Defending Australia’s north: Proximity does matter

Coyne believes that Dunk is reinvigorating the Brisbane line theory raised in October 1942, by Edward Ward, the minister for labour and national services, in which he accused the Australian government of having planned to abandon the country’s north in the event of a Japanese invasion, and rejects Dunk's theory that Australia can be defended from the south.

While Coyne believes that Dunk misunderstood his arguments in his previous articles and attempts to defend them, he does give credence to Dunk's own arguments as holding merit, creating a model that is informed by the two arguments presented as part of the 'North of 26° south' series in The Strategist.

What they agree on

Coyne concedes a couple of valid points made by Dunk, but does not cede the same weight to the issues raised by Dunk. Coyne agrees that forward positioning all our air and sea lift capabilities in Darwin would of course expose them to greater risk. He also is able to see difficulties in deployments from the north. 

"He [Dunk] is also right about the challenges of navigating Australia’s northern waters. And that deploying to the Pacific by sea from Darwin makes little sense. But that’s why I didn’t argue that Darwin itself would be a suitable forward operating base for all conflicts, just that it could be important," Coyne writes. 

Coyne and Dunk both agree that moving capabilities north would be a major undertaking and will require an all or nothing approach in terms of commitment. However, what they disagree on is whether this level of commitment will be worth it.

"Dunk is right, we need to 'acquire a level of defensive capability that we currently don’t have' to protect these logistic functions," he says.

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Coyne's rebuttal

Coyne's argument for his reply to Dunk is that his original articles were misunderstood. He writes, "Dunk offers a cavalcade of reasons why the Navy and Army couldn’t, or rather shouldn’t, be defending our nation from the north. But in doing so, Dunk has missed the nuances in my reasoning and misunderstood my argument.

"Most strategists, policymakers and governments are in fierce agreement on the strategic importance of Australia’s north, but they can’t seem to articulate a coherent long-term plan for defending it. My argument is that the current force posture in northern Australia is not fit for purpose. There’s more than a little irony that while the Australian Army continues to reduce its presence in Darwin, the US Marines increase theirs."

Coyne rejects the statement that he believes the move is inevitable but he believes it is reasonable to see value in the north as a forward base or lilypad for future conflicts. He sees the extensions to Tindal RAAF Base as a positive move towards the 'lilypad' for capability such as F-35s.

He cites the travel times as key to success of operations to our north despite the added vulnerability raised by Dunk.

"The idea that the Attack Class submarines would travel to the South China Sea, expend their ordinance, then sail for two weeks back to Stirling in Western Australia to rearm – while under threat from anti-submarine warfare, as they’d have likely compromised their location – before sailing for another two weeks to get back into the fray clearly illustrates the tyranny of distance," says Coyne.

"Both examples also demonstrate that at times proximity to the battlefield does matter, and extended transit times can expose the Australian Defence Force to additional risks."

Coyne also argues there would be other benefits than those raised in his previous articles regarding proximity, readiness and capability. 

"It would allow the ADF, in a time when extreme weather events are occurring more frequently, to provide government with options, including the ability to rapidly respond to regional events, or perhaps to contribute a battlegroup to a regional response," he states.

"Defence needs a scalable defence industry presence in northern Australia to support its future operations in the region, whether that’s responding to a pandemic, contributing to a multinational peacekeeping operation or engaging in some form of conflict."

Coyne also believes that with a leveling of the playing field through the increased ability of neighbours in areas such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, as well as the strides being made with possible adversary China in its naval forces, leave Australia's southern, supposedly more protected, ports just as at risk as those in the north despite the choke points of northern Australia's waters. 

"Australia cannot assume it will have air or sea superiority in any future conflict. China has substantially increased the size, range and lethality of its blue-water fleet. It has increased the range, mobility and accuracy of its strategic strike capability. In a future conflict, our southern ports and airfields and their approaches may be as susceptible to a surprise attack as those in the north," says Coyne.

Your thoughts

Coyne concludes by saying: "Dunk’s final paragraph crystalises the absolutism that underpins his position: ‘We need to ensure that we continue to realise the benefits that this geography provides, rather than sacrifice them, and potentially lots more, in an attempt to get closer to the fight.’ But speaking in absolutes brings inherent danger.

"The way that geography is understood can indeed change with time and context. Australia has become key political, military and economic terrain in this new era of major-power competition. Japan’s massive investment in energy resilience through the Inpex LNG plant near Darwin and Sun Cable’s proposal to build a $20 billion solar farm to supply power to Singapore illustrate this point.

"I hope that Defence’s ‘re-assessment of the strategic underpinnings of the 2016 Defence White Paper’ carefully considers the strategic importance of Australia’s north and our force posture there."

The final line here is key to what has brought these new discussions to the fore in strategic thinking and ASPI. The strategic situation of Australia and its allies has shifted since the 2016 White paper. Counter-terrorism, while still a high priority, is waning with the suppression of ISIS for now and the world is now entering a time of 'power competition'. The US is shaping is strategic thinking away from wars in the Middle East and repositioning its capabilities to potential conflict with China and Russia.

This strategic shift is driving the push for the ADF to develop the north to better face any future 'great power' conflict weather it be over the South China Sea, Taiwan or another contentious issue. 

In this sense, Coyne is correct in arguing for this drive north as it would provide a stepping stone or forward base to be able to face conflict or operations to our north better supporting the new goals a shift in strategic priorities would bring. This would be an extensive exercise that would take commitment, money and manpower from the ADF and government to ensure that any repositioning of capability is supported with the appropriate defences to ensure that the move does not present extra risks.

Dunk was correct in highlighting vulnerabilities involved and this should not be ignored; moving our forces north brings them closer to potential conflicts leading to shorter response times but does bring them closer and more vulnerable to potential opposition capability.

This must be taken into account in a move northwards, however for now if Australia is committed to supporting our largest ally the US in a shift of priority towards great power competition, then moving north is the best way to commit to this shift and ensure it is not completed half baked.

What are your thoughts? Is the north key to Australia's strategic future or are the risks raised by Dunk too great? Does the answer lie somewhere in between? Let us know your thoughts below or email This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..