhile, after signing the space MOU with Australia, President Moon said he hoped the deal would “enhance exchange and foster cooperation” across a range of fields including space exploration, the launch vehicle industry, and satellite navigation.

“[I] hope this agreement [becomes] the stepping stone for the two countries to expand into space together,” President Moon added.

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According to Michael Shoebridge, ASPI’s director defence, strategy and national security program, such initiatives form part of South Korea’s new regional security strategy.

“In sheer strategic and defence terms, South Korea shifted from its sole focus on the threat from North Korea several years ago and has been pursuing a force structure for its military that is able to play a part in deterring conflict in the wider region,” he writes.

“Seoul is showing strategic imagination that’s being translated into real military capability in a timely way.”

Shoebridge points to the country’s push to develop surface and sub-surface capabilities, aimed at strengthening its offensive posture.

He also notes South Korea’s aircraft carrier program, which would support longer-range regional engagements.

Other areas of investment include a ramp up in the development of independent surveillance and reconnaissance, and precision strike capabilities, which have “broader application than only deterring Pyongyang”.

“All these developments provide a platform for defence-to-defence cooperation from research and development to operational concepts and shared capabilities between Australia and South Korea,” Shoebridge continues.

But “high-technology” co-operation should be at the core of the partnership.

This, he writes, should include low-emissions technologies, space, critical-minerals, semi-conductors, artificial intelligence and uncrewed systems.

Shoebridge suggests Hanwha Defense Australia’s potential receipt of the LAND 400 Phase 3 contract — an $18 billion to $27 billion program to deliver next-generation infantry fighting vehicles to the Australian Army — could help get the ball rolling.

“Australia would have to build a deep technical working relationship with South Korean industry and its government research and development efforts, and this relationship could be used for co-operation on more useful capabilities that both countries need like missiles, small satellites, new energy systems for military purposes and unmanned systems,” he writes.

“That’s an indirect way to extract value from a dubious army armoured vehicle program, but if it’s really going to proceed, then it makes sense to extract benefits out of it that matter to our strategic environment.”

South Korea’s geostrategic pivot and its efforts to ramp up industry collaboration with regional partners like Australia signal “some alignment” on the “bigger strategic picture” around the Quad, AUKUS and shared challenges posed by China.

However, Shoebridge notes that while Seoul would benefit from co-operatives like the Quad and AUKUS, it would explore non-government alternatives to fostering its relationship with like-minded neighbours.  

He suggests Prime Minister Morrison invite his counterpart to the 2022 Sydney Dialogue on emerging and critical technologies.

“If we understand our strategic environment and the future of our digital world as it is affected by this, the future of the relationship won’t be about South Korea equipping the Australian Army with tracked howitzers and large armoured fighting vehicles,” he writes.

“Instead, it will be through deeper cooperation in the areas of strength that South Korea’s defence organisation and military are pursuing and that are relevant to maritime and air power, missiles, space and strike capabilities.

“And in a bigger strategic way, it will be through the contribution that the unique partnership between South Korea’s government and its ‘big tech’ sector can make to how the world’s powerful and creative democracies can harness the digital world for common prosperity, security and [wellbeing].”

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