iscover
As the maritime environment in the Indo-Pacific gets ever more contested and competitive, Australia’s status quo approach to defence planning and naval planning, in particular, requires a major overhaul, lest we find ourselves in significant danger.
As an island nation with vast oceanic borders, Australia has long understood the critical role of its Navy in safeguarding national interests, supporting alliances and ensuring the free flow of trade in the Indo-Pacific region, accordingly, Australia’s naval policy has been shaped by a unique combination of geography, economic reliance on maritime trade and shifting global power dynamics.
In the aftermath of World War II, Australia’s naval strategy evolved in response to the growing influence of the United States and the onset of the Cold War. The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) aligned closely with the US Navy under the ANZUS Treaty (1951), reinforcing Australia’s commitment to collective defence with the United States and New Zealand.
During this period, naval acquisitions, such as aircraft carriers HMAS Sydney and HMAS Melbourne, supported by a formidable surface fleet of modern destroyers and frigates, underscored Australia’s ambition to maintain a credible maritime presence through a de facto policy of power projection and “Forward Defence”.
The decades that followed saw fluctuating defence budgets and policy shifts, influenced by changing regional and global conditions, particularly the fallout of the Vietnam War, the fall of Saigon, and the “Guam Doctrine” of the Nixon administration gave way to the 1980s which saw Australia embark on a modernisation of its naval capabilities, commissioning advanced frigates and submarines as part of its pivot towards a continentally-focused, “self-reliant” defence strategy under the “Defence of Australia” policy.
Regardless of the ebbs and flows of recent history, maritime trade remains the backbone of Australia’s economy, with over 99 per cent of the nation’s international trade by volume transported via sea, including the key economic drivers of exports – iron ore, coal, and liquefied natural gas – which depend on secure and open shipping lanes.
It is this economic dependency and exposure to the volatility to the global maritime commons that underscores the strategic importance of protecting trade routes and maintaining freedom of navigation in regional and global waters.
In recent years, the Indo-Pacific has emerged as a focal point of global geopolitics, presenting both opportunities and challenges for Australian naval policy. The rise of China, in particular, as an increasingly global maritime power, along with increasing territorial disputes in the South China Sea and the proliferation of grey-zone tactics, has necessitated a significant recalibration and refocusing of Australia’s naval strategy.
Initiatives such as the AUKUS security partnership with the US and the UK, announced in 2021, highlight a renewed focus on enhancing technological capabilities, including the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines, with the surface fleet and Navy, as a whole, set to be fundamentally reshaped over the next decade.
However, strategic challenges persist, ranging from regional instability to the impact of climate change on Pacific Island nations, which are among Australia’s closest neighbours. To address these challenges, Australia has emphasised the importance of regional cooperation, fostering alliances through initiatives like the Quad (with the US, India, and Japan) and reinforcing partnerships with South-east Asian nations.
Today, Australia’s naval policy reflects a balance of historical ties, economic imperatives and seeking to respond to the myriad of traditional and non-traditional contemporary security concerns, where in an increasingly complex Indo-Pacific, the RAN will continue to play a pivotal role in securing Australia’s interests and promoting broader stability in the region.
However, it is becoming clear that more needs to be done in order to prepare the nation and its naval capabilities to face the challenges that are emerging across Australia’s primary area of interest.
In response, retired naval officer and security analyst Jen Parker has called on the next Australian government to embrace a bolder vision and plan for the Royal Australian Navy in a piece for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, titled The next Australian government needs a bolder plan for the navy.
Recent events necessitate a stronger response
The year 2024 was by far one of the most consequential for the future direction and capability of the Royal Australian Navy, with the release of the Independent Analysis into Navy’s Surface Combatant Fleet, the 2024 National Defence Strategy and the reprioritised 2024 Integrated Investment Program, all of which have earmarked significant funding reprioritisation to boost the capability of Australia’s Navy.
Adding further complexity is the ongoing deterioration of the monopolar world, traditionally dominated by the United States and the emergence of a multipolar world, with a growing number of maritime flashpoints and characterised by a number of emerging great powers and the increasing capability of non-state actors that all serve to complicate global maritime security.
The last year, in many ways, also dramatically demonstrated the rapid evolution and deterioration in the post-Second World War status quo, and even more so, shattered many long-held myths about maritime security and the “norms” that nations adhere to. Beginning with the Houthi’s war against global maritime trade through the Red Sea and ending with Beijing’s ongoing high-stakes games of chicken in the South China Sea against Australian and allied partners serving to undoubtedly raise the stakes.
Highlighting this shifting environment, Parker added further detail, saying, “In the past 12 months, the oceans on which we depend for our protection and prosperity have experienced a dramatic deterioration in security terms, unseen in recent decades. Globally, from the Black Sea to the Red Sea, maritime trade is under pressure. Europe has experienced further attacks on critical maritime infrastructure, including subsea cables – the backbone of internet connectivity.
