Well worth the wait? Discussing the inconsistencies and focusing on delivering the most lethal Hunter Class frigate

I would like to apologise for how long it has taken for me to get this analysis put together. Good work takes time and, accordingly, getting all the relevant information, responses and fact-checking takes time, so again, apologies.

Before we get into the meat and potatoes of this second piece, I need to make a single point very clear, the first part of this series and, indeed, this second piece, are not about advocating for the cancellation of the Royal Australian Navy’s Hunter Class frigate program.

It also has to be said that this isn’t an indictment of BAE Systems Australia or their workforce, which are essential to delivering the future of Australia’s cutting-edge naval capability, both above and below the waves.

Rather, my analysis is about unpacking the reasoning cited by the government for cancelling programs like JP 9102, which was effectively deemed “no longer fit for purpose”, while also shining a light on the inconsistencies in their rhetoric and state objectives in order to spur debate and, hopefully, create a culture of accountability and change to ensure value for money for the Australian taxpayer, and that the warfighter receives the most lethal and survivable variant of the Hunter Class possible.

Now with that disclaimer/clarification out of the way, let’s dive in and unpack some of the important context articulated by Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles and Minister of Defence Industry and Capability Delivery Pat Conroy as part of the release of the Independent Analysis into Navy’s Surface Combatant Fleet, along with the subsequent 2024 National Defence Strategy, recalibrated Integrated Investment Program and Defence Industry Development Strategy.

It goes without saying that the government’s logic and rhetoric around establishing an “enhanced lethality surface combatant fleet” that is optimised to support the strategic deterrence capability to be delivered by Australia’s fleet of conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines is a welcome change in direction; however, much still needs to be made of just how the fleet will be composed, how it will operate and whether the plans are enough in this era of great power competition and renewed antagonism from peer competitors.

Equally, it is worth mentioning that the government’s review failed to account for the future of Navy’s existing large surface vessels, like the Canberra Class amphibious warfare ships and HMAS Choules, along with the troubled Supply Class tankers and our minehunting fleet (although that seems to be dwindling at rapid pace), leaving significant questions about the long-term direction and capability of the Royal Australian Navy into the next decade and beyond.

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A conflicting story and reality – the government’s narrative v what is being delivered

At the launch of the Independent Analysis into Navy’s Surface Combatant Fleet in February 2024, the government announced a major period of expansion and investment that would see the Royal Australian Navy grow from 11 surface combatants to a fleet of 26, the largest the surface combatant fleet since the end of the Second World War.

Minister Marles explained this at the time, “At the heart of that we will be building six Hunter Class frigates at the Osborne Naval Shipyard in Adelaide. This will see the first of those ships delivered in 2034, which is the current time frame.

“We’re also announcing today that we will procure a new general purpose frigate, of which we will procure 11, and this will be a new class of ship for the Royal Australian Navy. We’re also procuring six large optionally crewed surface crewed-surface vessels. The LOSVs are in development with the United States ... They will operate in combination with the Hobart Class air warfare destroyers and they will also operate in conjunction with the Hunter Class frigates. These ships, in combination with the three existing air warfare destroyers, will take our service fleet of warships to 26.”

Despite this projected growth, the government retained the centrality of the Hunter Class frigates at the core of the nation’s Tier One surface combatant fleet in spite of scaling back the original order from nine to six, with delivery scheduled between 2034 and 2043, at a time when the government continues to warn the nation that our warning time has run out, our region is a hotbed of geopolitical competition and let’s not forget, that we need to be ready by 2027 just in case something kicks off over Taiwan.

Minister Marles would subsequently go on to stress the importance of Navy in this era of great power competition, explaining in a speech at the launch of the 2024 National Defence Strategy, recalibrated Integrated Investment Program, “Our national security and our national prosperity are based on a stable peaceful region where the global rules-based order is pre-eminent and respected. Indeed, the rules of the road at sea are everything for us,” necessitating a robust naval capability.

Reinforcing the centrality of Hunter in the future surface combatant fleet, Minister Marles told media during a press conference at RAAF Base Tindal, “The Hunter Class frigates are going to be as capable a frigate as exists in the world today. Hunter Class frigates will be the quietest frigate that exists in the world today. And we are very excited about what Hunter will add to our surface fleet.

“It will really be at the heart of our surface combatant fleet. Given, in a sense, what this announcement today is about is an acknowledgement of the vastness of our ocean approaches, of the areas that we need to surveil, of the task at hand for our Defence Force, in terms of surveilling and going after the assets of any adversary at sea, Hunter is right at the forefront of that as well. So, we are really looking forward to Hunter," he added.

Rounding out the narrative is Minister Conroy during a recent address to the National Press Club, where he explained in the context of expanded missile acquisition plans for the Royal Australian Navy, “Back in the dreadnought era, the lethality of warships was determined by their sheer tonnage. Today, the ability to hold an enemy at risk can be measured by the number of missile cells – the launch cells on warships that hold missiles ready for firing – and by the capability of those missiles.”

