Japan identifies next-gen military wish list to counter China

Geopolitics & Policy

31 January 2023

By: Stephen Kuper

In the face of growing tensions over Taiwan and repeated aggression from North Korea, Japan has stepped up its unprecedented military modernisation following South Korea’s efforts. The island powerhouse has launched its next round of acquisition, with eyes on some transformational, next-generation capabilities.

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Beijing’s continued assertiveness in the South China Sea (SCS) and renewed antagonism towards Taiwan has attracted ever growing attention and concern across the Indo-Pacific. For nations like Japan, these rising tensions are further exacerbated by historic animosities between the established and rising powers of the region which have all combined to prompt Japan's renewed period of military modernisation and expansion over the past five years.

Japan’s geostrategic realities, in particular, have rapidly evolved since the end of the Cold War, when the US could effectively guarantee the security of the island nation — accordingly, the Japanese government has responded with a period of unprecedented defence budgets as the pre-war power seeks to shake off the chains of the pacifist constitution enforced upon it by the US, UK, Australia and other allies following the end of the war in the Pacific.

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Further compounded by growing Russian aggression toward the post-war order and the ever present spectre of North Korean nuclear attack, Japan has, much like it’s South Korean counterpart, launched a series of military expansion, modernisation and recapitalisation efforts to completely overhaul the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), shifting away from the constraints of the post-Second World War pacifist constitution towards a developing a force of greater power projection, anti-access/area-denial and strategic deterrence capability.

Underpinning this dramatic shift in Japan’s strategic planning, the Japanese Ministry of Defense (MoD) has released an unprecedented list of priorities that will dramatically reshape the JSDF and its long-term capabilities in the region, with a suite of next-generation capabilities set to reshape the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.

Hypersonics, strike and autonomous systems

Range, speed and decisiveness have been identified as a key avenue for Japan to level the balance of power, in areas that have seemingly been dominated by China’s own Strategic Rocket Force and the broader People’s Liberation Army (PLA), to complement Japan’s well-documented modernisation of their conventional military capabilities, like the already impressive Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) and Japan Ground Self-Defense Forces (JGSDF).

At the core of this development and modernisation plan, Japan has prioritised the research and development and mass production of hypersonic weapons, “high-speed glide vehicles”, advanced torpedoes, sea mines and surface-to-air and ground and ship-launched anti-ship missiles to extend the range the JSDF can engage and hold an adversary at bay, with speed providing the determining factor for not only deployed operations, but equally for defending the Japanese home islands.

Outlined in this new plan, the Japanese government has articulated the following:

Research on hypersonic guided missiles [research and development].
Development of high-velocity glide missiles (improved type) for island defense [research and development].
Development of type 03 medium-range surface-to-air missile (improved type) with enhanced capabilities [research and development].
Development of new mines (small mines) [research and development].
Type 12 surface-to-ship guided missile enhanced type (ground launch type) (tentative name) [mass production].
High-speed glide missile for island defense (provisional name) [mass production].
Tomahawk [mass production].

Expanding on these plans, the Japanese government has also pushed for an expanded focus on autonomous and uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUV) systems to expand maritime intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance operations across the vast Japanese economic exclusion and critical maritime exclusion zones, while also serving as long range support for the JMSDF securing critical sea lines of communication.

Lessons for Australia’s future strategic planning

There is no doubt that Australia’s position and responsibilities in the Indo-Pacific region will depend on the nation’s ability to sustain itself economically, strategically and politically in the face of rising regional and global competition. Despite the nation’s virtually unrivalled wealth of natural resources, agricultural and industrial potential, there is a lack of a cohesive national security strategy integrating the development of individual, yet complementary public policy strategies to support a more robust Australian role in the region.

While contemporary Australia has been far removed from the harsh realities of conflict, with many generations never enduring the reality of rationing for food, energy, medical supplies or luxury goods, and even fewer within modern Australia understanding the socio-political and economic impact such rationing would have on the now world-leading Australian standard of living.

Enhancing Australia’s capacity to act as an independent power, incorporating great power-style strategic economic, diplomatic and military capability serves as a powerful symbol of Australia’s sovereignty and evolving responsibilities in supporting and enhancing the security and prosperity of Indo-Pacific Asia, this is particularly well explained by Peter Zeihan, who explains: "A de-globalised world doesn’t simply have a different economic geography, it has thousands of different and separate geographies. Economically speaking, the whole was stronger for the inclusion of all its parts. It is where we have gotten our wealth and pace of improvement and speed. Now the parts will be weaker for their separation."

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Accordingly, shifting the public discussion and debate away from the default Australian position of “it is all a little too difficult, so let’s not bother” will provide unprecedented economic, diplomatic, political and strategic opportunities for the nation.

As events continue to unfold throughout the region and China continues to throw its economic, political and strategic weight around, can Australia afford to remain a secondary power, or does it need to embrace a larger, more independent role in an era of increasing great power competition?

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it., This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it., or at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..