Does the IIP focus on ‘Theatre Command and Control’ provide the opportunity for us to get northern infrastructure right?

In the aftermath of the devastation wrought by Japan’s surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and the closely coordinated blitzkrieg-like advance of Japanese forces throughout Southeast Asia, culminating in the fall of Singapore and the Philippines, infamous American general Douglas MacArthur turned his eyes south.

In shifting Allied headquarters to Melbourne, General MacArthur cemented Australia’s central role to the Pacific war effort and highlighted the importance of our island continent in the war effort to reclaim the Pacific from Imperial Japan.

As the war progressed, Australia’s industrial base and geographic proximity to the key battlefields in Southeast Asia and the southernmost Japanese islands paved the way to the eventual capitulation of Japan, bringing the world and the region to peace.

While the Cold War began and evolved, Australia, for the large part, was viewed as a strategic backwater despite playing home to sensitive US military installations like Pine Gap and the Harold E Holt strategic communications relay in Western Australia. Our geography kept us isolated from many of the Cold War’s most intense conflagrations.

Throughout the Global War on Terror, these secretive facilities came to play minor but still important roles, while Australia proudly developed the General John Baker Complex, originally as “Headquarters Australian Theatre” (HQAST) in 2004, to eventually evolve into its current incarnation, Headquarters Joint Operations Command or HQ(JOC) outside of Canberra.

This first formal foray into theatre command and control in the post-war era would fundamentally transform Australia’s participation in the Global War on Terror and shape the development of the Australian Defence Force into a “joint force” and now pave the way to the development of an “integrated, focused force”.

Today, the aftermath of the 2023 Defence Strategic Review, 2024 National Defence Strategy and the 2024 Integrated Investment Program has highlighted the need for an expansive investment (worth between $11–15 billion over the next decade) to establish a theatre command and control capability.

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To this end, the Integrated Investment Program stated a requirement for “ADF commanders need to be able to quickly develop a comprehensive appreciation of key threats and opportunities on operations so they can make fast and effective decisions. The ADF also needs the ability to undermine a potential adversary’s ability to exercise effective command and control in order to complicate its risk calculus.”

Going further, the IIP added, “The Integrated Investment Program includes investments of $11–$15 billion in capabilities to enable ADF decisionmakers to assess complex situations, plan effectively and act quickly on operations. This includes investments in enhancing and modernising Defence’s joint, sea, land and air warfighting command and control systems and intelligence capabilities. Robust intelligence capabilities are central to National Defence as they directly support ADF operations and provide strategic decision‑making advantage.”

But what does this look like?

Northern infrastructure investments

A key component of getting this right is consolidating and maximising the existing northern infrastructure network that Australia already operates, both individually and in conjunction with key partners, including the United States.

As it stands, Australia’s two, most significant established defence facilities are represented by RAAF Base Tindal, outside of Katherine, and the combined Army, Navy and Air Force facilities in and around Darwin, with bare bases at RAAF Base Scherger near Weipa, Queensland RAAF Base Curtin near Derby, Western Australia and RAAF Base Learmonth near Exmouth, Western Australia, rounding out the remainder of our “established” northern defence infrastructure.

In order to maximise the capability offered to the Australian Defence Force and our partners, including the United States, the government’s proposed plans highlight expansive investment; however, there is little emphasis on the physical infrastructure in this focus on theatre command and control, with the IIP highlighting the emphasis on the “enhancement of the theatre land command and control architecture to support improved planning and decision making and provide new communications and geospatial data capabilities. This will also strengthen cyber security, resilience and interoperability”.

As well as the “continued replacement of Defence’s existing air traffic management and theatre air control systems. This will enhance the ability to manage aircraft movements in an agile, efficient manner, including in complex and disrupted operating environments; and the acquisition of a secure suite of ICT systems, applications and supporting infrastructure for Navy to support critical national command and control and interoperability and continued rollout of communications links for sharing data across deployed maritime units”.

Shifting to the IIP’s “Northern Base” focus, the IIP stressed the importance of the $14–18 billion worth of investment earmarked for transforming Australia’s northern base infrastructure, saying, “The Integrated Investment Program includes investments of $14–$18 billion to ensure Defence has a logistically connected and resilient set of bases, ports and barracks across Australia’s north. This is pivotal to enhance force projection and improve Defence’s resilience and ability to sustain operations through a crisis or conflict.”

