Congressional report into Chinese Navy reinforces major concerns

As the global centre of geopolitical and strategic focus and power pivots away from the traditionally land-locked Western and Central European theatre towards the broad-spectrum maritime dominated Indo-Pacific, decades of “wars of choice” rather than “wars of necessity” have left the US-led world order in a state of disarray.

In stark contrast, across the vast expanse of the Pacific, the Middle Kingdom has doubled down on its decades of economic growth and corresponding influence on the global and regional stage, embarking on the world’s largest peace time modernisation and build-up of the People’s Liberation Army, with the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA-N) now the largest navy in the world, shifting the once second rate, “brown water” navy, to become an increasingly capable “blue water”, global navy.

Naval power is fast re-emerging as the centrestage for great power competition in the 21st century as both the United States and its allies seek to regain ground ceded to China over the course of the period between the beginning of the new millennium and today.

Where the United States Navy and its supporting industrial base were once seen as the unassailable leader and security guarantor for much of the world and the global economy, it now stands as is, a shadow of its former glory.

These issues have been further compounded by extensive rounds of sequestration during the Obama years, the US Navy and its global partners, including Australia, face an increasingly uphill battle to field a range of next-generation capabilities ranging from hypersonic weapons, through to advanced surface and submarine capabilities.

Revealing the true state of circumstances, the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) has released a detailed report, titled, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, outlining major concerns about the rising superpower’s ambitions and capacity to deliver on those designs for regional and global prominence.

At the core of this concern is Beijing’s development of the largest naval force in the world and the rapid narrowing of the qualitative gap between itself and the US and its partners, with the CRS report detailing: “China’s navy is, by far, the largest of any country in East Asia, and sometime between 2015 and 2020 it surpassed the US Navy in numbers of battle force ships (meaning the types of ships that count towards the quoted size of the US Navy).

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DOD states that China’s navy “is the largest navy in the world with a battle force of approximately 340 platforms, including major surface combatants, submarines, ocean-going amphibious ships, mine warfare ships, aircraft carriers, and fleet auxiliaries ... This figure does not include approximately 85 patrol combatants and craft that carry anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM).

“The ... overall battle force [of China’s navy] is expected to grow to 400 ships by 2025 and 440 ships by 2030.” The US Navy, by comparison, included 294 battle force ships at the end of FY2021, and the Navy’s FY2024 budget submission projects that the Navy will include 290 battle force ships by the end of FY2030. US military officials and other observers are expressing concern or alarm regarding the pace of China’s naval shipbuilding effort and resulting trend lines regarding the relative sizes and capabilities of China’s navy and the US Navy.

No matter what way we cut it, we’re on the backfoot

The combination of qualitative and quantitative developments transforming the PLA-N at present represents major challenges to be overcome, something the CRS report highlights: “China’s naval modernisation effort encompasses a wide array of platform and weapon acquisition programs, including anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), submarines, surface ships, aircraft, unmanned vehicles (UVs), and supporting C4ISR (command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) systems. China’s naval modernisation effort also includes improvements in logistics, doctrine, personnel quality, education and training, and exercises.”

Beijing’s emphasis on rapid modernisation and a broader, digital transformation of the broader People’s Liberation Army is seeing the introduction of a suite of advanced capabilities ranging from power projection-focused aircraft carrier and associated strike groups, advanced attack and ballistic missile submarines, through to advanced cyber, quantum computing and precision, hypersonic weapons seeking to undermine, and in some ways, replicate the success of the US and its allies.

At the core of this force structure is a growing focus on Taiwan, and Beijing’s broader ambition to supplant and eventually entirely replace the United States as the premier Indo-Pacific strategic power.

This is highlighted by the CRS, which states, “China’s military modernisation effort, including its naval modernisation effort, is assessed as being aimed at developing capabilities for, among other things, addressing the situation with Taiwan militarily, if need be; achieving a greater degree of control or domination over China’s near-seas region, particularly the South China Sea; enforcing China’s view that it has the right to regulate foreign military activities in its 200-mile maritime exclusive economic zone (EEZ); defending China’s commercial sea lines of communication (SLOCs), particularly those linking China to the Persian Gulf; displacing US influence in the Western Pacific; and asserting China’s status as the leading regional power and a major world power. Additional missions for China’s navy include conducting maritime security (including antipiracy) operations, evacuating Chinese nationals from foreign countries when necessary, and conducting humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR) operations.”

Unpacking this further, the CRS report highlights the emphasis on undermining and supplanting the US in the Indo-Pacific, stating, “Observers believe China wants its navy to be capable of acting as part of an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) force — a force that can deter US intervention in a conflict in China’s near-seas region over Taiwan or some other issue, or failing that, delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of intervening US forces."

In contrast, the US Navy and its allies, including Australia, are facing stagnating or declining defence budgets (in real terms) as a result of increasingly costly technology-heavy platforms, coupled with continuing societal atomisation and disconnection from the principles of liberal democracy, placing increasing strain on their capacity to counter growing Chinese naval capabilities.

This is a sentiment echoed by retired US Navy Captain Sam Tangredi in a detailed analysis conducted for the US Naval Institute, where he states, “Using technological advantage as an indicator of quality, historical research on 28 naval wars (or wars with significant and protracted naval combat) indicates that 25 were won by the side with the larger fleet. When fleet size was roughly equal, superior strategy and substantially better trained and motivated crews carried the day. Only three could be said to have been won by a smaller fleet with superior technology.”

Tangredi reinforced these points further, stating, “The United States can fund a significant fleet that matches the growth of the PLA Navy — or not. Whether the fleet is 250 or 500 ships is for elected officials and the Navy to decide, but those leaders must identify, acknowledge, and own that risk. There is risk in all choices. But there is particularly higher risk in making choices based on unproven assumptions.”

In light of limited US capacity and the fact that Beijing can focus the entirety of its forces in the Indo-Pacific, Australia will face an increasingly competitive region, requiring a rapid departure from the business-as-usual approach that continues to dominate the nation’s defence planning and policy.

Final thoughts