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With Beijing’s recent exercises close to home, Jennifer Parker, retired naval officer and expert associate at the National Security College - Australian National University, has called for Australia to “become a naval power”. But what do we mean by that and aren’t we already doing it?
In an era marked by great power competition, particularly within the dynamic Indo-Pacific region, secure access to the sea is central to the enduring way of life for Australia. Our vast maritime domain not only forms the lifeblood of national trade and economic prosperity but also informs the strategic and tactical capabilities essential for protecting our nation and its interests.
Historically, the sea has been a crucial arena for commerce and conflict, and today, it remains central to Australia’s security and defence strategy. As global tensions rise, our ability to maintain and enhance maritime connectivity is a critical determinant of our national resilience.
Tactically, the capacity to control vital sea lanes and chokepoints ensures that our forces can operate effectively in the face of evolving challenges. In this context, a robust naval presence is not only a deterrent to potential adversaries but also a means of projecting power and securing our maritime periphery.
This strategic positioning is crucial, particularly given the growing assertiveness of neighbouring powers in the Indo-Pacific.
Strategically, a secure maritime domain bolsters Australia’s role as a key regional player across the vast maritime environs of the Indo-Pacific region, dominated by the Indian and Pacific oceans. By developing a potent, well-rounded naval capability, we can forge stronger alliances, contribute to collective security arrangements, and uphold the rules-based international order that sustains global stability.
Australia’s economic imperatives further accentuate this necessity; the sea is the conduit for the majority of Australia’s international trade and any disruption to this flow would have far-reaching consequences for our economy as was evidenced during the Houthis campaign in the Red Sea.
Accordingly, a capable navy, that is capable of sea control and power projection far from our shores, ensures not only the free flow of commerce but also the protection of critical infrastructure and resources that drive national growth and reinforces the key economic links that provide economic opportunity hundreds of millions across the region.
In this competitive era, it is imperative for Australia to transition towards becoming a recognised naval power. By investing in modernised fleets, advanced technology and strategic partnerships, we can secure our maritime interests and reinforce our standing within the Indo-Pacific theatre.
By doing so, Australia will not only safeguard its national interests but also contribute to a more stable and secure regional order. But what sort of navy do we need in order to achieve these objectives, and wasn’t the government’s Independent Analysis into Navy’s Surface Combatant Fleet and our future fleet of nuclear-powered submarines supposed to solve these problems?
To some, it would seem that these plans leave a little (or a lot) to be desired, to others, they’re close and it’s better than nothing, while to other commentators, it is exactly what Australia needs at this point in time, particularly as our primary (potential adversary) in the People’s Republic of China has rapidly been flexing its muscles and demonstrating that our once impermeable barrier of geographic isolation is no longer the protective cocoon it once was.
One of the most prominent advocates for a more serious investment and considered development of Australia as a naval power is retired naval officer and National Security College - ANU expert associate Jennifer Parker, who, in a piece for The Australian Financial Review titled China’s expedition shows Australia must become a naval power, outlined the challenges we will increasingly face and the steps we must take in order to mitigate some of the threats to our national security.
Confronting a ‘blue water’ great power
It is no secret that Beijing has embarked on one of the largest peacetime modernisation and expansion of the People’s Liberation Army and its contributing forces, with the People’s Liberation Army-Navy undergoing a rapid expansion of its capabilities and is quickly being transformed from a second-rate, “brown water” navy into one of the world’s premier, “blue water” naval forces.
At the core of this transformation is Beijing’s rapid development of a growing number of aircraft carriers – the premier power projection platform for all serious naval powers – along with a growing fleet of large amphibious warfare ships and a truly monumental growth in the surface combatant fleet, resulting in the fielding of a growing number of advanced and highly lethal surface combatants.
All of this comes before the well-documented growth of Beijing’s submarine fleet, incorporating both conventionally powered and nuclear-powered submarines, providing the Indo-Pacific’s rising regional and global power with a well-rounded, highly capable naval force optimised for power projection, sea control and the overall domination of the region and beyond.
Parker highlighted this growth, saying, “Over the last decade, China has morphed from a modest coastal navy into a true blue water force. In 2015, the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s battle force – submarines, surface combatants and aircraft carriers – stood at 255 vessels, according to the US Congressional Research Office. That figure has soared to 400 in 2025, with further growth on the horizon. The fleet’s quality has also jumped, with around 70 per cent of China’s current battle force built since 2010.”
While the growth is indeed impressive and is to be expected given Beijing’s stated ambitions and the scale of its shipbuilding industry, it is the quality and emphasis on kinetic effectors, or put more simply, firepower of their individual warships that is of specific concern, something Australia’s defence and national security community seem either unwilling or unable to recognise, accept and account for.
When accounting for this, Australia’s predicament only becomes more concerning, when as Parker detailed we consider the age and size of the Australian Navy’s combatant fleet, “Australia’s navy fields just 16 battle-force vessels – its smallest and oldest in decades. That includes six submarines aged 22 years to 29 years, seven ANZAC Class frigates (19 years to 27 years old), and three much newer Hobart Class destroyers that lack the firepower of true destroyers.
