Defence Strategic Review must tackle Australia’s drone vulnerability

Ukraine has also experienced the effects of drone warfare. Its electrical grid has been repeatedly smashed (or interdicted) by waves of cheap Iranian-made drones launched by Russia.

These events in Eastern Europe, while half a world away from the Pacific, provides a glimpse of the threats Australia will likely face in the future.

The upcoming Defence Strategic Review will address how Australia will meet the challenges of a changing political and technological security environment. Much attention will be devoted to crucial systems and capabilities including submarines, aircraft, precision-guided missiles, and even unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAV), such as the Loyal Wingman program.

But as the Ukraine conflict has demonstrated, there are two aspects to drone warfare for which we must be prepared.

What gets most attention are the drones themselves: how far and fast they can fly, and the size of their payload. Equally important is how to destroy or limit enemy use of them.

Warning signs were evident back in 2020, when Azerbaijan used Israeli and Turkish-made drones to decimate Armenian tanks and artillery during the Nagorno-Karabakh War.

Both Ukraine and Russia are discovering how difficult it is for their infantry, armor and artillery to function and manoeuvre under the gaze of unmanned aerial systems (UAS). Russia’s relentless attacks on Ukrainian critical infrastructure have also shown how cheap drones can replace missiles and manned bombers for strategic bombardment. Even if air defences manage to shoot down some UAS, enough can get through to cause massive damage.

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Although Russian and Iranian drones are not a big threat to Australia, Chinese drones are.

There is ample evidence Beijing has both the intention and means to wage drone warfare. For example, UAS will certainly be a key component of any Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

China has already offered a taste of this. Its military and civilian drone fleet buzzed Taiwanese territory in late 2022. Chinese media has also suggested that kamikaze drones could be used to destroy Taiwanese artillery or even assassinate top leaders in a decapitation strike.

To accomplish these missions, the People’s Liberation Army has amassed an array of big and small drones. These include the Wing Loong-3, a missile armed strike UCAV, similar to the MQ-1 Predator, except it reportedly has an intercontinental range of 10,000 kilometres — sufficient to reach Australia.

The high-altitude, turbojet-propelled WZ-7 “Soaring Dragon” reconnaissance UAS — China’s counterpart to the US RQ-4 Global Hawk — may have a range of 7,000 kilometres, which can cover much of the Pacific.   

What is remarkable about the Ukraine war is that big, expensive drones have not been the star players. Instead, it has been the little UAS with a camera that spots enemy troops moving, and calls down an accurate artillery barrage.

This points to a significant Chinese advantage. Chinese manufacturers produce 80 per cent of the world’s commercial drones, according to some estimates. This gives China an immense reservoir of small unmanned aircraft that can be modified for military purposes.

For Australia, the threat is immediate. China is paying close attention to the strategic and tactical lessons of the Ukraine conflict. Beijing may well decide drones are an ideal weapon for striking Australian bases and infrastructure. At the very least, it’s a way to disrupt or deter tactical operations by ground troops and ships.

It’s true a Chinese drone offensive against the Australian mainland would face geographical and technical challenges. But given the rapid and continuous improvements in UAS range, payload and accuracy, history suggests these obstacles will be overcome.

Defending against larger strike and reconnaissance drones can be accomplished by traditional kinetic means: guns, air defense missiles, and even lasers.

But the Ukraine war suggests future wars will be dominated by vast numbers of small UAS. These operate in coordinated swarms that overwhelm a target and can be operated by a lone infantryman or insurgent.

The laws of economics and logistics suggest relying on kinetic counter-drone weapons to stop these small intruders is neither affordable nor effective. A counter-UAS (C-UAS) system that runs out of ammunition will quickly be an expensive launcher with an empty magazine or another opportune target.

The challenge for Australia becomes not just finding methods to mitigate the drone threat, but also making these countermeasures practical and affordable. Radio-frequency (RF) countermeasures have emerged as a means to disrupt the command signals between drones and their operators.

The counter-drone strategy Australia chooses will set a precedent for how we will cope in the face of their use against us. Drones are already prominent, and effective modern formations, large and small, are using them for reconnaissance, strike and logistic support.

As it stands, ADF personnel at various levels have expressed concerns over drone security, and their limitations in taking them down in domestic air space.

As we look ahead to the Defence Strategic Review, it’s crucial we not only focus on traditional means for protecting the nation, but also recognise the urgent need to detect and limit the malicious use of drones on home soil.

Oleg Vornik is CEO at Australian ASX-listed counter-UAS and AI company DroneShield.