Defence Connect’s DSR priorities for delivering ‘impactful projection’

In the aftermath of Japan’s ruthlessly efficient and unprecedented blitzkrieg through the Pacific and Southeast Asia during the early years of the Second World War, Australia identified that like many of its European and American counterparts in the decades prior to the outbreak of hostilities, it had taken a number of factors in the inter-war years for granted.

Not least of these was the continuing dominance and commitment of its “great and powerful friend” in the British Empire which was thoroughly routed in the region at the Fall of Singapore, leaving Australia precariously exposed and hilariously unprepared for the conflict Imperial Japan would bring to our doorstep. While the entry of the United States into the conflict following the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 would serve as a major turning point for the Allies and Australia in particular, Australia’s leaders of both political persuasions recognised that Australia needed to do more. 

The immediate post-war years reiterated for Australia’s leaders that our long-term national security would increasingly be defined by several different, yet interconnected and increasingly complex factors, namely: 

• The benevolence, stability, and continuing commitment of its primary strategic partner;
• The geographic isolation of the continent, highlighted by the “tyranny of distance”;
• A relatively small population in comparison with our neighbours; and
• Increasingly, the geopolitical, economic and strategic ambition, and capabilities of Australia’s Indo-Pacific and Asian neighbours.

Today, the geopolitical and strategic environment Australia finds itself in has eerie echoes of the decades preceding the outbreak of World War II — rising tensions between great power adversaries, a relative decline in the intent and capability of our primary strategic guarantor and the increasing decline of the post-Cold War global order which has prompted the Australian government to begin the most consequential modernisation and recapitalisation of our nation’s defence capabilities since the Second World War. 

In response, the Albanese government is delivering on its campaign commitment to conduct an independent review in Australia’s strategic circumstances and the acquisition in what has been described by Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles as “an ambitious and extensive examination of our strategic circumstances and will underpin our Defence policy for decades to come”.

While there has been growing speculation by the media in recent days and weeks, many in the defence industry, strategic policy, and government community are eagerly awaiting its public release like kids waiting for Santa to visit — in light of this anticipation, the Defence Connect Editorial Team decided to outline their top three individual priority outcomes, the supporting reasoning, and a single priority investment they would like to see actioned in the Defence Strategic Review. 

Liam Garman - managing editor: Already, the old battlelines that have characterised Australia’s defence policy since the end of  Forward Defence have reemerged. Proponents of the Defence of Australia policy hoping to exploit the sea-air gap are engaged in furious missives over infantry fighting vehicles, while senior defence commentators are pointing to the use of combined arms fighting in Ukraine to evidence the risks of segments of the ADF being reduced to a constabulary force.

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Like the majestic Ghost Bat, I soar above such ideological and philosophical division. I hope that this is a measured Defence Strategic Review wishlist — based upon likely scenarios relative to what I perceive to be Australia’s defence shortfalls.

1. Don’t lose sight, 12 nuclear-powered submarines must be the goal: At the risk of sounding pastiche, Australia must put an end to the submarine to-and-fro with a concrete acquisition policy. This will give a firm commitment to our defence leaders, industry, and small-to-medium sized businesses.

The strategic case for submarines has not changed. In the event of any conflict in the South China Sea, global shipping will be diverted into Australia’s northern approaches including the Sunda Strait and the Lombok Strait through the Indonesian archipelago. If conflict ventures even further south, we might even find ships skirting to the south of Australia. Gone are the days that Australia could simply be perceived as an island on the far side of the world. Any increase in merchant vessels traffic would see an increased naval and submarine presence.

While some have heralded the oncoming obsolescence of submarine capabilities, military leaders, academics, and industry professionals are far from reaching consensus. Analysts such as Matthew Kroenig have highlighted that China’s anti-submarine warfare abilities have proven unable to detect submarine targets.

Meanwhile Dr Norman Friedman, who has a doctorate in theoretical physics and worked as a direct consultant to the US Secretary of the Navy, highlights that modern anti-submarine capabilities are both costly and untested in wartime. Moreover, Friedman notes that the rate of technological advancements for submarines are likely to outstrip ASW improvements — including the development of decoy technologies and exploitation of maritime blind spots. To sum up his argument, he notes that “strategic submarines will be less, not more, vulnerable in the future”.