These statements seem to firmly place the government’s ambition and desire for the Hunter Class and more broadly the overhauled surface combatant fleet, in direct conflict with what is set to be delivered as part of our “enhanced lethality” surface combatant fleet.

Now, yes, Minister Conroy did go on to say, “Under the Coalition’s plans, the Navy’s fleet of warships would have had a total of 432 missile cells. Under the Albanese government’s plans, we will more than double Navy’s lethality, delivering a surface combatant fleet with 880 missile cells”, when one considers the totality of the reconfigured surface combatant fleet as outlined in the Surface Fleet Review.

However, this doesn’t solve the fact that as the core of our Tier One surface combatant fleet, Hunter, as it stands, is still hilariously, hopelessly undergunned for its size and cost, particularly when compared to potential rivals like the next generation of Chinese surface combatants, like the Type 052D guided missile destroyer which has a standard VLS load out of 64 cells, and the significantly larger Type 055 guided missile cruiser which has a standard VLS load out of 112 VLS cells.

To be fair to Hunter though, neither does the existing Hobart Class destroyers with their 48 cell VLS capacity, hardly a true Tier One surface combatant, no matter how you skin the cat.

So now we have established that the narrative of the government doesn’t necessarily track, there is the recently revealed concerns about the costs associated with delivering batch 1 of the Hunter Class frigates.

Wait, they cost how much now?!

As outlined in the first part of this analysis, the costs of the Hunter program are now well documented, with the total program expected to cost in total around $45.6 billion for the six ships; however, recent analysis and research conducted by Michael Shoebridge of Strategic Analysis Australia revealed some truly concerning math, citing figures released by Australia’s Department of Defence in the 2023–2024 Defence Annual Report.

Shoebridge, seeking to draw comparison to a similar program (at least in theory) emphasised the vast differences between the US Navy’s own troubled, general purpose frigate program, the Constellation Class, based on a heavily modified European FREMM frigate (itself one of the original contenders for the SEA 5000 program later won by BAE Systems Australia), which he described as a “humming top of efficiency and value for money” when compared to the Hunter program.

He explained, “The US Navy is buying 10 Constellation Class frigates for about $18 billion Australian dollars. The contract began in 2020 and the first of 10 warships is expected to be delivered to the US Navy in 2029. Meanwhile, the Australia’s Defence Department’s recently tabled Annual Report for 23/24 reveals that the approved project cost for the first three Hunter Class frigates is AU$27.1 billion. That’s a smidgen over AU$9 billion a ship, with the first ship scheduled to be delivered to our Navy in 2032, 14 years after Defence awarded the contract back in 2018.”

For an additional comparison, again drawing on the US example, the per hull costs (including government furnished equipment) for the latest of the venerable and incredibly powerful Arleigh Burke Class destroyers, the 10,000-tonne Flight III variant, equated to US$2 billion or AU$3.07 billion per ship.

Shoebridge did provide some leniency for the US, citing figures from the Congressional Research Service’s November 2024 report, titled Navy Constellation (FFG-62) Class Frigate Program: Background and Issues for Congress, explaining that the initial rise in costs for the first ship is largely because “the lead ship has a higher estimated procurement cost ($US1,386.7 million, or about $US1.4 billion) than the follow-on ships because it is at the top of the production learning curve for the class, and because the lead ship’s procurement cost incorporates much of the detailed design/nonrecurring engineering costs for the class”.

Cost increases are logically to be expected when launching a new shipbuilding program with a “new” ship design, which sees efficiencies and cost savings increase as the program continues to ramp up production, with Shoebridge adding, “The remaining nine ships in the initial fixed price contract are expected to cost about US$1.2 billion each (about $1.8 billion Australian dollars).”

Further to this, the Congressional report provided an invaluable mechanism for American lawmakers to hold Defense decision makers accountable for costly decisions that will no doubt have a major impact on the future of the US Navy and its capacity to maintain a modicum of global presence through dispersed manned-unmanned teaming, of which the Constellation Class will play a pivotal role.

This is something Shoebridge identified, stating, “Congress’ powerful defence committees are using the analysis in the report to pressure Pentagon officials to fix the shipbuilding program. A likely response will be the Pentagon starting production of the ships at a second shipyard to bring costs down and speed up delivery – because the Pentagon also seems to think the current situation is unacceptable.”

Shoebridge added, “So, the US is showing that you don’t need to just watch a trouble defence program continue to fail. That’s a lesson we should learn and learn fast here in Australia with the projects that are meant to be equipping our own Navy.”

With all of this, one can’t help but feel more than a little sorry for BAE Systems as they bear the brunt of public criticism about the program, so what did they have to say?

Responding to the haters and setting the record straight

It needs to be said that BAE has been quite forthright in responding to public criticism and some policymakers’ concerns regarding the Hunter Class and its perceived lack of firepower, particularly regarding the VLS capacity in batch 1 of the Hunter Class.

