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With the Coalition’s weekend announcement that they would commit an additional $3 billion to round out Australia’s F-35 fleet at 100 aircraft, does the recent Chinese taskforce and growing global instability mean we would be better off with a fleet of F-35Bs?
As tensions continue to rise in the Indo-Pacific, Australia faces an increasingly complex and volatile security environment. The region has become a focal point for geopolitical competition, with strategic waterways, territorial disputes, and military build-ups heightening the risk of conflict. In this landscape, the need for a robust and flexible defence capability has never been more pressing.
Fixed-wing naval aviation, operating from aircraft carriers or large-deck amphibious ships, presents a critical asset in Australia’s ability to project power, maintain a forward presence and respond to emerging threats.
Fixed-wing aircraft provide unparalleled advantages in maritime surveillance, air superiority, strike capabilities and rapid response operations. Unlike land-based aircraft, carrier-borne fighters and surveillance platforms can operate closer to potential flashpoints, reducing reaction times and enhancing deterrence.
The ability to deploy air assets at sea also ensures greater operational reach, particularly in the vast expanses of the Indo-Pacific, where the tyranny of distance often limits conventional air power.
As regional powers expand their carrier capabilities and assertive maritime postures, Australia must consider whether its own force structure is sufficient to meet emerging challenges. Investing in fixed-wing naval aviation would not only strengthen the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) operational flexibility but also reaffirm Australia’s commitment to regional stability and security in an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific.
Most recently, China’s naval expedition to circumnavigate the Australian land-mass and the circumstances surrounding the detection and interdiction of the taskforce has shed light on just how vulnerable Australia appears to be.
In response, the Coalition announced a AU$3 billion election commitment to expand Australia’s F-35A Lightning II fleet by reinstating the acquisition of a fourth squadron, bringing the nation’s fifth-generation fighter fleet to 100, up from the current 72 F-35As.
Recognising this, opposition Defence spokesman, Andrew Hastie said, “We have a prime minister misleading the public and not across his brief, while his defence minister plays down national security issues. As an island nation in an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific region. It is essential that we are able to defend ourselves and protect our nation’s interests. Increasing our F-35 capability is an effective way we can do so.”
It is the final points of this statement that raises an important question, is an expansion of the F-35A capability the best use of our money, or would we be better suited investing in the F-35B to expand the reach and multi-domain deterrence capability of the Australian Defence Force as an “integrated, focused force”?
Many a Defence Connect reader will no doubt be familiar with my long advocacy for the redevelopment of at least some small measure of a fixed-wing naval aviation capability for the Australian Defence Force as we face an ever riskier threat environment, both close to home and our interests across the region.
However, it isn’t entirely straightforward, as Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s Dr Malcolm Davis explained, “Under the previous Coalition government led by PM Scott Morrison, as stated in the then 2020 Defence Strategic Update and Force Structure Plan, the intention had been for Australia to acquire a fourth squadron of F-35A Lightning II Joint Strike Fighters (JSF), bringing the fleet up to 100 aircraft whilst retiring the F/A-18F Super Hornet fleet by the mid-2030s.”
“The 2023 DSR and the 2024 NDS and IIP saw the Albanese Labor government eliminate planned funding for a fourth squadron of F-35As and extend the life of the F/A-18F Super Hornet and the E/A-18G Growler electronic attack aircraft,” Davis added.
However, simply committing to acquire the 28 F-35s that would make up the fourth squadron of Australian fifth-generation fighter aircraft is only part of the equation, and while important, given the rapid deterioration of the global environment and what can no doubt be a glimpse into the future, it is important to identify how these aircraft would, when combined with a host of other capabilities, figure into the nation’s “strategy of denial”, “impactful projection” and the development of an “integrated, focused force”.
Davis articulated this, posing an important question to Defence Connect, “Firstly, strategic context matters, where are the JSFs or other capabilities to be employed? In what possible operational contingencies and scenarios? Against which adversary (hint: it’s China)? And how can the ADF strengthen and enhance its airpower to allow greater burden sharing with the United States and other regional partners?
“Secondly, any capability choices must be fully funded or they are meaningless. The Coalition must commit to significantly increase defence spending accordingly, not just to acquire additional JSFs, but to respond more effectively to a rapidly worsening strategic outlook – a step that the current government seems to be moving only slowly to take.”
Adding an additional layer of complexity for policymakers is the rise of Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA), like Boeing’s MQ-28 Ghost Bat and similar such platforms being developed and fielded by potential adversaries, along with the recent revelation of Beijing’s own sixth-generation series of fighter aircraft that raise questions about the utility of fifth-generation fighter aircraft like the F-35.
Davis detailed this saying, “There should be a commitment to support the acquisition of Collaborative Combat Aircraft such as the MQ-28 Ghost Bat, and fund its future evolution into a more capable platform that can be acquired at lower cost and greater numbers than crewed aircraft such as the F-35A. Australia cannot continue to rely on small, brittle and boutique forces based around expensive and exquisite platforms – mass really does matter more than ever.”
Going further, Davis said, “There are a number of important ’sixth-generation’ programs underway - NGAD and F/A-XX in the United States (the former is being reviewed), and GCAP being developed by the UK, Japan and Italy. It would be a good move for whichever party wins to commit Australia to begin talks with both the United States on NGAD and F/A-XX, and with the GCAP consortium, to assess options for longer-range platforms for both air defence and strike that could initially complement the 100 F-35A JSFs, particularly in the strike/ISR role, alongside CCAs, and ultimately replace the F-35A, perhaps by the early 2040s.”
"The Chinese reveal of the J-36 will no doubt reinforce the requirement for NGAD to emphasise reach, payload and performance – well beyond what is possible with the JSF, and an ability to operate in contested airspace without needing tanker support. Australia needs to recognise this trend and be responsive to it,” he added.
The importance of tankers in any potential conflict in the Indo-Pacific is something that has often been overlooked or understated in Australian strategic circles, mainly the limited number of tankers available to Australia, combined with their inherent vulnerability adds yet more complexity and when one considers the mobility of ship-borne fixed-wing fighter aircraft, like the F-35B that the true utility of such a capability becomes apparent.
However, this would require a significant shift in the nation’s defence policy and posture, something Davis stated, telling Defence Connect, “I think the plan to acquire an extra 28 F-35A JSFs is a good one – providing its funded through an increase in defence spending overall beyond what the current government is planning for in the 2024 IIP and forward estimates – but it can’t be ’the solution’ to the RAAF’s capability needs. The Coalition needs to embrace a more ambitious and forward-leaning policy on Defence in general, and also specifically in regard to the RAAF’s role in deterrence by denial. Simply acquiring additional platforms doesn’t solve any real problems. There needs to be a more holistic approach to Australia’s future airpower that seems lacking at the moment, and that is a concern.”
While directed at the Coalition, it is safe to say that the same could be directly said of the government, should they be returned at the upcoming federal election. Either way, the events of recent weeks mean Australia needs to get far more serious about our own security and defence capabilities, because as uncomfortable as it may seem, we will need to be capable of doing more on our own.