“Closer to home, we’ve witnessed escalating aggression from China’s coastguard, which regularly has attacked Philippine vessels in the West Philippine Sea. Australian sailors have been placed at risk, most recently when a Chinese fighter pilot inexplicably deployed flares in front of an Australian helicopter operating in international airspace. This is not simply a canary in the coalmine; it means the breakdown of global norms.”
All these factors are ultimately compounded by the geographic make-up of the Indo-Pacific and the inescapable influence of the maritime environment that shapes the region and serves to reinforce the centrality of the Royal Australian Navy at the heart of the nation’s defence posture and capability.
Parker reinforced this reality and highlighted the precarious position we find ourselves in, despite the substantial policy work and some of the major milestones of 2024, saying, “If a conflict arises in the Indo-Pacific, it will be inherently maritime in nature and we will be compelled to fight with the capabilities we have at the time.
“In February 2024, the government announced a historic expansion of the surface combatant fleet – the destroyers and frigates of the Royal Australian Navy equipped with offensive and defensive weapons including missiles and torpedoes. But this expansion is not expected to materialise until the 2030s.
Parker detailed further, saying, “During the past 12 months there has been an integration of new missile capabilities in the navy’s small fleet. Announcements have included the acceleration of building ships for the army and key achievements in training, treaties and export controls to support Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines … These developments are positive, but they have not shifted the needle in the near term to address Australia’s vulnerabilities in the maritime domain.”
With this in mind, we can increasingly understand the growing need for Australia to have a far more ambitious plan for our naval capabilities and strategy to face down the traditional and asymmetric challenges we will continue to face over the coming decade.
Our fleet isn’t in good shape, but we need to be bold and ambitious
Before we get to bold, ambitious plans for the future navy, we have to understand where the surface fleet is today and unfortunately, it isn’t exactly in a good position.
Parker highlighted this, saying, “Australia’s surface combatant fleet has been reduced from 11 to 10 with the decommissioning of HMAS Anzac because of its age. The mine-hunting fleet also has been diminished, leaving only two vessels remaining after a mid-year decision to cancel their replacements.
Going further, Parker stated, “Australia’s two tankers, critical for replenishing fuel, food and ammunition for naval ships, have been laid up for most of 2024 because of defects. Additionally, much of Australia’s hydrographic capability, vital for surveying beneath the surface of the water, has been decommissioned, leaving only one ship in operation. The list goes on. These issues are the product of decades of delayed and indecisive decision making compounded by a lack of investment.”
“The increasing frequency of attacks in the maritime domain, coupled with the absence of strategic warning time for a potential regional conflict, highlights the urgent need to address Australia’s waning maritime power. This is not simply a nice-to-have but an essential requirement for an island nation when global security norms are being redefined.”
So if would be reasonably safe to say that we’re starting from a low base, so the only way (at least optimistically) is up! But what does that look like?
Using the SEA 3000 General Purpose Frigate program as a jumping off point, Parker stated, “In 2025 a timely decision on Australia’s future frigate design will be critical to achieving the planned 2029 delivery of the first of 11 ships. This decision must prioritise the option that minimises delivery risks, ensures operational capability by 2029 (or sooner), maximises commonality with existing Australian systems and offers the design flexibility to accommodate future upgrades.
“We must be even bolder than this. While the thought of another review may make us groan, the next government must conduct a thorough assessment of our broader naval and maritime capabilities. If we acknowledge that we’re not currently equipped to protect our trade routes or subsea cables, we must critically examine the composition of the wider fleet – not just the surface combatants but also our mine warfare, hydrographic, amphibious, replenishment and clearance diving capabilities.”
Finally, Parker emphasised the need for a public conversation about the nation’s defence budget and its percentage of the national gross domestic product, which is currently hovering around the 2 per cent mark, despite being told repeatedly that we live in the most dangerous period of time since the Second World War.
In doing so, Parker raised a key point I have often raised, which is nobody has ever said that appropriately defending Australia will be a cheap endeavour and that as a result, we shouldn’t seek to do so on the cheap, after all, national security is arguably the most sacrosanct responsibility of any government.
Final thoughts
While contemporary Australia has been far removed from the harsh realities of conflict, with many generations never enduring the reality of rationing for food, energy, medical supplies or luxury goods, and even fewer within modern Australia understanding the sociopolitical and economic impact such rationing would have on Australia’s standard and quality of life, there is no doubt that Australia’s position and responsibilities in the Indo-Pacific region will depend on the nation’s ability to sustain itself economically, strategically and politically in the face of rising regional and global competition.
At the forefront of this is the nation’s seemingly declining capacity to defend itself both independently and in concert with our regional and global partners, raising an important question worth asking: if we don’t take our own defence seriously, how can we expect anyone else to?
As events continue to unfold throughout the region and China continues to throw its economic, political and strategic weight around, can Australia afford to remain a secondary power, or does it need to embrace a larger, more independent role in an era of increasing great power competition?
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at