To this end, the company unveiled an upgunned “guided missile frigate” variant of the Hunter at the 2023 Indo-Pacific Conference that would seek to silence critics’ concerns through a series of modifications that would replace the standard mission bay and instead adds an additional 64 MK41 vertical launch cells and as many as eight more Naval Strike Missiles; the ship will be fielding a total of 96 VLS and 16 Naval Strike Missiles, with the potential to expand the missile load to 128 VLS cells with further modifications.

At the time, Craig Lockhart, now CEO of BAE Systems Australia, explained the logic behind the design changes, telling me at the time, “It’s pretty much the same as Hunter. It still has CEAFAR2 radar, still has the aviation suite. As I said, we’re removing that mission base. So we’re removing the big hang in the middle of the ship, which is really filled with shipping containers of autonomous systems, sea boats.

“We still retain one sea boat and we’re putting in its place a big box which is kind of full of missile cells. So it’s very little change. We would have to detune aspects of anti-submarine warfare capability and why would we do that? Because actually we’re changing the kind of role of the ship subtly. As I said before, the ship’s very, exactly engineered to be very, very quiet. There’s aspects of the propulsion line that’s been specifically engineered to minimise noise. By detuning that, we then get greater speed through the hull, greater speed through the propulsion line and we’ll lose some of that noise dampening. But that’s an aspect that we’ll work with the Royal Australian Navy to kind of finally kind of tune the balance between an ASW roll and a guided missile frigate.”

So it isn’t like BAE has been proactive and made the effort respond to criticisms about the real or perceived firepower shortfalls.

I do have to ask however, would anyone seriously expect that the US Navy would replace a bank of 64 VLS on their front-line Arleigh Burkes with a “multi-mission bay” capable of supporting RHIBs, as yet to be fielding autonomous systems and humanitarian and disaster relief supplies? I would hazard a guess, the answer is probably no, so why are we mandating this on our front-line combat vessels?

This isn’t to understate the importance of the anti-submarine capability, as a BAE Systems Australia spokesperson told me, “It is anticipated that more submarines will be operating in the Indo-Pacific region than anywhere else in the world. The Hunter Class is designed to meet that challenge, as the world’s most advanced and capable anti-submarine warfare frigate. Hunter will be constructed on an acoustically quiet hull and feature unique sonar capabilities, modular digital design and open systems architecture to facilitate through-life support and upgrades as new technologies develop.”

Regarding concerns about the delivery timeline and concerns about weight margins, the spokesperson said, “The Hunter Class is well within all the design criteria to meet its key performance characteristics. In order to improve the through-life margins of the frigate, a number of weight reduction activities have been undertaken, ranging from new materials through to different construction methods. The delivery of the first Hunter Class to the Royal Australian Navy remains on track and on schedule, with 21 units of Ship 1 in production.

“Through the prototyping program we have assessed the capacity of the Osborne Naval Shipyard and understand its capabilities and limitations. We have also developed a complete digital simulation of the build process, allowing us to forecast build times well into the future.”

I have to add that based on the media release when the Hunter Class was formally announced in 2018, the timeline for delivery, despite some slippage, was always planned for the “late-2020s”, vague as that timeline sounds, so one can hardly blame BAE for the government and department’s seeming lack of urgency around the delivery and lack of concern about the firepower in the frigates.

Even this original delivery “projection” would have placed the delivery of the first Hunter conceivably after any potential conflict that may erupt over Taiwan and begs the serious question, have we levied blame in the right direction?

Because I would suggest that we haven’t and we haven’t been doing it for some time, and I am happy to be proven wrong. So, maybe we go a bit easier on BAE for a while, after all, they’re only playing the cards they’ve been dealt with while also stepping up the pressure on both government and Defence to increase transparency beyond the same tired, prepared statements to the media and Senate estimates and critically get on the same page when it comes to building a true “enhanced lethality surface combatant fleet”.

Final thoughts

It is becoming ever clearer that Australia needs a truly world- leading and lethal surface combatant capability, getting this right will be important as the world continues to become increasingly multipolar and hotly contested.

But what does this mean for critical assets like Hunter? Well by no means should we cancel it, rather we need to ensure that the vessels are true Tier One surface combatants, by providing an even modest increase of VLS capacity to 48 from Hull 1, while accelerating the concept design and approval for the Hobart Class replacements (and bump the replacement number up to six at least) to be true Tier One surface combatants that are capable of giving any adversary a bloody nose.

Given the investments we have made in Hunter and the capability it will deliver, it is critical we maximise the capability we are getting across our planned and future Tier One surface combatant fleet because they’re going to be at the pointy end of any regional conflict, so equipping them accordingly is in our best interest.

We also need to view the surface and future submarine fleets as part of a whole, rather than seemingly in isolation from one another, only by doing this can we ensure that the Royal Australian Navy is capable enough to deter any adversary as part of the “integrated, focused force” ambition established in the 2023 Defence Strategic Review.

Importantly, no one has said that defending the nation in this era of renewed and increasingly capable great power competition will be cheap or easy and we have to accept that uncomfortable reality.

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..