Invest in long-term defence, diversify supplies: US Army Chief of Staff

Much of human history has been defined by the ambitions and conflagrations of “great powers” — these “great powers” are typically characterised by a range of factors that distinguish them from true middle powers, lower-tier middle and minor powers, including a complementary balance of “hard” and “soft” power dynamics such as military and economic strength and diplomatic and cultural influence. 

Further complicating the contemporary understanding of international power dynamics is confusion about the differences between “superpowers” and “great powers”, which has become increasingly blurred since the end of the Cold War. Today, this delineation between established “great powers” like the United Kingdom, France and to a lesser extent, Russia, with Germany, Japan and India recognised as lower-tier “great powers”. Meanwhile, the presence of the established global “superpower” like the United States and emerging “superpower” China makes the new era of great power competition increasingly confusing — nowhere is the diverse nature of this paradigm clearer than in the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Russia, an established “great power”, albeit significantly reduced from its former glory, has presented a significant challenge to post-Cold War balance of power with its invasion of Ukraine, shattering the arrogant belief that the collapse of the Soviet Union would precipitate an “End of History” which formed the foundation of much of the Western World’s economic, political, and strategic policy making for the best part of three decades. 

The Russian invasion and occupation of Ukraine has increasingly pushed the supply chains of both the United States and the NATO nations to the limit, particularly across supply chains for artillery rounds, specialised guided munitions and missiles, raising concerns about the survivability and durability of these supply chains, throwing into question the capacity of the United States in particular to remain the “Arsenal of Democracy”. 

Closer to home, in the Indo-Pacific, these concerns are particularly relevant for Australia and regional partner nations like Japan and South Korea who might be called upon to intervene in response to acts of aggression in the region, namely Taiwan. Recognising these concerns, the US Army Chief of Staff, General James McConville has voiced concerns about the resilience, diversity and redundancy of the Western supply chains, particularly as we enter a period of renewed great power competition. 

Great power competition isn’t going away 

It is important for Australia’s political and strategic leaders and more broadly the public, to recognise that for the first time, America has a true competitor in China — a nation with immense industrial potential, growing wealth and prosperity, a driving national purpose and a growing series of alliances with re-emerging, resource-rich great powers in Russia, and supported by a growing network of economic hubs and indebted pseudo-colonies throughout the Indo-Pacific and Asia. 

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For GEN McConville, planning for the long-term is fundamental for the West to reinforce its position and strengthen its resilience to military coercion, particularly by established and rising powers that seek to undermine the global order and engage in acts of hostility. McConville articulates this, saying, “We plan for the worst ... Russia is not done, they say they’re not: They’re going to build their army, and when they say 1.5 million [troops], they’re talking 2026. This thing is not over for the next couple of years.”

Accordingly, GEN McConville’s immediate priority for Western leaders and strategic planners is recognising that both great power and broader strategic competition isn’t going away, particularly as the global power dynamics shift toward a multipolar world and as a collective. We need to be prepared for an increasing period of strategic competition and everything that entails.  

Unlike the Soviet Union and especially the smaller periphery states the US has engaged since the end of the Cold War, China is a highly industrialised nation — with an industrial capacity comparable to, if not exceeding, that of the US, supported by a rapidly narrowing technological gap, supporting growing military capability and territorial ambitions, bringing the rising power into direct competition with the US and its now fraying alliance network of tired global allies. 

For Australia and the Indo-Pacific, this is particularly relevant as Beijing’s ambitions toward Taiwan and more broadly, the regional balance of power, with its long-term ambition of forcing the United States out of the Western Pacific and North Asia clearly a major threat to the economic, political and strategic stability of the region, with dramatic impacts on Australia’s national security.   

Greater emphasis on strengthening and diversifying supply chains

A central component of achieving this for GEN McConville is a renewed focus on not just strengthening existing supply chains, it is increasingly about diversifying these supply chains to avoid single points of failure for critical raw materials like rare earth elements, lithium batteries and key components like advanced semiconductors and materials, microprocessors and magnets that form the underlying technologies that have provided unprecedented economic growth and unrivalled tactical and strategic dominance for the West. 

“Everyone is taking a look at supply chains, [but] I don’t even like the word ‘chain’ ... We say ‘supply chain’, or we say ‘kill chain’; I like ‘networks’ and ‘fabrics’ as a different way of thinking about it. And what I mean by that is [with] chains, you’re only as good as the weakest link,” GEN McConville explained to the Association of the US Army Conference recently, highlighting the renewed emphasis on securing supply chains. 

Expanding on this key point, GEN McConville believes that expanding and nurturing industry development and modernisation is a key factor for strengthening the Western alliance base in the face of great power competition, however, government will need to provide an element of direction and certainty saying, “Industry is going to invest in areas that they think there’s going to be return on investment. So [for] many of these systems, [there] is going to have to be a long range investment ... If they see resources being put in, investments being made, contracts being signed, they’re going to get after that.”

Critically, to maximise the strength, resilience and competitiveness of the Western industrial base, allies like NATO member states, Australia, South Korea and Japan, who are each undergoing their own renewed period of strategic industrial development, will figure centrally in the Western response, with GEN McConville explaining, “Many of those countries are going to want to invest in their organic industrial base, [but] in some of those countries, they’re a lot further behind, because they just haven’t done it for 10 to 15 years ...

“If you’re sitting in Europe … you’re going have to invest in your defence, you’re gonna have to buy insurance, and then you’re going to have to, for industry, show them that you’re willing to pay for those systems and get things on contracts … long-term contracts," GEN McConville explained further. 

Recognising the opportunities and potential challenges facing Australia – how does the nation respond to the rapidly evolving regional environment, while also identifying and supporting the development of critical national strategic industries in an increasingly competitive era?

Lessons for Australia’s future strategic planning

Australia’s position and responsibilities in the Indo-Pacific region will depend on the nation’s ability to sustain itself economically, strategically and politically. Despite the nation’s virtually unrivalled wealth of natural resources, agricultural and industrial potential, there is a lack of a cohesive national security strategy integrating the development of individual, yet complementary public policy strategies to support a more robust Australian role in the region.

Contemporary Australia has been far removed from the harsh realities of conflict, with many generations never enduring the reality of rationing for food, energy, medical supplies or luxury goods, and even fewer within modern Australia understanding the socio-political and economic impact such rationing would have on the now world-leading Australian standard of living.  

Enhancing Australia’s capacity to act as an independent power, incorporating great power-style strategic economic, diplomatic and military capability serves as a powerful symbol of Australia’s sovereignty and evolving responsibilities in supporting and enhancing the security and prosperity of Indo-Pacific Asia. 

Shifting the public discussion away from the default Australian position of “it is all a little too difficult, so let’s not bother” will provide unprecedented economic, diplomatic, political and strategic opportunities for the nation. However, as events continue to unfold throughout the region and China continues to throw its economic, political and strategic weight around, can Australia afford to remain a secondary power, or does it need to embrace a larger, more independent role in an era of increasing great power competition?

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