Currently, the AUKUS agreement details the acquisition of “at least eight nuclear-powered submarines” though this must be increased to 12. With increased encroachment of foreign vessels in Australia’s maritime approach, I concur with ASPI’s Marcus Hellyer that a figure of 12 better enables greater surge capacity. It further mitigates risk of technological failure by enabling the ships to undergo complete and regular maintenance without undue demand for deployment.

These 12 submarines must be of the same build. The RAN would be wise to avoid the workforce constraints observed by the RAAF who had to balance the maintenance requirements of the Super Hornet, Growler, and F-35A — each of which required engineers with unique skills and readiness. Notions of a “stop-gap solution” run the risk of splitting Australia’s already limited workforce yet further.

2. Enhancing Australia’s maritime situational awareness: If one examines the recent paramilitary operations supported by the PLA-Navy, Australia must accept that: 1) our nation’s adversaries will happily exploit the greyzone to achieve their geostrategic objectives while expecting little response from Australia, and 2) that high-intensity conflict will include swarming tactics from civilian vessels.

Australia thus requires ISR capabilities that are capable of detecting small paramilitary assets. In 2011, it was revealed that the Jindalee Operational Radar Network failed to identify some 200 asylum seeker boats, with similar concerns raised over MH370.

The Australian Defence Force must consider investing into more Triton and P-8A Poseidon units. These capabilities will provide electronic surveillance and warfare capabilities, fundamental to counterbalance China’s greyzone operations and better enable the ADF to determine whether vessels are hostile.

3. Maintaining our offensive and defensive cyber capabilities: The Russian invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated the willingness of Australia’s adversaries to target critical civilian infrastructure. Targeting Australia’s energy grid and telecommunications networks would also invariably hamper Australia’s warfighting ability, threatening Australia’s industrial base and our Defence networks. Already, industrial control systems can be physically destroyed through cyber penetration as evidenced numerous times in Iran’s nuclear facilities.

A strong offensive cyber capability will also form an active deterrent for the Commonwealth against future cyber attacks. As with all deterrence theory, punitive cyber measures will ameliorate the risk of a foreign actor attempting to attack Australia in this domain. Further, since cyber is cost-effective, it will enable Australia to gain a competitive advantage relative to our adversaries.

Steve Kuper - senior analyst: If the government is serious about building a true “impactful projection” capability, we need to start thinking strategically, not tactically and that has to be reflected in the capability development and acquisition decisions — defence industry places a central role in this, but requires more considered thinking around platform acquisitions and the role they will play at both a tactical and strategic level.

Such analysis and planning will enhance industry certainty, particularly as we plan for what Australia actually needs, rather than an arbitrary like-for-like platform replacements which has been the modus operandi to date (look no further than the F-35 acquisition or the initial Hobart Class destroyer acquisition) — critically, this thinking can’t be a rigid dogma, rather it needs to be flexible, adaptable, and agile in its approach and delivery, without fundamentally reinventing the wheel every 3–4 years, something Australia continues to do. 

Taking these points into account, my three priority outcomes for the Defence Strategic Review to have the maximum impact on delivering Australia’s new doctrine of “impactful projection” are: 

1. Land-based intermediate range ballistic missiles: Australia has a well-documented long-range strike capability gap following the retirement of the venerable F-111 bombers in the early-2010s — while successive governments have sought to address this capability gap, the emphasis has largely been on purely tactical capabilities, like the HIMARs platform, including the proposed next-generation Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) which will provide Army with a strike range in excess of 500 kilometres, the Naval Strike Missile which has a range of between 200–250 kilometres, and the Tomahawk Land Attack Cruise Missile with a range of up to 2,500 kilometres, while the anti-ship variant has a range of approximately 460 kilometres. 

While these tactical platforms will provide major advantages for the joint force ADF throughout the region, they fail to provide the true strategic reach and deterrence factor necessary for securing Australia’s national interests and providing Australia’s forward deployed forces with the insurance provided by a true strategic long-range strike capability. Accordingly, leveraging Australia’s growing space launch industry capabilities to develop and field a fleet of intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM) equipped with a “soft-kill” counter-electronics warheads, similar to the Boeing developed Counter-electronics High-powered Microwave Advanced Missile Project (CHAMP) platform and a range of up to 5,500 kilometres provides Australia with a leading-edge strategic deterrence capability. 

