What’s in a name? Regional and global tier one and two combatants raise questions

As Australia faces growing regional security challenges and a rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape, the need for a modern, adaptable and effective naval force has never been more critical, particularly as the nation seeks to complement the future fleet of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine fleet.

Central to this transformation is the distinction between Tier 1 and Tier 2 surface combatants, a categorisation that underscores the necessity for a balanced and versatile fleet to meet a diverse range of operational requirements.

This breakdown and categorisation of naval surface capabilities was indeed the very linchpin of the government’s 2024 Independent Analysis into Navy’s Surface Combatant Fleet, more colloquially known as the Surface Fleet Review.

Tier 1 surface combatants, such as destroyers and advanced frigates, represent the high-end warfighting capability of the RAN. These vessels are designed for operations in contested environments, boasting advanced sensors, weapons systems and significant endurance.

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Serving in this role is the existing Hobart Class guided missile destroyers and the planned fleet of Hunter Class guided missile frigates. Their role is to project power, defend critical national interests and operate alongside allied forces in high-threat scenarios.

As part of Australia’s strategic pivot towards greater self-reliance and regional engagement, Tier 1 assets are vital for ensuring maritime superiority and deterring potential adversaries across the Indo-Pacific.

In contrast, Tier 2 surface combatants are designed as smaller, more cost-effective vessels optimised for less complex missions such as long-range maritime security patrols, including securing sea-lines of communication and too a lesser extent, maritime border protection and lower-intensity combat operations.

This tier also enhances the Navy’s ability to maintain persistent presence across Australia’s vast maritime domain and our critical sea-lines-of-communication across the Indian Ocean, through the Western Pacific and maritime southeast Asia contributing to the broader regional and global maritime security, regional stability and disaster response efforts.

The distinction between these two tiers reflects a pragmatic approach to force structure and resource allocation, enabling the RAN to balance capability with affordability.

By integrating Tier 1 and Tier 2 surface combatants into a cohesive fleet, the Navy can achieve the strategic flexibility required to address both high-end warfighting scenarios and the day-to-day demands of maritime governance. This dual-tier approach also aligns with Australia’s broader 2023 Defence Strategic Review, which emphasises the need for agility, innovation and collaboration in response to a dynamic security environment.

As the RAN embarks on this transformative journey, the future of Australia’s Navy hinges on its ability to integrate cutting-edge technology, foster partnerships and develop a workforce for both uniformed and industry equipped for the challenges of modern naval operations and those of the next decade.

However, the definitions, even at their most basic levels, leaves a lot to be desired, particularly as the fleet as planned stands and that is before we even get to the proposed acquisition of experimental “Large Optionally Crewed Surface Vessels” with the same combat system and the armaments proposed for the base Hunter Class frigates and the delivery of which is not expected en masse until the mid-2030s.

Our ’Tier One’ surface fleet

As it stands, the nation’s future Tier One surface fleet will be dominated by the three existing Hobart Class guided missile destroyers and the planned six Hunter Class guided missile frigates.

Now it does need to be said, the Hobart and Hunter Class vessels, respectively, are designed and optimised for very different roles, with the Hobart Class designed to be traditional, high-end air defence, with the planned upgrades to the Aegis combat system that will see the fielding of Baseline 9 capabilities and the integration of Tomahawk cruise missile systems to enhance the air and missile defence and strike capabilities of the Hobart Class, respectively.

In contrast, the Hunter Class was designed and billed as a fleet of the world’s best anti-submarine warfare vessels, critical at a time when almost 50 per cent of the world’s combat submarines are expected to be operating in the Indo-Pacific. It is important to recognise that there are some similarities, particularly as it relates to their common combat system being Aegis and the Saab interface and the weapons load-out, with the Mk 45, 5-inch main gun and the Mk 41 vertical launch systems, that is about where the similarities end.

Importantly, and often overlooked, the Hunter Class, through the integration of the CEAFAR2 radar system and the size and arrangement of the arrays, will effectively deliver the nation one of, if not the most potent air and missile defence warships in the world, far in excess of the capability delivered by the Hobart Class as the Royal Australian Navy’s premier air defence surface combatants.

Equally, one of the often cited (including by myself, repeatedly) issues is the lack of missile magazine capacity across the Royal Australian Navy’s surface combatant fleet and it is here that the key comparison between comparable allied and potential adversarial “Tier One” surface combatants really raises questions about whether as planned, our surface fleet categorisations are accurate and are we preparing accordingly?

It is here that I also have to include some of the critiques of my own criticisms around the magazine capacity across the planned Australian “Tier One” fleet, with the two most frequent counter arguments I have had levied against me.

The first being that Australia will never buy enough missiles to fill larger missile magazines (leaving aside the fact that this conflicts with recognition that Australia needs to urgently build a pre-war consumables stockpile) and second, that Australia’s ships will ALWAYS be part of a larger, allied task group, so our allies, particularly the US, don’t really care if we don’t bring much “kinetically” to the fight.

I am going to leave those two points there because, well, despite hearing them numerous times, especially over the last two years, I am still flabbergasted by them.

How do we compare? Well, unsurprisingly, not well...

This brings me to the central thesis of my headline, “What is in a name?” and how does Australia’s existing and planned “Tier One” surface combatant fleet compare to the similar capabilities of our partners in the Indo-Pacific and those of our potential adversaries, namely those of the People’s Liberation Army-Navy and Russia’s Pacific Fleet?

As the subhead detailed, perhaps unsurprisingly, not very well and for all intents and purposes, our “Tier One” surface combatants, on the purely “effector” aspect of the calculation, are effectively “Tier Two” surface combatants and raises one important question, what is the point of having the world’s best sensor suites (both anti-air, missile and submarine) and a limited capacity to engage a threat?

