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The recently released Defence Strategic Update looks to refine and readjust Australia’s defence capability to meet a shifting strategic environment – in other words, to mitigate risk. Writing in ASPI’s The Strategist, UWA’s chair in defence studies Peter Dean makes the case that it inadvertently raises it.
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Released 1 July, the 2020 Defence Strategic Update and 2020 Force Structure Plan acknowledge the rapidly changing nature of our immediate and regional environment. The documents envision an operating environment dominated by "major power competition", and concludes that "the prospect of high-intensity conflict in the Indo-Pacific, while still unlikely, is less remote than in the past".
While many have been quick to write off much of the language contained in the policy update as flowery in nature, just as many have argued that it represents a marked shift in defence policy, building on that already contained in the Pacific Step-up.
As the documents would have it, the focus is no longer on fighting wars of choice in the Middle East backed by the US and NATO allies. Instead, it is now in the Indo-Pacific — especially the area from the north-east Indian Ocean through to maritime and mainland south-east Asia to Papua New Guinea and the south-west Pacific.
Not only does the Australian Defence Force need to be prepared to operate in this region – but it needs to be prepared to fight if need be.
Last month, a number of salient points were raised in the Lowy Institute's The Interpreter surrounding risk and the strategy update – with Curtin defence policy PhD candidate Victor Abramowicz critiquing the “high-risk, low-reward” nature of the policy.
As he would have it, both documents represent a troubling departure from the limited self-defence doctrine that characterised strategic policy since the close of the Cold War, stating:
"This language of 'willingness' is unprecedented in recent memory, uncertain in its application and raises the possibility of squandering the very defensive advantages the government wishes to achieve.
"On the first point, every white paper for at least the last 20 years has been comfortable with the 'fact' of the ADF’s existence as a modern and capable defence force being sufficient to deter and defend against attack. There was no mention before of a need to make sure adversaries 'understood' we were willing to use force, which implies that now something more is necessary."
However, writing in ASPI's The Strategist, UWA's chair in defence studies Peter Dean has made one of the most cutting analyses to date, speaking to – as he puts it – the "internal risks" associated with the update.
A service schism?
"Defence policy is all about managing risk," writes Dean, "and in this regard the update has been well received.
"Its frank, forthright but balanced tone about the risks of our strategic environment has been appreciated by the public and the policy community alike. But getting our defence policy right isn’t only about understanding our external environment. Aligning strategy, force structure and operating concepts is just as much about managing our internal risks and challenges."
So, what are these internal risks? The revised strategic objectives include deterrence (to "deter actions against Australia's interests") and response (to "respond with credible military force") in the midst of a potentially high-end conflict. And as Dean writes, this could poses a profound challenge to the ADF's military culture that could flare division between branches.
Drastic shifts in operational objectives might drive innovation within Army, the RAAF, or the RAN as branches look to keep pace at breakneck speed – yet, at the same time, Dean argues that these tend (historically) to also act as a wedge between the services. On this point, he notes that it took more than a decade from the release of the 1976 defence white paper to the 1987 paper to align strategy and force structure.
"The internal battles among the three military services and with the Defence Department during this decade are legendary," he adds.
"In the lead-up to the 1987 white paper, defence minister Kim Beazley broke the deadlock by commissioning Paul Dibb to undertake an independent review of Australia’s defence capabilities."
An influential review of Australia's defence plans, the Dibb report (Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities) led to significant changes in Australia's defence policy, including adoption of the Defence of Australia Policy, despite the report's recommendations not being fully accepted by the Hawke government.
Backyard battles
Another – and perhaps more striking – "internal risk" associated with the update as identified by Dean is the change in operational environment it envisages. Marking a move from Middle Eastern counterinsurgency operations (coupled with limited maritime security operations), the ADF is now required to prepare for conventional combat closer to home.
Of course, this ties in to the above point on joint force stressors – the RAN and RAAF are much more likely to play a much greater role in securing the Indo-Pacific than their counterparts in Army, for obvious reasons. However, Dean raises a valid point insofar as the historical record is concerned – the shift to counterinsurgency proved difficult for not just the Soviets in Afghanistan, but also the US (and Australia) in Vietnam.
"How will the joint ADF operate in our region, especially one defined by a maritime environment featuring expansive archipelagos with population, infrastructure, economic and military power clustered in littoral areas?" asks Dean.
"How will the Air Force provide protection to the Navy in these areas? How well can the Navy deploy and sustain our Army in this region? How will our Army fight?"
Your thoughts
To fight effectively in this space will require the ADF to act as more than just the sum of its parts. After the creation of the joint command structure in 1987, Australia has consistently moved towards a more integrated cross-service culture, through both formal steps like the 2015 First Principles Review and grassroots co-ordination.
Yet, as Dean argues, "the risks are real".
"Despite decades in development, the ADF’s single service cultures and parochialism still run deep. Reform has often been too slow; as the first principles review noted, there have been 48 previous reviews dating back to 1973," he says.
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