Importantly, as a responsible member of the international community and one committed to upholding the international rules-based order, Australia must commit to a policy of “no first use” for such weapons, instead using them as a strategic deterrent and serving to enhance the strategic deterrence value provided by Australia’s plan of nuclear-powered submarines — the non-nuclear nature of the platform also maintains Australia’ commitment to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons systems. 

2. Extra DDGs, general purpose frigates and an extra AOR: As an island nation with an export-dominated economy, Australia is dependent on the unrestricted access to the sea and the critical sea lines of communication (SLOC) that surround our continent. It is clear from growing media commentary and speculation that Australia’s naval forces will receive a boost in the DSR, however, what that looks like remains elusive. 

In order to protect Australia’s maritime interests and SLOC expanding the surface fleet and its capability is critical — because of this, expanding the number of Hobart Class destroyers is the first way to do this, however rather than the additional three proposed by Navantia in an unsolicited proposal to government, I suggest six, with three built in Adelaide and three built in Spain, with an extra “Hobart payload module” added to bring the ships up to a 96-cell capacity. This extra payload should also be retrofitted to the original three Hobart Class vessels as part of their planned combat system modernisation and upgrades to accommodate the NSM and Tomahawk capabilities due to begin this decade. 

As a “three ocean” nation, fielding nine such vessels means that the east, west, and northern approaches have an equal number of highly capable warships that are deployable independently or as part of a larger Australian or allied task group — the split build provides long-term benefits to Australia’s defence industry, while also mandating the use of Australian steel provides additional economic benefits to the nation. 

An additional Supply Class replenishment vessel, also increases the operational and strategic flexibility available to combatant commanders, while also ensuring the Navy has the range to cover the vast maritime borders Australia has to contend with — this acquisition can be packaged up with the Spanish build of additional Hobart Class vessels and also leverage the use of Australian steel as was the case with HMAS Supply and HMAS Stalwart. 

Finally, the frequent debate about “up-gunning” Australia’s OPV fleet, or the potential acquisition of a new fleet of missile armed corvettes is a case of sleight of hand and doesn’t provide Australia with the high-end warfighting capability the Navy needs to secure our SLOC — accordingly, the local-build of a new fleet of smaller, general purpose patrol frigates, akin to the Royal Navy’s Inspiration Class vessels will provide the Navy with the necessary depth in capability, taking the pressure of high-end platforms while also enhancing regional presence.

Additionally, this acquisition would also provide the potential for economic value-add through a local build and helping the Royal New Zealand Navy replace their Anzac Class frigates, while also expanding potential export avenues for Australian licence-built general purpose frigates for sale in South America, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. 

3. Conduct detailed analysis of munition use in Ukraine to inform and speed up acquisition of key munitions: The sheer volumes of munition currently being expended by Ukraine and Russia during their conflict has become a widely recognised challenge for both Russia and the West as it seeks to supply Ukraine. Frequent reports that the Russians and the Ukrainians are running low on ammunition highlights repeated concerns that Australia, like much of the West, would run out of key ammunition within weeks at best and days at worst in the event of any major conflict. 

This is best explained by Raytheon Technologies chief executive Greg Hayes, who raised concerns about the pace Stinger and Javelin munitions are being used in Ukraine, and the US defence industrial base’s capacity to keep up. Despite Raytheon and Lockheed Martin building about 400 Javelins per month, Hayes said, “in the first 10 months of the war, we’ve essentially used up 13 years of Stinger production, and five years’ worth of Javelin production. So the question is, how are we going to resupply, restock the inventories?”

Priority long-term investment: MQ-Next (Strike and ISR capabilities): The planned replacement for the MQ-9 series uncrewed aerial combat systems currently in development by Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Boeing, Kratos, and General Atomics for the United States Air Force focuses on long-range strike, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities in heavily defended airspaces — akin to a loyal wingman concept for the B-21 Raider bomber. 

Australia’s expertise in the loyal wingman concept developed through the MQ-28A Ghost Bat, combined with the AUKUS agreement and Australia’s significant capability gap in the area of long-range aerial strike means that the MQ-Next program is the perfect fit for addressing this capability requirement providing a platform with the range and suite of capabilities that can enhance the joint nature of the Australian Defence Force. 

