Power projection and long-range sea denial at the core of Beijing’s ambitions

Naval power has always played a critical role in the way great powers interact. The decades leading up to the outbreak of the First World War saw an unprecedented competition between the UK and German Empire, with much of the emphasis placed on Dreadnought battleships echoing a similar, albeit smaller, naval arms race continuing to gather steam between the US and China.

At the beginning of the 20th century, the British Royal Navy was unrivalled in its ability to rule the waves. Maintaining this capability was the “two-power” standard which sought to ensure that the Royal Navy was at least the size of the next two largest competing navies. This naval might guaranteed the British economy’s access to vital raw resources and helped ensure that the “sun never set on the British Empire”.

In the distance, as France struggled to rebuild itself as a true competitor, the newly formed German Empire emerged as an economic, political, and naval competitor to Britain. Driven by voracious consumer and economic demand, combined with a new sense of national purpose, Bismarck’s Germany rapidly became a European and global powerhouse in the decades following its formation in 1871.

Recognising the mounting challenge posed by the rising German power, the British Royal Navy launched HMS Dreadnought in 1906, effectively resetting the game and laying down the challenge to Germany and any other nation that sought to challenge the industrial, economic, and naval might of the British Empire.

Fast forward to the beginning of the 21st century and the US, following decades of the Cold War, remained the world’s largest and most powerful naval power. Commanding the seas through a vast fleet of technologically advanced surface vessels and submarines, with the mighty supercarrier serving as the epicentre of America’s global maritime hegemony.

However, America’s maritime hegemony is now being challenged by a rising power in China that is introducing a suite of maritime capabilities to rival the dominance of the US Navy, as history appears to be repeating itself in the 21st century. We covered rapid qualitative and quantitative edge Beijing is now seeking to leverage in the first part of this short series.

Learning the lessons of the Third Taiwan Strait Crises in the mid-1990s, Beijing sought to counter the seemingly unrivalled might of the US Navy centred around aircraft carriers, while also borrowing the operational concepts and adding a layer of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) to effectively project power and influence, while leveraging a unique defensive advantage.

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At the core of this push is best explained by the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) which highlights, “China’s military modernisation effort, including its naval modernisation effort, is assessed as being aimed at developing capabilities for, among other things, addressing the situation with Taiwan militarily, if need be; achieving a greater degree of control or domination over China’s near-seas region, particularly the South China Sea; enforcing China’s view that it has the right to regulate foreign military activities in its 200-mile maritime exclusive economic zone (EEZ); defending China’s commercial sea lines of communication (SLOCs), particularly those linking China to the Persian Gulf; displacing US influence in the Western Pacific; and asserting China’s status as the leading regional power and a major world power.”

Expanding on this, the CRS has emphasised a number of rapidly emerging Chinese capabilities that are seeking to affect the change in the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, wrestling it away from the United States, effectively leaving nations like Australia vulnerable.

Beijing’s sword and shield – A2/AD

At the core of Beijing’s ambitions to counter and protect its immediate maritime borders and interests, particularly its critical commercial sea lines of communication (SLOCs) through Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, is the growing anti-access/area denial network designed with two major goals in mind: kill the US Navy’s carrier strike groups and protect the nation’s immediate maritime interests.

The CRS explains, “China is fielding two types of land-based ballistic missiles with a capability of hitting ships at sea at extended ranges — the DF-21D, a road-mobile anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) with a range of more than 1,500 kilometres (i.e. more than 910 nautical miles), and the DF-26, a road-mobile, multi-role intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) with a maximum range of about 3,000 kilometres (i.e. about 1,620 nautical miles) that DOD says is ‘capable of conducting both conventional and nuclear precision strikes against ground targets as well as conventional strikes against naval targets’.”

Many Australian and international strategic analysts have highlighted the growing reach and lethality of Beijing’s A2/AD kill chain, particularly as a challenge to the United States Navy’s aircraft carriers and the strategic and tactical mobility these platforms enable for the US and allies, including Australia, however it is critical to understand that largely, these are still developmental weapons systems.

This is reinforced by the CRS reports, which states, “Until 2020, reported test flights of DF-21s and SDF-26s had not involved attempts to hit moving ships at sea. A November 14, 2020, press report stated that an August 2020 test firing of DF-21 and DF-26 ASBMs into the South China resulted in the missiles successfully hitting a moving target ship south of the Paracel Islands. A December 3, 2020, press report stated that Admiral Philip Davidson, the commander of US Indo-Pacific Command, ‘confirmed, for the first time from the US government side, that China’s People’s Liberation Army has successfully tested an anti-ship ballistic missile against a moving ship’.”

