Can we have ‘impactful projection’ without ‘impactful presence’?

“Impactful projection” has emerged as one of the favoured terms of the new government and the growing pace of Australia’s strategic realignment, with Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles leveraging the term to prepare the public and the defence ecosystem ahead of the release of the Defence Strategic Review (DSR). 

This emphasis on “impactful projection” has gained further traction following the government’s recent announcements confirming the acquisition of the fifth-generation Naval Strike Missile (NSM) for the Royal Australian Navy’s major surface combatants, and the much-anticipated acquisition of the HIMARS system which are much needed transformational capabilities for the strike capacity of the Australian Defence Force. 

In their purist sense, these new acquisitions serve as the linchpin of how the Deputy Prime Minister articulates his concept of “impactful projection” and the way it will shape the ADF over the coming decades:  “I think increasingly we’re going to need to think about our defence force in terms of being able to provide the country with impactful projection, impactful projection, meaning an ability to hold an adversary at risk, much further from our shores, across kind of the full spectrum of proportionate response. Now, that is actually a different mindset to what we’ve probably had before.” 

Despite the public anticipation and much of the hype surrounding these acquisitions ahead of the formal release of the DSR and the ensuring implications for force structure, planning and long-term capability acquisition, there seems to be a glaring lack of consideration for Australia’s future capacity to deploy with “impactful presence” throughout the Indo-Pacific. 

In contrast to the media hype surrounding the acquisition of critical next-generation capabilities like the NSM and HIMARs, we have witnessed increased hostility toward the planned acquisition of advanced ground combat vehicles as planned under the LAND 400 Phase 3 program and the planned acquisition of advanced variants of the Abrams tanks, key platforms which will enable the ADF to deploy and engage a peer level threat “much further from our shores” as the Deputy Prime Minister envisages. 

Delivering a lopsided capability?  

For a nation which enjoys an almost unrivalled strategic geographic moat through the Southeast Asian archipelago and through to the South Pacific, long range fires seemingly make a lot of sense, until you identify the truly immense distances required. 

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Platforms like the standard HIMARS capability have a range of between 300 and 499 kilometres when armed with the in-development Precision Strike Missile (PrSM), impressive ranges when covering the steppes of Ukraine, that become less impressive when compared to the ranges Australia seeks to cover, seemingly from our home shores. 

By way of contrast, the distance between Darwin and Dili for example is approximately 390 nautical miles, or 725 kilometres, putting even East Timor well outside of the range of the otherwise impressive tactical HIMARS capability. 

This means that in order for Australia to deliver meaningful deterrence and “risk” to a potential adversary, the ADF will need to get closer, before it gets further away, necessitating increased survivability and flexibility for the ADF, particularly the Army, begging the question if the media commentary is to be believed, is the DSR going to cut a much needed capability at a time we can’t afford to cut it? 

Navy and Air Force don’t escape these challenges either, especially given the limited number of aircraft, ships and submarines that can be deployed through the region. This is particularly prominent with the ageing Collins Class submarines and the limited number of major surface combatants the Navy can call upon, equally strained, Air Force has a limited capacity to generate and deploy enough sorties in depth and at range. 

While it is hoped that the DSR will identify and respond to this perfect confluence of tactical and strategic geographic and operational realities, more of the same thinking, largely based on the now defunct “Sea-Air Gap” strategy underpinned by a limited expeditionary capability will severely impact the capability of the ADF to truly hold an adversary “at risk”.

What way ADF? 

As the strategic environment continues to deteriorate and the complexity of the challenges that face Australia continue to evolve, the ADF will be required to undertake increasingly complex, high-intensity operations, potentially against peer competitors. 

Doing so will require an increase not just in the complexity of the platforms and capabilities fielded, but also the manpower deployed, to enable the ADF to respond to threats reliably and consistently in our primary sphere of influence. 

This is reinforced by ASPI defence economist Marcus Hellyer who states: “While the term ‘impactful projection’ might be novel, we shouldn’t be surprised at the underlying message, which calls for greater combat power, force-projection capabilities, and self-reliant strike capabilities.” 

But what does this radically different ADF look like? With a planned increase of the ADF manpower by around 30 per cent by 2040, the ADF will begin to slowly build muscle, combined with the animosity toward high-intensity combat capabilities like armoured vehicles, tanks and even some questioning the utility of major surface combatants. we seem to be left with more questions than answers. 

It is clear that both the Australian Defence Force and the Australian people will need to become accustomed to a more robust military capability for the nation in the coming decades. However, we have to learn the lessons of the past, from both our own history and that of comparably sized and even great powers, lest we repeat the tragic mistakes that led to Australia’s abysmal state of preparedness in the lead-up to the Second World War. 

In order to avoid repeating history, it is clear that Australia and the ADF must begin to view expeditionary capability and the underlying doctrine, force structure and platforms as a fundamental component of the nation’s new strategic paradigm. Only our capacity to deploy to defend and support our regional partners and in defence of our interests through “impactful presence” will ensure that Australia’s critical sea lines of communication remain unmolested in the era of great power competition. 

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