Has the Biden administration’s decision to amend the nuclear declaration policy weakened the nation’s defence posture?
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Late last month, the US Department of Defense submitted the classified 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) to Congress.
According to the Pentagon, the NPR represents a “comprehensive, balanced approach” to US nuclear strategy, policy, posture and forces.
“Maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent and strong and credible extended deterrence commitments, remain a top priority for the department and the nation,” the Pentagon noted in a statement.
“The NPR underscores our commitment to reducing the role of nuclear weapons and re-establishing our leadership in arms control.
“We will continue to emphasise strategic stability, seek to avoid costly arms races, and facilitate risk reduction and arms control arrangements where possible.”
The interim 2022 NPR strategy notes that as long as nuclear weapons exist, the “fundamental role” of the US stockpile would be to “deter nuclear attack” on the United States, our allies, and partners”.
The Pentagon goes on to stress that the United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons “in extreme circumstances”.
According to Patty-Jane Geller, policy analyst, nuclear deterrence and missile defence at The Heritage Foundation, the new strategy represents a subtle but significant revision of the nation’s nuclear deterrence policy.
Geller welcomes the Biden administration’s resistance to progressive lawmakers who lobbied for a “no first use” policy but laments the shift away from a policy of “calculated ambiguity”, which emphasised that the role of US nuclear weapons is to deter both nuclear and non-nuclear attacks.
“[President] Biden’s ‘fundamental role’ policy walks this back, deemphasising the role nuclear weapons play in deterring nonnuclear attacks,” she writes.
She claims Biden’s revision, which resembles the policy declared by former President Barack Obama in 2010, is no longer fit-for-purpose, given the deteriorating geopolitical environment – namely the growing threat posed by Russia and China.
“Since then, Russia has invaded Ukraine (twice), Russian President Vladimir Putin has demonstrated an active chemical-weapons program with attacks on political opponents, and China has greatly expanded its military forces,” Geller writes.
“Indeed, the Trump administration strengthened Mr. Obama’s nuclear policy partly in recognition that our adversaries had greatly increased their lethal nonnuclear capabilities.”
The analyst makes particular reference to the ongoing clash in Ukraine, pointing to President Putin’s recent nuclear threats, with the former KGB spy ordering Russia’s nuclear forces to be on high alert.
Geller adds US allies supported the Trump administration’s declaratory policy, pointing to remarks from Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Sasha Baker.
“I can’t say that I’ve found an ally who is urging us to reduce our nuclear deterrence or our declaratory policy in particular,” Baker said in March.
Geller suggests that in the absence of a call for revision from allies, the amendment may have been a response to internal pressure from progressives.
“If our allies did not advocate for this change in policy, then perhaps Mr Biden is retreating to Obama-era nuclear policy to placate the left side of his party that favours nuclear disarmament,” she contends.
“But altering policy that impacts nuclear deterrence—the number-one issue for US national security—for political purposes would be nothing short of irresponsible.”
Alternatively, the policy shift may be an attempt to reduce tensions with Russia and China by demonstrating US intentions are “more benign” than those of the previous administrations.
But according to Geller, this would be “wishful thinking”.
“More likely, this policy will suggest to adversaries and allies alike that the US might be more reluctant to use nuclear weapons against major chemical, biological or conventional attacks,” she writes.
“Our adversaries may interpret that message to mean they now have greater freedom to take more risks, so long as they keep the violence just below the nuclear threshold.”
She adds that weakening declaratory policy amid sabre-rattling from President Putin could signal his threats are working, and that the US is “backing off”.
This could undermine confidence among the US’ key strategic allies.
“Mr Biden’s decision to announce the reduced role of US nuclear weapons as war wages on along NATO’s borders could also cause allies to question the administration’s assurance that it will live up to its extended deterrence commitments,” Geller notes.
Geller concludes: “Unfortunately, there’s not much anyone can do to reverse this policy since the authority to use nuclear weapons lies solely in the president’s hands.
“But moving forward, support for a modern and flexible nuclear deterrent will remain more critical than ever.
“In the face of some of the greatest threats to national security, the US must show strength.”
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