The MQ-28A Ghost Bat is designed to fulfil a vastly different role to the proposed MQ-Next program, with the the US Air Force request for information outlining a need for an “envisioned next-generation, medium altitude, long endurance, ISR and strike drone or family of drones”.

Early participation and engagement with the MQ-Next program provides Australia with the opportunity to influence the outcome and the capability profile of the platform, while also benefiting from the economies of scale associated with a larger US Air Force acquisition program — equating to greater value for money for the Royal Australian Air Force in the aerial long-range strike and ISR capability package. 

Robert Dougherty - senior journalist: The Australian government launched the Defence Strategic Review to examine defence force posture, force structure, and capabilities. It presents the biggest vehicle for change of the Australian Defence Force in recent history and to squander that on a new “five-year plan” would be beyond wasteful.

I’d like to see this DSR invest in technology and strategy that presents meaningful international recognition of a nation that is ready to stand up and be counted. With that view clearly in mind, my three priority outcomes for the Defence Strategic Review have to deliver Australia out from the shadow of its international allies:

1. Ground-based strategic deterrent: Like it or not, Australia is going to need an intercontinental ballistic missile program if it wants to be considered a major player in the world.

Missile programs are the preferred long-term strategy used by the most influential countries on this planet and despite public backlash, they ensure relative safety of national interests as a result.

Russia, the United States, China, France, India, the United Kingdom, Israel, and North Korea are all countries known to have operational ICBMs. Excluding Israel and North Korea, they also make up six of the top 12 largest economies by GDP and Australia is the 13th.

An ICBM program is expensive to produce, but it’s a cost that the nation will have to bear to be internationally recognised. It’s also worth remembering we already provide significant early warning capabilities for other countries internationally.

2. Unmanned weapon systems: Unmanned aerial and ground-based systems have been confined to the science-fiction box for far too long and are now coming into the light as the next stage of battlefield weapons.

Hundreds of drones are being sent to the Ukraine-Russo war by both sides of the conflict, and they have proven to be a more substantial instrument of war than ever before.

Turkish drone manufacturer Baykar is already testing their Red Apple jet-powered unmanned combat aerial vehicle, while US science teams like DARPA have a head-start down the path of using artificial intelligence algorithms to pilot aircraft or combine aerial and land drones for OFFensive Swarm-Enabled Tactics in urban areas.

Now is a good time for Australia to start looking at its own options for industry, research and development, funding allocations and acquisitions.

3. Disruptive technologies: It’s impossible to know what form they may take, but I’d like to see some disruptive technologies discussed in the Defence Strategic Review such as encryption/decryption, cyber, and intelligence-based focused projects.

We live in the cyber age, a time period where every system, person, organisation, and country is connected through the internet. Let’s put our foot forward on that front. 

Lessons for Australia’s future strategic planning

There is no doubt that Australia’s position and responsibilities in the Indo-Pacific region will depend on the nation’s ability to sustain itself economically, strategically and politically in the face of rising regional and global competition. Despite the nation’s virtually unrivalled wealth of natural resources, agricultural and industrial potential, there is a lack of a cohesive national security strategy integrating the development of individual, yet complementary public policy strategies to support a more robust Australian role in the region. 

While contemporary Australia has been far removed from the harsh realities of conflict, with many generations never enduring the reality of rationing for food, energy, medical supplies or luxury goods, and even fewer within modern Australia understanding the socio-political and economic impact such rationing would have on the now world-leading Australian standard of living.  

Enhancing Australia’s capacity to act as an independent power, incorporating great power-style strategic economic, diplomatic and military capability serves as a powerful symbol of Australia’s sovereignty and evolving responsibilities in supporting and enhancing the security and prosperity of Indo-Pacific Asia, this is particularly well explained by Peter Zeihan, who explains: “A deglobalised world doesn’t simply have a different economic geography, it has thousands of different and separate geographies. Economically speaking, the whole was stronger for the inclusion of all its parts. It is where we have gotten our wealth and pace of improvement and speed. Now the parts will be weaker for their separation.”

Accordingly, shifting the public discussion and debate away from the default Australian position of “it is all a little too difficult, so let’s not bother” will provide unprecedented economic, diplomatic, political and strategic opportunities for the nation.

As events continue to unfold throughout the region and China continues to throw its economic, political and strategic weight around, can Australia afford to remain a secondary power, or does it need to embrace a larger, more independent role in an era of increasing great power competition?

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