Unpacking this further, the IIP stated a number of key investment focuses, namely, “the development of the Defence estate across Darwin and Townsville to address force posture requirements and enhance the integrated, focused force’s ability to undertake operations from northern Australia. The redevelopment of the Larrakeyah Defence Precinct in Darwin, including facilities upgrades and new berthing capabilities to accommodate major surface combatants and submarines at HMAS Coonawarra”.

This program of works also includes a host of “resilience” works and forward basing logistics support and resources, including in Townsville, in order to accommodate Army’s Littoral Manoeuvre Brigades and their associated sealift capabilities, ensuring they’re capable of providing rapid response to a range of contingencies across Australia’s northern approaches and our “immediate region”.

But how do we maximise the spend identified in the IIP and the capability delivered to the Australian warfighter?

The hub and spoke – consolidating infrastructure

One way to do this, particularly in northern Australia, is to consolidate key pieces of the Defence estate and infrastructure, particularly in the Darwin area to build fit for purpose and future-proofed infrastructure and incorporating a consolidated “Theatre Command and Control” hub for Australian and partner forces in a single, easily defendable location.

The best part is via the well-established model of asset recycling, particularly for the infrastructure around the existing Larrakeyah Barracks and HMAS Coonawarra sites. The government could certainly recover any costs to consolidate and build a fit-for-purpose infrastructure on a green or brown field site in the Darwin area, say at East Arm, or even Wickham Point within the natural confines of the wider Darwin harbour area.

Further enhancing the value proposition is the opportunity to, in conjunction with the United States, establish a secondary Indo-Pacific Command headquarters facility at the cross-roads of both the Indian and Pacific Oceans, respectively, while also serving to enhance the interoperability and, indeed, interchangeability of Allied forces operating in the region, by designing the infrastructure to emulate the facilities in Pearl Harbor.

This would also serve to spread the costs, allowing for the other planned infrastructure developments to continue unabated. It would also serve to establish this new Joint Base Darwin as the hub at the centre of the Western Pacific’s command and control infrastructure and Australia’s northern infrastructure, providing the opportunity to disaggregate critical infrastructure from this central hub.

Fanning out from this central hub, our aforementioned infrastructure can continue to be developed and modernised as outlined in the Integrated Investment Program and, if leveraged properly, can expand Australia’s area of maritime and air control beyond our northern borders, adding further teeth to our “Strategy of Denial” while contributing to the development of a continent-wide, integrated air and missile defence network.

A key component is making sure that these critical pieces of infrastructure are not passive actors. They need to be active contributors to their defence, which incorporates a range of integrated defensive capabilities. After all, a ship is silly to pick a fight with a fort and that logic remains true to this day.

Economically, this asset recycling of the existing infrastructure could serve to open Darwin up to the immense economic opportunity in Southeast Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific, serving to slowly transition the city into a financial and entertainment hub for the region’s wealth, while maintaining its pivotal role in the nation’s agricultural, resources and energy export industry.

So it seems like the best of both worlds, right? Happy to be proven wrong.

Final thoughts

Importantly, in this era of renewed competition between autarchy and democracy, this is an uncomfortable conversation that needs to be had in the open with the Australian people, as ultimately, they will be called upon to help implement it, to consent to the direction, and to defend it should diplomacy fail.

Our economic resilience, capacity, and competitiveness will prove equally as critical to success in the new world power paradigm as that of the United States, the United Kingdom, or Europe, and we need to begin to recognise the opportunities presented before us.

Expanding and enhancing the opportunities available to Australians while building critical economic resilience, and as a result, deterrence to economic coercion, should be the core focus of the government because only when our economy is strong can we ensure that we can deter aggression towards the nation or our interests.

This also requires a greater degree of transparency and a culture of innovation and collaboration between the nation’s strategic policymakers, elected officials, and the constituents they represent and serve – equally, this approach will need to entice the Australian public to once again invest in and believe in the future direction of the nation.

Additionally, Australia will need to have an honest conversation about how we view ourselves and what our own ambitions are. Is it reasonable for Australia to position itself as a “middle” or “regional” power in this rapidly evolving geopolitical environment? Equally, if we are going to brand ourselves as such, shouldn’t we aim for the top tier to ensure we get the best deal for ourselves and our future generations?

If we are going to emerge as a prosperous, secure, and free nation in the new era of great power competition, it is clear we will need break the shackles of short-termism and begin to think far more long term, to the benefit of current and future generations of Australians.

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..