Rising tide lifts all boats: Aggregating Aussie, Kiwi acquisition, sustainment and training

Few nations have the shared history, narrative, sense of comradery and social bond quite like Australia and our cross-ditch cousins, New Zealand.

This unique relationship evolved throughout the 20th century where Australian and New Zealand men and women served together on battlefields across the globe, from the beaches of Gallipoli to the skies over Europe, the jungles of Malaya and the mountains of Afghanistan.

While in large part, our familial relationship with our smaller cousins has resulted in some areas of collaboration in terms of defence acquisition, think the joint acquisition of the Anzac Class frigates, almost entirely built in Australia; the troubled MRH-90 Taipan; the New Zealand variant of the LAV-25, in Australian service the Australian Light Armoured Vehicle (ASLAV); and, of course, (at least until 2017) the E/F-88 Austeyr.

However, we have, in many ways, diverged in areas such as the recent upgrades of the Royal New Zealand Navy’s Anzac Class frigates taking place in Canada, the acquisition of the replenishment-oiler HMNZS Aotearoa, the Kiwi’s continued operation of the MRH-90 Taipan, and the New Zealand Army’s shift to an AR-based platform replacing the bullpup E/F-88 Austeyr as the primary service rifle for the New Zealand Defence Force of the 21st century.

All of this comes before the landmark announcement of Australia’s trilateral partnership with the United States and the United Kingdom to develop and field a fleet of Australian-owned and operated conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines amid growing geopolitical tensions and the potential for great power competition to devolve into great power conflict in the Indo-Pacific.

This shift in the global power dynamics has prompted a shift in cross-ditch relations, with the two nations recognising that they need to strengthen their defence collaboration, with the recent joint communiqué between Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and New Zealand Prime Minister Christopher Luxon, stating the, “Prime ministers recognised that Australia and New Zealand face the most complex and challenging strategic circumstances since World War II. They noted the importance of our alliance to collective security and regional peace and stability and affirmed that we would continue to work closely together to protect and promote our shared interests and values, and to deter threats to our national security.

“In that spirit, prime ministers acknowledged the extensive work already undertaken between our respective sovereign defence forces to be able to come together as an ‘Anzac’ force to respond to regional and global challenges,” it continued further.

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Bringing us to the most interesting part of the joint communiqué, which articulated a growing desire to collaborate on defence procurement between the two nations, stating, “Prime ministers jointly decided to prioritise combined defence procurement as an enabler of interoperability. Prime ministers noted that the mutual recognition of our defence industrial bases supports this cooperation and enables broader defence industry integration and technological advancement.”

But what does that look like in practice?

What are the opportunities?

From the Australian perspective, we have a firm road map going forward in the form of the 2023 Defence Strategic Review, the 2024 National Defence Strategy and supporting Integrated Investment Program with the next decade’s worth of defence capability investment mapped out to help shape the nation’s response to the rapidly deteriorating global and regional security environment.

However, the New Zealand case is a little more tricky, with the recent change in government prompting a review of the New Zealand government’s 2023 Defence Policy and Strategy Statement and the key findings of this review moving forward.

Nevertheless, we do have some basic knowledge to help shape our understanding of areas for potential joint procurement and collaboration in the maintenance, sustainment, upgrade and training segments of the capability life cycle to maximise efficiencies and deliver an enhanced quality and quantity of aggregate capability for both Australia and New Zealand.

Beginning with the New Zealand Army, we know that much like Australia’s ASLAV fleet, New Zealand’s fleet of LAVs will require either a complete upgrade, or as is more likely a complete replacement to ensure that the New Zealand Army has a viable, modern light armoured vehicle capability, with Australia’s recent export contract with Germany for the Boxer heavy weapons variant providing an example of such an opportunity.

The same logic could also be applied to New Zealand’s requirement for a fleet of new, protected mobility vehicles to build on the small fleet of Australian-built Bushmaster vehicles and other tactical logistics vehicles all of which could be built in Australia with additional opportunities for New Zealand-based industry to feed into Australia’s defence industrial supply chain.

