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Opinion: Much has been written on the Defence Strategic Review (DSR) and potential implications of several of its proposals for the future. One recommendation on force planning seems relatively minor but would result in major changes to how Defence plans force structure. The DSR recommends “a new, more focused approach to defence planning based on net assessment”, a method developed and championed by the iconic Andrew Marshall, writes founder of Robust Policy and former director of RAND Australia, Dr Carl Rhodes.
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In examining the utility and consequences of force planning using net assessment, let’s first understand its roots. Marshall firstly recognised, while working on the Cold War at RAND Corporation in the 1950s, that states don’t behave as individual, rational actors. States, even communist ones, consist of groups of organisations and each of those organisations has their own interests. Understanding organisational behaviour was therefore important to deciphering decision-making processes in the Soviet Union. Additionally, force planning methods of this time focused on improving simulated future war outcomes against an adversary with fixed projected capabilities. Marshall’s preferred approach was to view the Cold War as a long-term struggle against an adaptive competitor reacting to the actions of both the United States and the changing world around it. This mindset permeates the net assessment process.
Marshall also recognised that many intelligence assessments used as assumptions for force planning failed to recognise that the adversary had limited resources, just like the United States. There were limits to the growth of their military as a result: budgetary, industrial, and organisational. Additionally, increasing Soviet military budgets would come at the expense of other government services. Underinvesting in health care in favour of military investments, for example, would weaken the adversary’s population over the long-term, shifting the military balance. Another shortfall was that intelligence estimates overestimated Soviet capabilities and failed to properly recognise the strengths of the US in certain key areas. The long-term military competition was about much more than technical capabilities of military equipment, it also needed to properly factor differences in training, organisation, alliance cohesion and other areas.
The Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment (ONA) stood up in 1973 with Marshall serving as its first director until 2015, a tenure so long and highly regarded that Marshall was known as the Pentagon’s Yoda. ONA continues to produce highly classified, tightly controlled assessments for the Secretary of Defense (whom ONA advises directly) and other senior leaders in DoD. Key to these assessments, according to DoD Policy 5111.11, are capabilities of the US and foreign nations by theatre, domain, and function while considering capabilities, operating concepts, doctrine, and weapon systems. ONA itself has a relatively small staff and manages an independent research program, including commissioned work from other parts of government and outside organisations. War gaming plays an important role in understanding the future of warfare while simulated campaign modelling, typically used for force planning, has a less dominant role.
While net assessment is an important and valuable process, Andrew Marshall’s writing and public statements were crystal clear that it shouldn’t be used in force planning processes.
The use of net assessment is intended to be diagnostic. It will highlight efficiency and inefficiency in the way we and others do things, and areas of comparative advantage with respect to our rivals. It is not intended to provide recommendation as to force levels or force structures as an output.
– Andrew Marshall, The Nature and Scope of Net Assessment
Marshall was rightfully concerned that linking net assessment to force planning could easily bias or corrupt its analysis. The mixed quantitative and qualitative nature and the extensive role of expert judgement in the net assessment process means that someone favouring a certain outcome could distort any net assessment to promote certain strategies or systems.
I have personally led and reviewed studies embracing scenario-based and capability-based planning, both have been used for designing future force structure in the US DoD over the past 25 years. Each of these methods has various strengths and weaknesses and care must be taken to reduce bias and avoid fragile solutions that fail when assumptions change. Net assessment is also a complex analytic process that requires an understanding of how to properly integrate interdisciplinary inputs and expert judgement. High-quality net assessments require both in-house expertise and resources to fund external supporting analyses. Implementing net assessment would allow Defence to better understand long-term strategic trends, but it should be limited to a diagnostic role rather than a prescriptive role in force planning processes.
Carl Rhodes is founder of Robust Policy, a Canberra firm providing high-quality analysis and policy solutions. Previously, he served 25 years with RAND Corporation including a term as director of RAND Australia.