This kind of seems like having an umbrella that has holes in it. Yeah, sure, you don’t get as wet in a downpour, but you still get wet, nonetheless.

While the Hobart Class destroyers and Hunter Class frigates are Australia’s “Tier One” naval platforms, designed for regional defence, allied interoperability and multi-mission flexibility, when comparing these vessels to our partners and potential adversaries, these categorisations truly fall short.

In the case of the Hobart Class, with a displacement of approximately 7,000 tonnes and a 48-cell Mk 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS), is optimised for air defence using the Aegis Combat System and SM-2/SM-6 missiles. However, it is outclassed in firepower and VLS capacity by destroyers such as China’s Type 055, which displaces around 13,000 tonnes and carries 112 VLS cells for a wide range of missiles, including HHQ-9 surface-to-air, YJ-18 anti-ship, and CJ-10 land-attack missiles.

Similarly, South Korea’s Sejong the Great Class boasts an unmatched 128 VLS cells, Japan’s Maya Class features 96 VLS cells and ballistic missile defence capabilities, and the US Arleigh Burke Class Flight II with 90 VLS cells, while the newer and larger Flight III combines 96 VLS cells with advanced AN/SPY-6 radar.

Russia’s Admiral Gorshkov Class destroyer equivalents, though smaller, carry versatile Kalibr, Oniks and Zircon hypersonic missiles in 32 VLS cells, with the upgraded 22350M variant expected to expand this missile magazine capacity to 48–64 cells.

The Hunter Class frigates, with a proposed full-load displacement exceeding 10,000 tonnes at full load, are designed as large multi-role warships emphasising anti-submarine warfare (ASW). Equipped with a 32-cell Mk 41 VLS, advanced CEAFAR2 radar, and the potential to integrate Tomahawk cruise missiles, the Hunter Class offers flexibility but lags significantly in VLS capacity compared to larger vessels such as the Type 055 and Sejong the Great Class and is significantly under-armed when compared to the Arleigh Burke and Maya Class, respectively.

Critically, while comparable to the US Constellation Class frigates (7,300 tonnes fully loaded, 32 VLS cells), the Hunter Class dwarfs Japan’s Mogami Class (5,500 tonnes fully loaded) and South Korea’s Daegu Class (3,600 tonnes, fully loaded), which are lighter and more focused on regional operations. Meanwhile, Russia’s 22350M, with similar displacement and up to 64 VLS cells, emphasises greater missile capacity and offensive versatility.

Overall, while Australia’s Hobart and Hunter classes are highly capable platforms tailored to regional defence and allied operations, they are generally outgunned in size, firepower and VLS capacity by the leading surface combatants of “larger naval powers”.

China’s Type 055 stands out as the most heavily armed destroyer globally, while South Korea’s Sejong the Great Class and the US Arleigh Burke Class provide unparalleled firepower and multi-mission capabilities from the allied side of the ledger. Russia’s Admiral Gorshkov Class and its enhanced 22350M variant highlight the increasing use of hypersonic weapons and flexible designs.

While the Hobart and Hunter prioritise advanced sensors, ASW and fleet defence, they lack the missile diversity and offensive reach of larger, globally focused platforms, significantly limiting the capacity of the Australian Defence Force’s capacity to sustainably engage in and maintain a strategy of denial.

With this in mind, it is worth asking, are Australia’s “Tier One” surface combatants truly worthy of that categorisation and moniker?

In my opinion, the answer is a resounding no, and that has a dramatic impact on our strategy and capacity to act independently regardless of reassurances that Australia will ALWAYS be part of a larger allied task force.

Final thoughts

While contemporary Australia has been far removed from the harsh realities of conflict, with many generations never enduring the reality of rationing for food, energy, medical supplies or luxury goods, and even fewer within modern Australia understanding the sociopolitical and economic impact such rationing would have on Australia’s standard and quality of life.

There is no doubt that Australia’s position and responsibilities in the Indo-Pacific region will depend on the nation’s ability to sustain itself economically, strategically and politically in the face of rising regional and global competition.

At the forefront of this is the nation’s seemingly declining capacity to defend itself both independently and in concert with our regional and global partners, raising an important question worth asking: If we don’t take our own defence seriously, how can we expect anyone else to?

Ultimately, this comes back to the government’s shift away from a “Balanced Force” towards a “Focused Force” as championed in the Defence Strategic Review and the foundational problem that is our lack of clearly defined role and objectives for our own Defence capabilities.

In the maritime domain, this is of paramount importance as identified by David Uren, writing for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, that “two-thirds of Australia’s exports by value and a little over 40 per cent of its imports by value travelling through the Indonesian archipelago. About 6 per cent of exports go east across the Pacific Ocean to New Zealand, the Pacific islands and North or South America, while about 13 per cent of imports come from the east”.

Uren added, “Only about 4 per cent of Australia’s maritime trade travels west across the Indian Ocean without going through Indonesian waters, bound for India, the Middle East or the Suez Canal. Of the Australian exports that enter Indonesian waters, about 73 per cent are headed for North Asia (principally iron ore and LNG), while 17 per cent have destinations in Southeast Asia, and 10 per cent are en route for India, the Middle East or Europe. Among the imports coming through the Indonesian straits, about 11 per cent come from North Asia, and a little over 40 per cent from each of Southeast Asia and Europe.”

Importantly, no one has said that defending the nation in this era of renewed and increasingly capable great power competition will be cheap or easy and we have to accept that uncomfortable reality, because the alternative outcome is infinitely worse.

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..