Parker added, “While the government plans to grow the fleet to levels not seen in decades by the 2030s and 2040s, the current shortfall is compounded by dwindling support capabilities – like replenishment, hydrography and mine warfare – after decades of underinvestment by successive governments. Comparing ship counts alone may be crude, but it highlights China’s drive to become a true blue water maritime power. Its rapid fleet expansion goes hand in hand with sweeping structural reforms, including the creation of a coast guard in 2013 – now the world’s largest maritime law enforcement outfit, boasting over 142 vessels."
This combination of factors presents significant challenges to Australia’s national security, particularly as we adjust to the increasing transactional approach of the United States as our principle strategic partner and security guarantor while also accounting for a relative decline in the power and capability of the United States as it faces a true peer competitor in the People’s Republic of China.
Parker highlighted these threats, saying, “Why should Australia care about China’s growing naval and maritime power? Because our core vulnerabilities lie at sea. Some 99 per cent of our trade travels by ship, and 99 per cent of our data travelling to the rest of the world passes through undersea cables. But it’s not just about data and trade – it’s the critical goods that keep our economy running and ensure our security, from fuel and ammunition to pharmaceuticals and fertiliser. Cut off those supplies, and we cripple our economy and security – no fuel means grounded F-35s and idle trucks nationwide.”
Going further, Parker added, “In a crisis or conflict, an adversary wouldn’t need to invade our shores to bring Australia’s economy – and by extension, our defence – to its knees. All they’d have to do is cut off our critical seaborne supplies: fuel, fertiliser, ammunition, pharmaceuticals, and more. In a rapidly deteriorating strategic environment, Australia must be able to defend its maritime domain.”
Addressing this, Parker said, “Recognising this vulnerability means Australia must develop the capacity to protect critical seaborne supplies in a crisis. It demands focus, structural reform, speed and investment.”
But what exactly does that look like and more importantly, if, as we’re repeatedly told almost daily, we live in the most “dangerous period” since the end of the Second World War, why haven’t we got this right by now?
What exactly are we aiming for?
If, as Parker suggested, Australians can expect to see an increasing number of Chinese naval task groups operating in close proximity to the Australian coastline and, we urgently need to develop serious “naval power”, what does it look like?
Well, Parker does have some ideas, beginning with an urgent call to reorganise and restructure both our mindset and our materiel assets, importantly, Parker said, “We must recognise that maritime capability isn’t just hardware – it’s also structure and mindset. We need to reform our civil maritime security, establish a coastguard to free the Royal Australian Navy from border policing, and adjust our legislative architecture to build a genuinely capable maritime strategic fleet."
This emphasis on structure provides us with a unique opportunity to blend tried-and-true methods and capabilities, with a touch of innovation, to build a complementary, balanced suite of capabilities that provide both conventional and asymmetric capabilities and doctrines to build and enhance our national resilience and capacity to resist clear and coordinated efforts to coerce the Australian public and government.
Importantly (and while I disagree with the sentiment, I must confess I understand it) Parker is clear, saying, “Australia shouldn’t – and can’t – hope to match China’s naval might. Our maritime strategy hinges on alliances and partnerships across the region, including deeper cooperation with partners like the United States, Japan, and India. Yet to safeguard our vital interests at sea, we must demonstrate self-reliance within our alliances – we must develop a comprehensive maritime strategy and resource it.”
Where I disagree with Parker is the “shouldn’t – and can’t – hope to match China’s naval might” part, because it comes across as overwhelmingly reductive, in expecting that Australia will have to fight it out alone, which we know isn’t the case at the large scale, but there will undoubtedly be times and places where Australia will have to fight alone across the Indo-Pacific and we need to be assured of both a qualitative and quantitative edge over our adversary.
Ultimately, this means we need to take our own security more seriously, because if we don’t, how can we expect anyone else will?
This is something that Parker seems to concur with, saying, “China’s naval demonstration on Australia’s east coast should serve a reminder of our vulnerability, and a warning that addressing this vulnerability requires Australia to truly recognise its place as a maritime power – our future prosperity and security depend on it.”
Final thoughts
We have to accept that while the world is increasingly becoming “multipolar”, the Indo-Pacific, in particular, is rapidly becoming the most hotly contested region in the world.
Underpinned by the emerging economic, political, and strategic might of powers like China, India, Pakistan, Thailand, Vietnam and the established and re-emerging capability of both South Korea and Japan, in particular, are serving to create a hotbed of competition on our doorstep.
Recognising this array of challenges and opportunities, both the Australian public and its policymakers need to look beyond the myopic lens that has traditionally dominated our diplomatic, strategic and economic policy making since Federation.
Ultimately, we need to see Australia begin to play the long game to fully capitalise on the opportunities transforming the Indo-Pacific. The most important questions now become, when will we see a more detailed analysis and response to the challenges and opportunities facing Australia and when will we see both a narrative and strategy that better helps industry and the Australian public understand the challenges faced and opportunities we have presented before us?
As events continue to unfold throughout the region and China continues to throw its economic, political and strategic weight around, can Australia afford to remain a secondary power, or does it need to embrace a larger, more independent role in an era of increasing great power competition?
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at
