Why Australia must capitalise on public support for a strong stance on China to advance its long-term national security interests.
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Over the past few years, the increasingly coercive nature of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Indo-Pacific posture has reshaped public perceptions of the regime in Australia.
Findings from the Lowy Institute’s Poll 2021 revealed that trust in China has slumped to a record low, with just 16 per cent of respondents stating they trust China ‘a great deal’ or ‘somewhat’ to act responsibly on the world stage, down from 52 per cent three years prior.
Just 10 per cent of respondents said they have ‘some’ or ‘a lot’ of confidence in China’s President, Xi Jinping, to ‘do the right thing’ regarding world affairs.
Confidence in the CCP’s chief has more than halved from 22 per cent in 2020, and is down a staggering 33 percentage points from 2018.
This shift may now be more entrenched, with the CCP showing no signs of openness to dialogue barring subservience from the Commonwealth government.
Instead, the CCP has continued to threaten Australia with economic punishment, and more recently, has sought to intimidate militarily.
Defence recently confirmed reports of a laser attack on a Royal Australian Air Force P-8A Poseidon while in flight over Australia’s northern approaches on Thursday, 17 February.
According to intelligence gathered by RAAF personnel, the laser emanated from a Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Luyang Class guided missile destroyer travelling through the Arafura Sea alongside a PLAN Yuzhao Class amphibious transport dock vessel.
Prime Minister Scott Morrison condemned the PLAN, describing the “unprovoked” and “unwarranted” laser attack as an “act of intimidation”.
The report and the subsequent condemnation from government and Defence was the latest in a series of public rebukes of Chinese behaviour in the region.
Chief of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) Mike Burgess went on record earlier this month warning that foreign interference activities by the likes of China threaten Australia’s political integrity.
But according to Michael Shoebridge, director of the defence, strategy and national security program at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), government, defence, and national security officials need to be more specific about the Chinese threat.
Shoebridge references senator Kimberley Kitching’s recent use of parliamentary privilege to unmask a Chinese “puppeteer” behind a foreign influence plot to back political candidates at the upcoming federal election.
He claims it should not be left to opposition senators to divulge such intelligence to the general public.
“ASIO should get comfortable naming the key individuals behind such plots and the foreign government they were serving,” he writes.
“Doing so can only help our understanding and keep our democracy resilient.
“We’ve seen an inability to name the problem publicly, with phrases like ‘a sophisticated state actor’ and ‘country-agnostic’ policies, for too long. Naming problems helps face and resolve them.”
The ASPI analyst goes on to stress the importance of bipartisan support for a strong stance on China.
“[When] you are dealing with a powerful, coercive regime like the one led by Xi, that takes continued political will. The current debate is reminding us all of that,” he continues.
“It’s also a reminder that times have changed radically in the 10 years since the then Australian government — Julia Gillard’s government — released the optimistic Australia in the Asian century strategy that saw only the upside of economic engagement with the region, notably China.”
According to Shoebridge, a return to the former Australia-China relationship, based on shared economic interests, is no longer conceivable.
“Any party governing Australia after the forthcoming election needs to understand in its bones that there is no ‘reset’ moment that takes us back to the future,” he states.
“There are still businesses and also officials at state and federal level who harbour nostalgic dreams of a return to the plan of increasing Australian access to the China market.
“But, without cringing and damaging concessions in which Australia demonstrates penitence and contrition for daring to have differences with the Chinese Communist Party regime, there’s not the remotest prospect of new directions for the relationship while Xi rules China and conducts a ‘great closing’ after Deng Xiaoping’s great opening to the world.”
Rather, he argues, policymakers should focus their efforts on building a coalition with like-minded nations to counter aggression from authoritarian regimes.
“Below the level of simple statements about China policy, there’s a heaving mass of issues that the Australian government will need to keep taking decisions and talking about,” he notes.
“How important is collective action by the world’s powerful democracies given the now concerted actions of two autocratic powers — Russia and China — against our interests and values? How do the very different political systems in the democratic and authoritarian worlds engage digitally and in areas of data and technology?
“How much does Australian policy, regulation and investment need to push and support our companies and universities to accelerate their diversification strategies away from long-term all-in bets on the China market? Will Australia seek to be a leader in any of these debates and areas of decision or be a fast and quiet follower?”
Shoebridge concludes: “Whoever wins government in the next Australian election, their job will be to serve Australia’s national interest by working on the China challenge with our close partners and friends — and by being honest with Australians about the practical challenges Beijing brings.”
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