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Public opposition in South Korea to rapprochement with Japan has shone a spotlight on the challenges faced by US defence planners in building a coalition of like-minded nations across the Indo-Pacific.
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In 2022, the United States government rebuked Chinese accusations that it sought to build an alliance system akin to NATO in the Indo-Pacific.
Rather, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd J Austin III shared his vision that the United States would support the creation of a “network” of nations to uphold the international rules-based order. While the vision of a seemingly informal association of like-minded nations would almost certainly fall short of including collective defence mechanisms such as NATO’s Article 5, the United States Department of Defense expressed hope that it would facilitate increased cooperation between partner nations in the event of a crisis.
“What we are trying to do when we talk about building a network, is to strengthen the institutional capacity of each of those nations so that if there is a crisis, it’s not the first time [they’re] ever trying to do anything together,” a spokesperson told Department of Defense News in September 2022.
“You have habits of cooperation, as well as increase the ties between those networks, sometimes not even involving us.”
Names and organisations mentioned in this “constellation” of regional partnerships includes treaty allies such as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia and Thailand — as well as ASEAN and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.
However, despite the well-intentioned model proposed by the United States government to enable nations in the Indo-Pacific to deepen cooperation and support one another in the event of crises, historical grievances and changing attitudes to the role of China could stifle any emergent network.
One primary case study includes two US allies, South Korea and Japan. A recent analysis published by the United States Institute of Peace detailed how historical inertia threatens rapprochement between the two nations, despite facing similar geopolitical and security challenges.
According to USIP’s Frank Aum, polling has indicated that 60 per cent of South Koreans oppose the recently renewed bilateral relations with Japan.
Recent steps toward rehabilitated relations have been publicly hampered by ongoing legal action from victims of Japanese forced labor during Japanese occupation, which sparked a series of retaliatory measures including Japanese export controls on technology destined for South Korea and a subsequent complaint by South Korea to the World Trade Organization.
Security cooperation has likewise been rocky. The two nations clashed in 2018 when a South Korean warship locked onto a Japanese military plane, which resulted in the suspension of the two nations’ security relationship.
Historical grievances between the two nations are reflected in 2022 favourability research, where the South Korean public viewed North Korea favourably than Japan. Recent research by Hankook has detailed how South Korea's public views regional players.
- US – 59 per cent favourability among respondents
- North Korea – 29.4 per cent
- Japan – 29 per cent
- China – 23.9 per cent
- Russia – 23.3 per cent
Clearly, expectations that Indo-Pacific nations will follow the adage of “the enemy of my enemy” is an insufficient basis by which the United States can establish a network of like-minded nations.
Historical grievances among Indo-Pacific states will be further tested by the belief that China’s ascendence to economic hegemony is a fait accompli.
Research in Israel, Malaysia, Singapore, and South Korea published by Pew Research in 2022 outlined that “a majority think it’s more important to prioritise strengthening economic relations with China, even if it means not addressing human rights issues”.
Meanwhile, even the West’s historic allies have softened their stance on China. The same research outlines that 42 per cent of Singaporean respondents believe that China’s military was either “not a” or “not too” serious of a problem. Meanwhile, 49 per cent of respondents agreed that strong commercial ties with China was important, as opposed to 33 per cent for the United States.
While building a network of nations to buttress against one power gaining regional hegemony in the Indo-Pacific is a prudent position, the United States, Australia, and Japan cannot expect all treaty allies — much less nations pursuing a hedging strategy — to be willing participants.