Anti-ship ballistic missiles are part of Beijing’s A2/AD equation. These impressive, yet still developmental capabilities are complemented by an increasing suite of anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) which seek to add scale to the speed and proposed lethality of their larger counterparts, providing Beijing with the capacity to seemingly overwhelm allied defensive systems.

The “low observability” of China’s ASCMs is highlighted by the CRS, “China’s extensive inventory of anti-ship cruise missiles includes both Russian- and Chinese-made designs, including some advanced and highly capable ones, such as the Chinese-made YJ-18.”

The scope and scale of Beijing’s ASCM program is something that many Western analysts have long coveted, particularly as the capability of these new platforms seems to put the contemporary Western arsenals to shame, something the CRS reinforces, stating, “Although China’s ASCMs do not always receive as much press attention as China’s ASBMs (perhaps because ASBMs are a more recent development), observers are nevertheless concerned about them. As discussed later in this report, the relatively long ranges of certain Chinese ASCMs have led to concerns among some observers that the US Navy is not moving quickly enough to arm US Navy surface ships with similarly ranged ASCMs.”

Wolf packs – Beijing’s growing submarine arm

Much has been made of Australia’s recently announced AUKUS agreement and its roadmap for fielding a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines, particularly from Beijing which has levelled several accusations of breaching non-proliferation law and initiating a regional arms race against Australia, the rising power has embarked on its own ambitious submarine program.

China’s submarine fleet has grown from relatively modest roots, to now be one of the largest and most advanced submarine forces in the world. Fielding both conventionally and nuclear-powered vessels across a variety of classes and roles, ranging from attack through to ballistic missile submarines presents a powerful deterrent in the Indo-Pacific.

The CRS unpacks this modernisation, stating, “China has been steadily modernising its submarine force, and most of its submarines are now built to relatively modern Chinese and Russian designs. Qualitatively, China’s newest submarines might not be as capable as Russia’s newest submarines, but compared to China’s earlier submarines, which were built to antiquated designs, its newer submarines are much more capable.

Unpacking further, the CRS states, “Most of China’s submarines are non-nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSs). China also operates a small number of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) and a small number of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). The number of SSNs and SSBNs may grow in coming years, but the force will likely continue to consist mostly of SSs. DOD states that ‘the PLAN has placed a high priority on modernising its submarine force, but its force structure continues to grow modestly as it works to mature its force, integrate new technologies, and expand its shipyards ... The PLAN will likely maintain between 65 and 70 submarines through the 2020s, replacing older units with more capable units on a near one-to-one basis’.”

Providing further detail, the CRS, quoting ONI provides further detail on the projected scope and scale of Beijing’s future submarine, stating, “ONI projects that China’s submarine force will grow from a total of 66 boats (4 SSBNs, 7 SSNs, and 55 SSs) in 2020 to 76 boats (8 SSBNs, 13 SSNs, and 55 SSs) in 2030. A November 27, 2022, press report states ‘The dry-docks at China’s nuclear submarine facility at Huludao, Liaoning province, show increased activity. New construction halls are primed. Another dry dock is ready to go. International analysts point to this as evidence Beijing is gearing up for the mass production of a new generation of nuclear-powered attack and ballistic missile submarines’.”

This growing submarine is also seeing greater numbers of Chinese submarines at sea, conducting patrols, particularly for their SSBNs which places increasing pressure on the US Navy’s own attack submarines to neutralise those strategic platforms, drawing them away from their own patrol and sea protection responsibilities.

Packing a punch – Major surface combatants

Surface-based naval power projection remains, as if not more important than it has been in the past few decades, and it is something Beijing actively recognises and is actively pursuing, with aircraft carriers and large deck amphibious warfare ships the tip of the spear.

While Beijing has rapidly developed a number of aircraft carriers, namely the Liaoning, Shandong and Fujian with a fourth carrier currently under construction, CRS analysts detail the expected growth of the Chinese fleet and the respective expertise to conduct high-intensity carrier operations, stating, “Observers have speculated that China may eventually field a force of four to six (or possibly more than six) aircraft carriers. In late November 2019, it was reported that the Chinese government, while deciding to proceed with the construction of the fourth carrier, had put on hold plans to build a fifth carrier, which was to be nuclear-powered, due to budgetary and technical considerations. Observers expect that it will be some time before China masters carrier-based aircraft operations on a substantial scale.”