Shifting to the Navy and by far some of the biggest ticket items, with SEA 3000, Australia’s General Purpose Frigate program, to provide minimally seven, optimally 11 general purpose frigates to serve in the "Tier Two” capacity and add expanded lethality to the Royal Australian Navy – a unique opportunity for Australia and New Zealand to collaborate and maximise economies of scale in terms of acquisition, maintenance and sustainment over the next two decades.

Similar opportunities exist in the Royal New Zealand Navy’s need to replace the Lake Class inshore patrol vessels and the fleet of Protector offshore patrol vessels as well as the need to acquire two “enhanced sealift vessels” to complement the HMNZS Canterbury and as replacement to its Southern Ocean, Antarctic-rated patrol vessels, all of which Australia is either uniquely placed to provide (through an industry partner like Austal) or in the market for sealift and Antarctic patrol vessels itself.

Again, a potential for the joint development of common platforms to share costs, maximise the acquisition benefits, along with cost-benefits as a result of through-life sustainment, maintenance and training opportunities across the two nations.

Bringing us to the Royal New Zealand Air Force where the two nations operate a number of common platforms, including the growing fleet of P-8A Poseidon and the C-130J-30 Super Hercules airlift aircraft which form the basis of New Zealand’s maritime patrol and strategic and tactical airlift capabilities, respectively.

Given Australia’s own existing and growing 737-based maintenance, sustainment and training facility in South Australia, we are well positioned to support the Royal New Zealand Air Force’s own fleet of Poseidons. The same opportunity exists with our complementary fleet of C-130J-30 Super Hercules aircraft, with both also providing test cases for the development of a larger network of Indo-Pacific regional maintenance, repair, overhaul and upgrade (MROU) hubs for other regional partners.

Now yes, I will fully admit that these are overly simplified birds’-eye view of the opportunities available at present and could, if targeted appropriately, have immense benefit for both nations and their respective defence capabilities, as well as the development of a quantum of mass for defence industry capability across the two nations.

So let’s get started now!

Final thoughts

Without sounding like a broken record, it is important to both understand and accept that Australians are going to be asked to confront and accept a number of uncomfortable realities in the coming years.

First and foremost, Australians will have to accept that while the world is increasingly becoming “multipolar”, the Indo-Pacific, in particular, is rapidly becoming the most hotly contested region in the world, and this will fundamentally reshape the position, role and security of the nation.

This period of multipolarity competition has been underpinned by the emerging economic, political, and strategic might of powers like China, India, Pakistan, Thailand, Vietnam, and the established and re-emerging capability of both South Korea and Japan, in particular, are serving to create a hotbed of competition on our doorstep.

Second, both the Australian public and our policymakers will have to accept that without a period of considered effort, investment and reform, or as I like to colloquially refer to it, our “Rocky montage” moment, current and future generations of Australians will be increasingly impoverished, living a nation pushed around by the region’s now rising powers.

Recognising this array of challenges and opportunities, both the Australian public and its policymakers need to look beyond the myopic lens of short-termism that has traditionally dominated our diplomatic, strategic, and economic policy making since Federation.

Again, as I have said multiple times before, we need to see Australia begin to play the long game to fully capitalise on the opportunities that are transforming the Indo-Pacific and working with our cross-ditch cousins provides an opportunity to really aggregate and combine our capabilities to maximise the outcomes for both nations.

The most important question now becomes, when will we see a more detailed analysis and response to the challenges and opportunities facing Australia, and when will we see both a narrative and strategy that better helps industry and the Australian public understand the challenges faced and opportunities we have presented before us?

As events continue to unfold throughout the region and China continues to throw its economic, political, and strategic weight around, can Australia afford to remain a secondary power, or does it need to embrace a larger, more independent role in an era of increasing great power competition?

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..