These emergent carrier capabilities are also being reinforced by a growing number of large deck, amphibious warfare ships, similar to the US Navy’s Wasp and America Class and Australia’s own Canberra Class LHDs, CRS highlights that Beijing’s use case for these sorts of high-end capabilities are still a little vague, stating, “Although aircraft carriers might have some value for China in Taiwan-related conflict scenarios, they are not considered critical for Chinese operations in such scenarios, because Taiwan is within range of land-based Chinese aircraft. Consequently, most observers believe that China is acquiring carriers primarily for their value in other kinds of operations, and to demonstrate China’s status as a leading regional power and major world power. Chinese aircraft carriers could be used for power-projection operations, particularly in scenarios that do not involve opposing US forces, and to impress or intimidate foreign observers.”

Beijing’s carriers and large deck amphibious warfare ships equally serve a political and diplomatic role, with these impressive vessels serving a unique prestigious position in a national arsenal in addition to combat operations, however, the efficacy in combat scenarios does remain in question.

“Politically, aircraft carriers could be particularly valuable to China for projecting an image of China as a major world power, because aircraft carriers are viewed by many as symbols of major world power status. In a combat situation involving opposing US naval and air forces, Chinese aircraft carriers would be highly vulnerable to attack by US ships and aircraft, but conducting such attacks could divert US ships and aircraft from performing other missions in a conflict situation with China,” the CRS details.

However, Beijing’s carriers, like those in the US, Royal, and French Navy’s, respectively, are largely passive actors without their imbedded air wings and, critically, their attached surface escorts, namely their large cruisers, destroyers, and frigates which are being rapidly built and put to sea, with rapid technological developments rapidly reshaping the balance of power.

Beijing understands the importance of these platforms and has accordingly embarked on a rapid fleet modernisation and expansion program resulting in some truly formidable ships like the Type 055 cruisers and Type 052C/D destroyers, respectively.

The CRS highlights this, stating, “These new classes of surface combatants demonstrate a significant modernisation of PLA Navy surface combatant technology. DOD states that China’s navy ‘remains engaged in a robust shipbuilding program for surface combatants. At the close of 2021, the PLAN was building an aircraft carrier, a new batch of guided-missile destroyers (DDG), and a new batch of guided missile frigates (FFG). These assets will significantly upgrade the PLAN’s air defence, anti-ship, and anti-submarine capabilities, and will be critical as the PLAN expands its operations beyond the range of the PLA’s shore-based air defense systems.’ DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency) states that ‘the era of past designs has given way to production of modern multi-mission destroyer, frigate, and corvette classes as China’s technological advancement in naval design has begun to approach a level commensurate with, and in some cases exceeding, that of other modern navies.’ China is also upgrading its older surface combatants with new weapons and other equipment.”

Meanwhile, Beijing has embraced the importance of large, ocean-going frigates as a means of beefing up the surface fleet and providing a distributed fleet of high-intensity combat oriented warships in frigates like the Type 054A/B frigates, which is providing critical mass to the PLA-N.

“ONI stated in February 2020 that 30 Type 054As entered service between 2008 and 2019, and that no additional Type 054As were then under construction. An August 2021 press report from a Chinse media outlet, however, stated that ‘China is reportedly building another batch of Type 054A frigates for the People’s Liberation Army Navy after it had launched two new ships of this class over the past few months.’ The press report noted that a report from the Janes Organization had stated that the 32nd Type 054A ship had recently been launched (i.e. put into the water for the final stages of its construction). Other press reports, citing satellite images of Chinese shipyards, state that China’s frigate production may be shifting to a new, larger frigate that some observers refer to as the Type 054B,” the CRS explained further.

Final thoughts

Simply put, Australia is going to need to do more than it is currently doing and was outlined in the government’s long-awaited Defence Strategic Review. We also desperately need to shift away from the false belief that we’re either going to do all the fighting on our own, or the US will do the vast majority of the heavy lifting, as with everything, the truth is somewhere in the middle.

In accepting that we will have to do more and be capable of more, both the Australian public and its leaders needs to accept that the ADF will need to be larger, more potent, and capable of independently holding its own in a high-intensity conflict, at least until the full might of allied forces can be brought to bear.

We also need to accept that Australia as a nation must become more self-sufficient and re-industrialise to ensure that the nation can’t be isolated or cut off from critical supplies and industrial and economic inputs in a conflict scenario, or at a minimum we have the capacity to prevent Australia from being isolated for any protracted period of time.

Equally, as events continue to unfold throughout the region and China continues to throw its economic, political, and strategic weight around, can Australia afford to remain a secondary power, or does it need to embrace a larger, more independent role in an era of increasing great power competition?

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..